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Abstract 
Psychopathy is associated with severe and violent 
aggressive behaviors, poor treatment outcomes and high 
rates of recidivism. In youth, conduct problems and 
callous/unemotional characteristics are associated with 
characteristics of adulthood psychopathy. Downward 
extending adult criteria to youth is problematic. However, 
there is substantial evidence that adults with psychopathy 
traits began that developmental trajectory in childhood. 
This study adds to the developing literature clarifying the 
construct of psychopathy in youth, including the nature of 
callous/unemotional traits and the relationship to social-
cognitive processes. Results indicate the 
callous/unemotional trait significantly predicted empathic 
concern, perspective taking, cognitive dysregulation, and 
outcome values in obtaining a tangible reward and getting 
in trouble or being punished. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Aggression affects multiple facets of public life 
including crime rates and the social and financial 
functioning of families and communities (Connor, 2002). 
Although juvenile violence has seen an overall decrease 
since the mid 1990’s, it remains at historically high 
levels (Connor, 2002). Public concern continues to rise due 
to recent high profile youth crime witnessed in the 
community such as school shootings (Connor, 2002). 
Regardless of the overall crime decrease, the focus on 
childhood aggression is warranted as researchers have shown 
that adult antisocial behavior begins in childhood (Broidy 
et al., 2003). Further, for those youth demonstrating 
extreme antisocial behaviors, these behaviors are likely to 
continue into adulthood (Loeber, 1982).  
 The extreme antisocial behaviors that account for the 
most severe group of adult offenders are called 
psychopathic traits (Hare, 1993). Psychopathy is associated 
with severe and violent aggressive behaviors, poor 
treatment outcomes and high rates of recidivism (Gacono & 
Hughes, 2004; Hemphill, Hare, & Wong, 1998). The classic 
definition of psychopathy, proposed by Cleckley in 1941, 
includes a constellation of deviant personality traits such 
  
 
2 
as lack of remorse or shame, absence of 
nervousness/psychoneurosis, inadequately motivated 
antisocial behavior, general poverty in major affective 
reactions, and a failure to follow any life plan (Cleckley, 
1941) among sixteen characteristics. In 1993, Hare and 
colleagues updated this definition by separating Cleckley’s 
psychopathic traits into two factors, 1) personality traits 
and 2) antisocial behaviors. Personality traits or Factor 
1, include the characteristics of pathological lying, 
callousness/lack of empathy, lack of remorse of guilt, and 
shallow affect (Hare, 1993) among others. Socially deviant 
behaviors, also known as Factor 2, include poor behavioral 
controls, early behavioral problems, irresponsibility, need 
for stimulation/proneness to boredom, and impulsivity 
(Hare, 1993).  
 Psychopaths comprise 15-30% of criminals in the adult 
offender population (Hare, 1993; Salekin et al., 2004). 
Researchers show that psychopathic offenders commit more 
violent and nonviolent crimes than nonpsychopath offenders 
(Porter, Birt, & Boer, 2001). On average this group begins 
offending in late adolescence with the rate of offending 
remaining at high levels into their late 40s (Porter et 
al., 2001). Because of the reported age of onset, much of 
the research attempting to understand psychopathic traits 
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in children began with retrospective investigations 
conducted with adults categorized by psychopathic traits. 
In a review of retrospective studies concerning psychopathy 
and recidivism, researchers found psychopathic traits 
evidenced in childhood to predict severe and violent 
antisocial behavior in adults (Hemphill et al., 1998). 
These findings suggest psychopathy may be a developmental 
disorder in which specific personality traits can be 
assessed in children (Viding, 2004).  
 Substantial attention has been given to understanding 
psychopathy in children including how the definition 
applies to children, assessment practices, and examining 
the developmental trajectory of risk factors associated 
with violence, aggression and psychopathy (Frick, 1998; 
Lynam, 1997; Salekin, Rogers, & Machin, 2001; Seagrave & 
Grisso, 2002). Simply, downward extending adult criteria to 
youth is problematic. Thus, using a factor analysis Frick 
and colleagues (1994) identified characteristics of 
psychopathy in youth. Two factors emerged in children that 
were related to characteristics found in adults with 
psychopathy including impulsivity/conduct problems and 
callous/unemotional traits (Frick, O’Brien, Wootton, & 
McBurnett, 1994). The impulsivity/conduct problems factor 
consisted of behaviors such as impulsivity, poor impulse 
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control, and delinquent behaviors (Frick et al., 1994) 
similar to Factor 2 reported in adults by Hare (1991). The 
callous/unemotional factor was characterized by lack of 
guilt, lack of empathy, and superficial charm (Frick et 
al., 1994) similar to Factor 1 reported in adults by Hare 
(1991). In a community sample of adolescents, three factors 
emerged including an impulsivity/conduct problems factor, a 
callous/unemotional factor, and a narcissism factor (Frick, 
Bodin, & Barry, 2000). Although the narcissism factor has 
appeared in these samples, researchers conceptualize it as 
a condition for a subtype of psychopathy and not 
necessarily a main factor (Poythress & Skeem, 2006). With 
adults, narcissistic personality disorder typically loads 
on the first factor of psychopathy (Harpur, Hare, & 
Hakstian,, 1989). Narcissistic characteristics that are 
found on the first factor include such traits as a 
grandiose sense of self-importance, arrogant self-
appraisal, lack of empathy, an unwillingness to recognize 
or identify with feelings or needs of others, and 
interpersonal exploitation (Widiger, 2006). Narcissism’s 
relationship to psychopathy remains unclear requiring 
further investigation. 
 The prevalence of psychopathy in the young offender 
population has been estimated at 21.5%, similar to the 15-
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30% estimate for adults (Salekin et al., 2004). Early 
identification of these youth could influence the safety of 
communities and aid in the understanding of the etiology, 
development, and treatment regimens of psychopaths (Gacono 
& Hughes, 2004; Lynam, 1997; Salekin et al., 2004).   
 In an attempt to further understand the nature of 
individuals with psychopathy, social cognitive processes 
have been examined. Social cognitive processes are defined 
as the mechanisms that lead to social behaviors that are 
the basis of social adjustment evaluations made by others 
(Crick & Dodge, 1994). The Center for Disease Control 
(2005) identified social cognitive deficits as a risk 
factor for increasing the probability of violence during 
adolescence and young adulthood. Researchers argue that 
examining social cognitions of children will help explain 
the construct of psychopathy in youth. That is, impaired 
social cognition offers a possible explanation for the 
evidence of persistent conduct problems of children with 
significant psychopathic, or in terms consistent with Frick 
and colleagues’ (1994) work, callous/unemotional (CU) 
traits. Pardini et al., (2003) demonstrated children high 
on CU traits had significant difficulty in modifying their 
social cognitions for goal-driven behavior when punished. 
Specifically, they concluded this group of children may 
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have trouble considering the probability of various 
outcomes, particularly when outcomes are negative, of their 
antisocial behavior (Pardini, Lochman, & Frick, 2003). 
Further, some research shows individuals with significant 
psychopathic traits demonstrate adequate intellect (e.g., 
cognitive abilities) (Loney, Frick, Ellis, and McCoy, 1998; 
Newman & Wallace, 1993), are free from symptoms of a 
thought disorder yet frequently fail to utilize good 
judgment in decision-making (Newman & Wallace, 1993). These 
results highlighted the need to clarify the connection 
between psychopathic traits and social cognition.  Second, 
errors made in social-information processing are a 
consistent finding in the development and maintenance of 
delinquent behavior in antisocial children who are not 
evidencing psychopathy (Dodge, Lochman, Harnish, Bates, & 
Pettit, 1997). Thus, a more complete understanding of how 
psychopathic traits in youth (also termed 
callous/unemotional & impulsivity and conduct problems) are 
related to social-information processing is needed.  
 Most of the research samples examining psychopathy 
utilize individuals who are incarcerated, likely because of 
the availability of these offenders (Kirkman, 2002). 
However, not all psychopaths are recidivist criminals in 
incarcerated settings (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 1993). Some 
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psychopaths have no criminal record at all but are members 
of our communities and neighborhoods (Hare, 1993). It is 
necessary to study those individuals who demonstrate 
psychopathic traits and who are capable of avoiding the 
prisons and jails in order to fully understand the 
psychopathic personality (Hare, 1993; Kirkman, 2002). In 
regard to children, researchers examining clinic-referred 
and forensic samples generate mixed results in terms of 
whether the callous/unemotional traits found in 
incarcerated samples are characteristic of all antisocial 
youth (Frick, Cornell, Bodin, Dane, Barry, & Loney, 2003). 
Studying psychopathy in a community sample of aggressive 
youth offers the prospect of expanding the knowledge 
concerning the definition of psychopathy but also this 
study assists in gaining more information concerning 
various types of social cognition in children (Kirkman, 
2002). If children with psychopathic traits can be 
correctly identified, then the social environment of a 
school would be an excellent place to study the functioning 
of the psychopaths who are, according to Lynam (1997), the 
“truly successful or noninstitutionalized people”. It is 
also possible that by studying individuals who display 
psychopathic traits but do not demonstrate a level of 
behavior requiring incarceration, researchers can start to 
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distinguish the traits that are specific to psychopathy 
from those primarily related to criminality (Kirkman, 2002; 
Lynam, 1997). That is, differentiating traits related to a 
personality structure (e.g., Factor 1) from those that are 
mostly behavioral (e.g., Factor 2; Gacono & Hughes, 2004). 
 The purpose of the current study was to expand 
previous research conducted by Pardini and colleagues in 
2003. Pardini and colleagues (2003) examined the definition 
of psychopathy in a sample of adjudicated youth as well as 
its relationship to social-cognitive processes. The current 
study sought to clarify how the findings from an 
incarcerated sample of youth who exhibited various levels 
of psychopathy are comparable to youth who require 
treatment for aggression outside of the scope of services 
typically provided by a student’s home school district but 
who do not require incarceration. The current study 
examined psychopathy, via callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissistic traits as 
they related to social-cognitive processes (e.g., values 
and outcome expectations) on a range of social 
interactions/events in a community sample of children with 
behavioral and emotional difficulties. The narcissism 
factor was included in this study as a preliminary 
investigation of the psychopathy factor structure in the 
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current community sample due to the investigation which 
identified narcissism as a distinct factor in a community 
sample of 1,136 elementary school-age children (Frick, 
Bodin, & Barry, 2000). 
 The current study contributed to the literature base 
in a number of ways. Specifically, the current study 
further clarified the definition of psychopathy in a subset 
of youth who require treatment for aggression in an 
alternative education center. Lack of empathy is often 
referred to as a key developmental component in the 
development of the callous/unemotional trait (Frick et al., 
1994; Hare, 1991, 1993; Cleckley, 1941). Thus, examining 
empathy as it related to callous/unemotional factor helped 
to clarify and distinguish the callous/unemotional factor 
from the impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism 
factors.  
Dysregulated behaviors also referred to as behavioral 
and cognitive impulsivity (Loeber et al., 2001) or 
behavioral, emotional, and cognitive dysregulation 
(Mezzich, et al., 1997), characterize children with conduct 
problems (Loeber, 1982; Frick et al., 1994); however, 
dysregulated behaviors alone do not distinguish groups of 
antisocials (Frick et al., 2003). Also, children presenting 
with both callous/unemotional traits and dysregulated 
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behaviors are those who present as similar to the profile 
of an adult psychopath (Frick et al., 2003). Thus, 
examining dysregulation was an important part of clarifying 
the construct of child psychopathy. 
Finally, behavioral inhibition, also referred to as 
fearfulness (Pardini et al., 2003), is associated with 
increased levels of the impulsivity/conduct problems factor 
of psychopathy (Frick, Lilienfield, Ellis, Loney, & 
Silverhorn, 1999; Pardini et al., 2003). Similarly, 
fearfulness is related to decreased levels of the 
callous/unemotional factor (Pardini et al., 2003). Thus, 
examining behavioral inhibition assisted in further 
clarifying childhood psychopathy and helped distinguish the 
impulsivity/conduct problems, callous/unemotional traits, 
and narcissism factors. In summary, by examining the 
contribution of the callous/unemotional factor, 
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissistic traits as 
they related to important developmental tasks such as 
empathy, behavior regulation and adequate management of 
behavioral inhibition (fear) contributed to the literature 
defining psychopathy.  
The examination of the role of the psychopathic traits 
and social-cognitive processes also contributed to the 
current literature. Specifically, the use of the 
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callous/unemotional trait, impulsivity/conduct problems 
factor, and narcissism factor in explaining variance in 
outcome expectations and values when engaging in aggressive 
behaviors to obtain tangible rewards, reduce aversive 
treatment, avoid punishment, and portray dominance helped 
to expand and clarify earlier findings.    
 Four research questions were investigated in the 
current study. Generally, the current study hypothesized 
that the community sample would demonstrate similar, yet 
less severe patterns of psychopathy and callous/unemotional 
symptoms while evidencing similar impulsivity/conduct 
problems as the incarcerated sample of youth found in the 
Pardini and colleagues’ 2003 study. Due to conflicting 
research, it was unclear how the narcissism factor would 
project in this study (Frick et al., 2000; Harpur et al., 
1989).   
 Specifically, the first research question investigated 
how much variance the callous/unemotional factor explained 
in both emotional (personal distress and empathic concern) 
and cognitive (perspective taking) empathy and likewise, 
how much variance the impulsivity/conduct problems factor 
explained in both emotional (personal distress and empathic 
concern) and cognitive (perspective taking) empathy and how 
much variance the narcissism factor explained in both 
  
 
12 
emotional (personal distress and empathic concern) and 
cognitive (perspective taking) empathy? The current study 
hypothesized that the callous/unemotional trait would 
predict emotional and cognitive empathy; however, the 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor would not. Because the 
narcissism factor has been found to load on Factor 1 of 
Hare’s two factor model (1993) as does the 
callous/unemotional factor (Harpur et al., 1989), it was 
hypothesized that the narcissistic factor may share 
variance with the callous/unemotional trait in predicting 
emotional and cognitive empathy. However, in the one study 
where the narcissism factor emerged in the community 
sample, the narcissism traits were more closely related to 
measures of impulsivity/conduct problems (Frick et al., 
2000). Therefore, it was also possible that the narcissism 
factor, similar to the hypothesis concerning the 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor, would not predict 
cognitive or emotional empathy.   
 The second research question examined whether the 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor predicted dysregulated 
behaviors (behavioral, cognitive, and emotional), the 
callous/unemotional factor predicted dysregulated behaviors 
(behavioral, cognitive, and emotional), and the narcissism 
factor predicted dysregulated behaviors (behavioral, 
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cognitive, and emotional)? It was hypothesized that 
impulsivity/conduct problems would explain variance in the 
dysregulated behaviors variables including behavioral, 
emotional, and cognitive dysregulation; however, the 
callous/unemotional factor would not. Again, previous 
findings were unclear concerning the narcissistic factor; 
therefore, it was unclear whether the narcissism factor 
would explain variance in dysregulated behaviors, as 
hypothesized with the impulsivity/conduct problems factor, 
or would not, as hypothesized with the callous/unemotional 
factor.  
 The third research question investigated how much 
variance in behavioral inhibition or fearfulness was 
uniquely explained by the callous/unemotional, 
impulsivity/conduct problems factors, and narcissism 
factor? It was hypothesized that the callous/unemotional 
trait would not explain variance within the behavioral 
inhibition or fearfulness variable and in fact would 
demonstrate a negative relationship; whereas, the 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor would predict 
behavioral inhibition/fearfulness. Again, previous findings 
were unclear concerning the narcissistic factor; therefore, 
it was unclear whether the narcissism factor would explain 
variance in behavioral inhibition, as hypothesized with the 
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impulsivity/conduct problems factor, or would not, as 
hypothesized with the callous/unemotional factor.    
 Finally, did callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissistic traits 
independently predict social-cognitive processes in 
community youth displaying aggressive behaviors? It was 
hypothesized that the callous/unemotional factor, but not 
the impulsivity/conduct problems factor would predict a 
higher value placed on aggressive acts and a disregard for 
the negative consequences of aggressive behavior. More 
specifically, the callous/unemotional factor would predict 
increased expectations and values associated with the 
positive outcomes of aggressive behavior and decreased 
expectations and values associated with the negative 
consequences for aggressive behavior. It was expected that 
the impulsivity/conduct problems factor would not be 
related to the outcome expectations or values. Again, 
previous findings were unclear concerning the narcissism 
factor; therefore, it was unclear whether the narcissism 
factor would explain variance in social cognition, as 
hypothesized with the callous/unemotional factor, or would 
not, as hypothesized with the impulsivity/conduct problems 
factor. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
General Aggression 
 Aggression research is essential because of its 
negative effects on an individual’s development, family 
cohesion, the social and financial cost to local, state, 
and federal agencies and the overall quality of life 
indicators such as crime rates, community safety(Connor, 
2002). Recently the focus on understanding aggression in 
children and adolescents has increased from public concern 
over school shootings, to community delinquency such as 
gang activity and anecdotal cases highlighted in the media 
of families, to unrecognized and untreated mental illness 
and violence in youth (Connor, 2002). The study of 
aggression is complicated as various terms apply to the 
same construct or one term has divergent definitions 
depending on the field of study. Terms that are often used 
to describe aggression include violence, delinquency, 
oppositionality, criminality, conduct-disorder, antisocial 
behavior, psychopathic or sociopathic behavior (Connor, 
2002).  Webster’s College Dictionary (2002) defines 
aggression as a forceful action or procedure, especially an 
unprovoked attack; hostile, injurious, or destructive 
behavior or outlook especially when caused by frustration. 
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The criminal justice field defines aggression or antisocial 
behaviors as an act that violates the rules and laws of 
society; an act that is illegal, no matter what the age of 
the perpetrator (Steiner & Cauffman, 1998). Clinical 
definitions often refer to childhood aggression as 
synonymous with the DSM’s diagnosis conduct disorder (APA, 
1994). Psychometric based definitions may refer to 
externalizing behaviors as aggressive as compared to 
internalizing behaviors (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978; 
Naglieri, LeBuffe, & Pfeiffer, 1994). Psychometrically, 
aggression is a type of externalizing behavior 
characterized by impulsive, hyperactive, delinquent and 
aggressive behaviors (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978; Naglieri 
et al, 1994). Personality and Social Psychology definitions 
categorize extreme aggression as antisocial personality 
disorder and/or sociopathic/psychopathic personality (APA, 
1994). Obviously, aggression is an enormously heterogeneous 
and broad category of behavior that is defined in several 
ways. In addition to definitional differences, there are 
multiple ways aggressive behaviors can be subdivided into 
meaningful categories 
 First it is important to distinguish adaptive and 
maladaptive aggression. Not all aggression serves the same 
purpose (Connor, 2002). Adaptive aggression occurs in the 
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service of ensuring the integrity or survival of the 
individual (Connor, 2002). It is a behavioral expression of 
intact internal mechanisms (e.g., biological, 
psychological, cognitive, and emotional) utilized across 
environments to compete for resources or defend oneself to 
ensure survival (Wakefield, 1992). Although adaptive 
aggression is recognized as a natural human process, and is 
described in the research, maladaptive aggression is the 
central focus of psychological research and concern in 
society (Connor, 2002). Maladaptive aggression does not 
occur in the service of an individual or group and is an 
expression of a disordered internal mechanism, usually the 
central nervous system, across a range of environments 
(Wakefield, 1992). Maladaptive aggression transpires 
independently of typical social contexts, occurs in the 
absence of antecedent social cues, and is 
disproportionately intense, frequent, severe and long 
lasting without appropriate termination (Connor, 2002).  
Classifications of Maladaptive Aggression 
 Maladaptive aggression is routinely described by one 
of six categories. Although each has a different name, many 
of the categories are quite similar. The differences 
between category labels are related to preference of the 
author/field or theoretical perspective than the actual 
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aggressive behaviors described. One dichotomy is offensive 
vs. defensive aggression found in neurobiological research 
on animals (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984). Offensive 
aggression is defined as an unprovoked attack on another 
and arises out of a challenge over obtaining a scant 
resource (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984)). Defensive 
aggression, is provoked and in response to a threatening 
situation (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984). The applicability 
of these aggression styles to human behavior is largely 
theoretical (Connor, 2002). Pulkkinen (1987) conducted one 
of the only empirically based tests of offensive-defensive 
aggression with 196 boys and 173 girls, average age 8 years 
3 months. The study defined offensive aggression as 
unprovoked verbal or physical attack on another child and 
defensive aggression as an angry reaction to an irritation 
(Pulkkinen, 1987). Peer nominations and teacher rating 
scales were utilized in order to define/categorize 
aggressive behavior shown in the classroom (Pulkkinen, 
1987). The study assumed that aggressive and nonaggressive 
behaviors could be categorized into the dimensions, Social-
Activity (offensive)-Social Passivity (defensive) 
(defensive) or Strong Control of Behavior (offensive)-Weak 
Control of Behavior (defensive). The findings of the study 
did not support the defensive vs. offensive aggression 
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dichotomy; all aggressive behaviors fell within the 
quadrant, Social Activity and Weak Control of Behavior 
(Pulkkinen, 1987).  
 A second category is relational aggression. Relational 
aggression is defined as angrily excluding a peer from the 
group, purposely ending a friendship to reject a peer, 
spreading rumors, indirectly retaliating toward a peer by 
having other friends exclude or reject someone and tattling 
(Crick & Grotpeter, 1995; Crick & Werner, 1998; Hood, 
1996). Typically, when children use relational aggression 
they focus on ways to undermine the goals valued by 
respective peers (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995; Crick & Werner, 
1998; Hood, 1996). Higher rates of relational aggression 
are reported in females when compared to males (Bjorkqvist, 
Osterman, & Kaukiainen, 1992). Researchers hypothesize that 
girls tend to focus on relational issues in their social 
interactions; thus their aggression will reflect these 
themes (Bjorkqvist et al., 1992; Crick & Grotpeter, 1995).  
 A third classification of aggression is overt vs. 
covert aggression. Overt aggression is an openly 
confrontational act of physical aggression (Achenbach, 
Conners, Quay, Verhulst, & Howell, 1989; Loeber & 
Schmaling, 1985; Waschbusch, 2002). Examples include 
physical fighting, bullying, using weapons, open defiance 
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of rules (Achenbach et al., 1989; Loeber & Schmaling, 
1985), annoying others, temper tantrums, arguing with 
others, being stubborn, and being easily touchy or annoyed 
(Waschbusch, 2002). Covert aggression is any hidden, 
furtive, and clandestine act of aggression (Achenbach et 
al., 1989; Loeber & Schmaling, 1985). Covert aggression is 
non-confrontational and those engaging in this type of 
aggression tend to be more socially withdrawn, anxious, and 
have internalizing problems (Waschbusch, 2002). Examples 
include stealing, fire setting, truancy, and running away 
(Achenbach et al., 1989; Loeber & Schmaling, 1985; 
Waschbusch, 2002). Oppositional defiant behaviors often lie 
at the midpoint between overt and covert aggression 
(Connor, 2002).  
 Reactive vs. proactive aggression is another 
aggression category. The theoretical roots for these 
constructs lie in social-psychological research on 
aggression in humans (Connor, 2002). Reactive aggression 
occurs when a frustrating or threatening event triggers an 
aggressive act and induces anger (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 
2005). Here aggression is an angry, defensive response to 
threat, frustration, or provocation (Crick & Dodge, 1996) 
sometimes termed “hot blooded” aggression (Waschbusch, 
2002). The goal of reactive aggression is solely to defend 
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oneself against a perceived threat or to inflict harm on a 
source of frustration (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & 
Sears, 1939). Children who are categorized as reactive in 
their aggression report early experiences of physical 
abuse, and ongoing hostile attributions, which is the 
tendency to view the world as negative, out to get you and 
dangerous (Waschbusch, 2002). Physiologically and 
behaviorally, reactive aggression is characterized by 
intense central nervous system autonomatic arousal, 
irritability, fear or anger, and frenzied, unplanned 
attacks on the object of frustration (Dodge, 1991). The 
Basic Threat Circuitry is the neural circuitry implicated 
in the expression of reactive aggression and is used for 
response to basic (real or perceived) threats in the 
environment (Greg & Siegal, 2001; Panksepp, 1998). 
Stimulated at low levels from a distant threat the Basic 
Threat Circuitry initializes a freezing response (Blair, 
Mitchell, & Blair, 2005; Blanchard, Blanchard, & Takahashi, 
1977). At higher levels of stimulation from a more proximal 
threat, the system initializes escape-related behaviors and 
at even higher levels of stimulation when escape is 
impossible, the basic threat circuitry initiates reactive 
aggression (Blair et al., 2005; Blanchard et al., 1977).  
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 Proactive aggression is non-impulsive, planned “cold 
blooded” aggression (Waschbusch, 2002). It is associated 
with a learning history where aggressive behavior is found 
to be a viable means to obtain a goal (Waschbusch, 2002). 
Those engaging in proactive aggression report overly 
positive evaluations of the outcomes of their aggressive 
acts (Waschbusch, 2002). Proactive aggression highly 
resembles instrumental aggression discussed in detail 
below. 
 Instrumental vs. hostile aggression encompasses 
another subdivision of the aggression construct. Hostile 
aggression occurs with the intention to inflict injury or 
pain upon a victim, with little advantage to the aggressor 
(Connor, 2002). Instrumental aggression is purposeful and 
goal directed (Dodge, 1991). The goal is not usually the 
pain of the victim but rather the victim’s possessions or 
to increase one’s status within a hierarchy (Blair et al., 
2005). This type of aggression is highly organized, 
patterned, and directed toward the promise of a reward 
(Dodge, 1991). Physiologically and behaviorally, there is 
little central nervous system arousal, irritability, anger, 
or fear (Connor, 2002). According to Bandura (1973), 
instrumental aggression is learned through reinforced 
social role modeling and positive outcomes for aggressive 
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behaviors in social settings. Most antisocial behavior is 
goal directed (Blair et al., 2005). 
 The research shows mixed support for the instrumental 
vs. hostile aggression dichotomy (Hartup & de Wit, 1974; 
Rule, 1974; Willis & Foster, 1990).  First there is overlap 
between the behavioral reactions of instrumental and 
hostile acts with both instrumental and hostile reactions 
demonstrated in many aggressive incidents (Hartup & de Wit, 
1974). Second, in studies examining children’s social 
perceptions, children perceive episodes of instrumental and 
hostile aggression similarly and evaluate both as equally 
problematic and negative (Rule, 1974; Willis & Foster, 
1990). Other studies report that a child’s behavior can 
differentiate the two constructs (Hartup, 1974).  
Examining aggression in preschoolers and elementary school 
children Hartup (1974) found that hostile aggression 
increased with age while instrumental aggression decreased. 
Also, boys demonstrated more hostile reactions as compared 
to girls (Hartup, 1974). Moreover, clinically referred 
children evidence this distinction (Atkins & Stoff, 1993; 
Atkins, Stoff, Osborne, & Brown, 1993). On two studies with 
adolescent boys referred for disruptive behavior disorders, 
researchers found an association between impulsivity and 
hostile aggression but not instrumental aggression, 
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offering more support for the distinction (Atkins & Stoff, 
1993; Atkins et al., 1993). Generally, it appears that a 
distinction between hostile and instrumental aggression is 
supported in terms of children’s behavior but may not be 
evident in social peer perception.  
 A distinction that mirrors the differentiation between 
instrumental/proactive and reactive aggression is that of 
predatory vs. affective aggression. The theoretical roots 
of this distinction lie in neurobiological research on 
aggression in animals (Connor, 2002). Predatory aggression, 
similar to instrumental and proactive aggression, is 
defined as a motivated, goal-oriented behavior executed 
with planning by the animal with good motor control and low 
autonomic nervous system arousal (Eichelman, 1987; Moyer, 
1976). Affective aggression on the other hand is similar to 
the description of reactive aggression. Simply, it is a 
reaction to a threat. This threat may be directed toward 
the animal itself, its young, or its territory (Eichelman, 
1987; Moyer, 1976). The goal of affective aggression as in 
reactive aggression is defensive and includes an unplanned 
attack, poor motor control, and high anatomic nervous 
system arousal (Connor, 2002).  
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Aggression in the Current Study 
 It is apparent from this review that differences in 
aggression terminology simply lie in the population 
examined, wording, or theoretical perspective. Most types 
of aggression depicted can be divided into reactive 
(hostile and affective) and instrumental (predatory and 
proactive) aggression. A unitary model with dichotomous 
terminology is helpful when discussing aggression simply 
for conceptualization; however, Loeber and Stouthamer-
Loeber (1998) argue that “a unitary model of externalizing 
problems does not adequately account for types of 
delinquent offenders (e.g., overt, violent offenders vs. 
covert, minor delinquents) or differences in terms of time 
of onset and differential life-course trajectories among 
offender subtypes” (p.243).  
 Subsequently, not all aggressive individuals will fall 
nicely into one category or the other. The current study 
focuses on aggression found at the extreme end of the 
distribution of antisocial individuals, specifically those 
exhibiting psychopathic personality traits, and proposes a 
type of aggression that combines instrumental and reactive 
aggression, with the instrumental aggression remaining the 
dominant means of negative interactions.  
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Research has offered support for two major categories 
of aggressive individuals, those engaging in solely 
reactive aggression and those demonstrating high frequency 
of both instrumental and reactive aggression (Barratt et 
al., 1999; Connor, 2002; Crick & Dodge, 1996; Linnoila et 
al., 1983). Those individuals who engage in primarily 
reactive aggression demonstrate an indifference to 
conventional rules (Blair et al., 2005). The description of 
reactive, hostile, and affective aggression previously 
discussed also applies to these individuals. Individuals 
evidencing both reactive and instrumental aggression are 
indifferent to moral transgressions and demonstrate little 
guilt or empathy with their victims (Blair et al., 2005). 
In addition to demonstrating the reactive, hostile, and 
affective aggression defined earlier, these individuals 
more predominantly exhibit instrumental, proactive, and 
predatory characteristics of aggression.  
Consistent with the second category of aggressive 
individuals, those individuals who demonstrate psychopathic 
personality present with elevated levels of instrumental 
aggression (Woodworth & Porter, 2002). The behavior of the 
psychopath is often motivated by distinct goals rather than 
emotional reactions. This coincides with the lack of 
emotional reactivity often associated with the classic 
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psychopath (Cleckley, 1976). Woodworth and Porter (2002) 
investigated whether psychopaths engage in more 
instrumental or reactive aggression. They found that 
psychopaths were more likely to engage in instrumental 
violence than nonpsychopaths with almost all of the 
psychopaths committing instrumental homicidal violence 
rather than impulsive homicidal violence. Other researchers 
found similar results with psychopathic offenders being 
motivated more by material gain and not by heightened 
emotional arousal as well as exhibiting a higher likelihood 
to engage in instrumental violence than reactive violence 
(Cornell, Warren, Hawk, Stafford, Oram, & Pine, 1996). 
However, other researchers argue individuals with 
psychopathy demonstrate high levels of both reactive and 
instrumental aggression (Cornell et al., 1996; Williamson 
et al., 1987) and speculate because psychopathy is 
associated with high impulsivity this suggests psychopaths 
may engage in reactive aggression if subjected to 
provocation (Woodworth & Porter, 2002).  
Prevalence of Aggression 
 Aggression is not a recent concern in terms of 
children and adolescents (Connor, 2002). Over the past 50 
years, rates of maladaptive aggression and antisocial 
behaviors increased in frequency and severity among 
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children and adolescents in the United States (Connor, 
2002). Juvenile violence peaked in the 1980’s and early 
1990’s (Loeber & Hay, 1997; Waschbusch, 2002). Although it 
has been decreasing since the middle 1990’s, juvenile 
violence continues to remain at historically high levels 
(Connor, 2002). Estimates suggest that a small proportion 
of adolescents (6-8%) are responsible for a large 
proportion (60-85%) of serious criminal acts (Cruise, 
Colwell, Lyons, & Baker, 2003). Between 1993 and 2003, 
juveniles were involved, as victims or offenders, in 38% of 
all violent crimes in which the victim could estimate the 
age of the offender (OJJDP, 2005). According to the 
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and the 
Supplementary Homicide Reports from the FBI, four out of 
five violent victimizations of younger teens aged 12-14 
involved offenders perceived to be juveniles (OJJDP, 2005). 
Homicide is the second leading cause of death in 15-19 year 
olds (CDC, 2005; Loeber & Hay, 1997) and the leading cause 
of death in African Americans between the ages of 15 and 19 
(CDC, 2005). It is evident from these statistics that 
although juvenile violence appears to be decreasing, it 
continues to be a serious problem for society. It should 
also be noted that the statistics recorded do not encompass 
all episodes of aggression that occur everyday in schools 
  
 
29 
and communities. Aggression does not always result in a 
statistic but does have largely negative effects on 
children, families, schools, and communities.  
Stability of Aggression 
 For the past 80 years, an abundance of research has 
addressed the early-onset of aggressive/antisocial 
behaviors (Connor, 2002). Research demonstrates that adult 
antisocial behavior is evidenced in childhood (Broidy et 
al., 2003; Loeber, 1982; Waschbusch, 2002). In a study 
examining developmental trajectories of childhood 
delinquency, Broidy et al. (2003) found that physical 
aggression in male children is a distinct predictor of 
later violent delinquency and is the most consistent 
predictor of both violent and nonviolent offending in 
adolescence. Youth demonstrating extreme antisocial 
behavior have the greatest likelihood of continuing 
antisocial behavior (Loeber, 1982). The earlier the 
antisocial behaviors/conduct problems are established the 
more stable they will be with estimates of 50% of those 
individuals with early behavior/conduct problems remaining 
antisocial into adolescence and adulthood (Waschbusch, 
2002). As adults, these children engage in more murder, 
robbery, rape, and arson, are more likely to exhibit 
multiple offences, and be incarcerated compared to those 
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who develop late onset conduct problems (Waschbusch, 2002). 
For later onset of conduct problems, the stability seems to 
be less predictable and has been shown to decrease and end 
in young adulthood (Waschbusch, 2002).     
  Furthermore, those children demonstrating chronic 
delinquency displayed antisocial behavior in more than one 
setting, demonstrated a higher variety of antisocial 
behaviors, and showed an earlier onset of these behaviors 
(Loeber, 1982). Loeber (1982) also found that the patterns 
of antisocial behavior tend to change during preadolescence 
and adolescence with the number of youth engaging in overt 
antisocial acts declining between the ages of 6 and 16; 
whereas, the number of youths engaging in covert antisocial 
acts increases. 
Risk Factors for Aggression 
 Many factors influence aggression including 
environmental, emotional, and cognitive factors. 
Environmental aspects include such issues as divorce, job 
loss, birth of siblings, stress, SES, a history of 
aggression, parental psychopathology, exposure to violence, 
and ineffective parenting (CDC, 2005; Connor, 2002). 
Emotional precursors include difficult temperament, poor 
attachment, and poor emotional regulation (Connor, 2002; 
Loeber & Hay, 1997). Cognitive antecedents include low 
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intelligence, reading problems, attention problems, social 
cognitive deficits, mental scripts, favorable attitudes 
toward aggression, rejection sensitivity, and inflated 
self-esteem (CDC, 2005; Loeber & Hay, 2005). A complete 
discussion of each of these risk factors is beyond the 
scope of this paper. What is evident from the listing is 
that multiple risk factors exist, there is not a single 
pattern or combination that predicts aggression or 
violence, and the presence of protective factors may 
influence the development of later aggression (Connor, 
2002). 
Psychopathology of Aggression 
 The development of aggression and similar behaviors is 
one of the most common reasons children and adolescents are 
psychiatrically referred to mental health settings (Connor, 
2002). Aggression, disruptive behaviors, and antisocial 
behaviors viewed as severely maladaptive may be considered 
for mental health diagnoses. Disorders are classified by 
two predominant methods. The American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) utilizes criteria presented in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV 
(DSM-IV; APA, 1994) and the World Health Organization (WHO) 
classifies psychiatric illness according to the 
International Classification of Diseases, which is in its 
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10th revision (ICD-10; WHO, 1992). The current paper 
utilizes the DSM-IV’s descriptions of disruptive behavior 
disorders.  
 The DSM-IV (APA, 1994) describes a number of 
disruptive behavior disorders including oppositional 
defiant disorder, conduct disorder, and antisocial 
personality disorder (DSM-IV; APA, 1994). These disorders 
comprise the diagnoses most commonly associated with the 
development of aggression in children, adolescents, and 
adults. Each is described briefly below.  
 Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) is depicted in the 
DSM-IV (APA, 1994) as a recurrent pattern of negativistic, 
defiant, disobedient, and hostile behavior toward authority 
figures that persists for at least 6 months, is 
characterized by frequent arguments with adults, defying or 
refusing to comply with adults, deliberately annoying 
others, being easily annoyed, being angry or resentful, and 
being spiteful or vindictive. A diagnosis of ODD requires 
that the behaviors occur more often than typically seen in 
individuals of a similar age and developmental level (APA, 
1994). The behaviors must also lead to significant 
impairment in social, academic, or occupational functioning 
(APA, 1994). The diagnosis of ODD is not made if the 
behaviors occur exclusively during the course of a 
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Psychotic or Mood disorder or if the behaviors meet the 
criteria for a diagnosis of Conduct Disorder or Antisocial 
Personality Disorder (APA, 1994). An individual is usually 
identified as a child with ODD before the age of 8 and 
typically no later than early adolescence (APA, 1994). ODD 
is often a developmental antecedent to a diagnosis of 
conduct disorder; however, although it is a precursor to 
Conduct Disorder, not all children with ODD will develop 
Conduct Disorder (APA, 1994; Greene et al., 2002). 
  Conduct Disorder (CD) is defined as a repetitive and 
persistent pattern of behavior in which the basic rights of 
others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are 
violated and in which antisocial behaviors are exhibited to 
the extreme given the individuals’ developmental level 
(APA, 1994; Salekin et al., 2002). At least 3 of the 
following behaviors must be evident in the past 12 months 
with at least one present for at least 6 months: aggression 
to people and animals, destruction of property, 
deceitfulness or theft, and serious violations of rules 
(APA, 1994). The disturbance in behavior must cause 
clinically significant impairment in social, academic, or 
occupational functioning and if the individual is 18 or 
older, the symptoms do not meet the criteria for Antisocial 
Personality Disorder (APA, 1994).  
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 CD is subtyped by the age of onset into Childhood-
Onset Type and Adolescent-Onset Type (APA, 1994). 
Childhood-Onset Type is defined by the onset of at least 
one criterion before the age of 10 years old (APA, 1994). 
These children are usually male, exhibit frequent physical 
aggression toward others, have disturbed peer 
relationships, may have previously been diagnosed with ODD, 
and typically demonstrate symptoms meeting full criteria CD 
before puberty (APA, 1994). Individuals with Childhood-
Onset Type are more likely to have persistent CD and to 
develop adult Antisocial Personality Disorder than those 
with Adolescent-Onset Type (APA, 1994). Adolescent-Onset 
Type is defined by the onset of at least one criterion 
after the age of 10 years (APA, 1994). These children are 
less likely than those with Childhood-Onset Type to display 
aggressive behaviors and are more likely to have more 
normative peer relationships (APA, 1994). These individuals 
are less likely to have persistent CD or to develop adult 
Antisocial Personality Disorder (APA, 1994).   
 Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) is 
characterized by four criteria. First, at least three of 
the following must be present since the age of 15 for the 
diagnosis of ASPD: failure to conform to social norms, 
deceitfulness/lies, impulsivity, irritability and 
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aggressiveness/fights and assaults, reckless disregard for 
safety of self or others, irresponsibility, and lack of 
remorse (APA, 1994). Second and third, the individual’s 
current age must be at least 18 and he/she has previously 
held a diagnosis of Conduct Disorder with onset before age 
15 (APA, 1994). Finally, the antisocial behavior must not 
occur exclusively during schizophrenia or manic episodes 
(APA, 1994). This pattern of behavior has also been 
referred to as dissocial personality disorder, sociopathy, 
and psychopathy (APA, 1994). Of specific concern in this 
paper is the inclusion of psychopathic personality disorder 
under the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.    
 The diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder is 
based largely on a pervasive pattern of antisocial 
behaviors. This fails to take into account the personality 
dimension argued to be an essential element in describing 
psychopaths (Gacono & Hughes, 2004). A purely behavioral 
definition of psychopathy identifies the disorder through a 
history of chronic antisocial behaviors without examining 
these behaviors for antisocial personality dimensions 
(Viding, 2004). Examining both affective and interpersonal 
traits and not simply antisocial behaviors, facilitates a 
more thorough understanding of psychopathic and 
nonpsychopathic criminals (Gacono, Loving, & Bodholdt, 
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2001). It has been argued that the exclusive behavioral 
definition allows for the overdiagnosis of psychopathy in 
criminals and an underdiagnosis in non-criminals (Viding, 
2004). 
 Conceptualizing psychopathy as consisting of two-
factors, personality traits and behaviors, results in 
conflicting base rates for psychopathy and ASPD (Gacono et 
al., 2001). Rates of ASPD in the community are estimated at 
5.8% for men and 1.2% for women; however, in forensic 
populations, 50-80% of the individuals meet the criteria 
for an ASPD diagnosis (Gacono et al., 2001). Interestingly, 
only 15-25% of the same forensic population will classify 
as psychopaths (Gacono et al., 2001). Gacono et al. (2001) 
argued that ASPD and psychopathy are not equivalent and 
that when compared, ASPD is more heterogeneous. The ASPD 
diagnosis could be arrived at by an unlimited combination 
of the criteria and some have estimated a possible 27 
trillion combinations (Rogers and Dion, 1991). This leads 
to extremely different individuals being included together 
under a single diagnosis (Gacono et al., 2001). Gacono and 
Hughes (2004) explained that most psychopaths meet ASPD 
criteria but most individuals with an ASPD diagnosis are 
not psychopaths. Contrary to ASPD, psychopathy is a 
homogenous diagnosis and continues to hold important 
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implications for research and clinical usage (Gacono et 
al., 2001). Further, psychopathy holds a higher risk for 
both offending and violence than ASPD (Gacono & Hughes, 
2004). For these reasons, it is vitally important that the 
characteristics of psychopaths are examined and understood 
in order to gain a complete awareness of how the psychopath 
is unique and what implications this may have for diagnosis 
and treatment.  
Psychopathy 
 The smallest, most severe group of offenders in the 
adult population is that of the psychopath (Hare, 1993). 
The word psychopathy literally means “mental illness” 
derived from psyche or mind and pathos or disease (Hare, 
1993). Philippe Pinel, a nineteenth century French 
psychiatrist, was one of the first to write about 
psychopaths (Hare, 1993). Pinel attempted to describe a 
pattern of behavior that appeared to be void of remorse 
with a total lack of restraint using the term insanity 
without delirium (Hare, 1993; Millon, Simonsen, & Birket-
Smith, 1998). Since the nineteenth century, the term 
psychopathy has been taken through many conceptions. The 
classic definition of psychopathy, as it is referred to 
today, was first proposed by Cleckley in his book The Mask 
of Sanity, first published in 1941. He described 
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psychopathy as a constellation of deviant personality 
traits with sixteen specific characteristics including: 
Table 1 
Cleckley’s Psychopathy Characteristics 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Characteristics 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
superficial charm/good intelligence   
no delusions/irrational thinking insight 
absence of nervousness/psychoneurosis   
untruthfulness and insincerity with/without drink 
lack of remorse or shame     
inadequately motivated antisocial behavior 
poor judgment/failure to learn 
pathologic egocentric/incapacity for love 
general poverty in major affective reactions 
unreliability 
unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations 
Fantastic and uninviting behavior with/without drink 
Suicide rarely carried out 
Sex life impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated 
Failure to follow any life plan 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Hare et al. (1993) later identified twenty characteristics 
to describe psychopathy characterized as either personality 
traits or antisocial behaviors.  
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Table 2  
Hare’s Psychopathy Traits 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Factor 1      Factor 2 
Personality Traits    Socially Deviant Behaviors 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
pathological lying    need for stimulation/   
callous/lack of empathy    proneness to boredom 
glibness/superficial charm   irresponsibility 
lack of remorse or guilt   parasitic lifestyle 
shallow affect     early behavioral problems 
conning/manipulative    juvenile delinquency 
failure to accept responsibility  poor behavioral controls 
       revocation of conditional 
        release 
       promiscuous sexual behavior 
       impulsivity 
       criminal versatility 
       lack of realistic long-term  
        goals 
       many short-term marital  
        relationships 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 Definitions of psychopathy continue to be modified as 
more information and research is collected and as various 
perspectives are adopted on this construct. Cook and 
colleagues (Cook & Michie, 2001; Cooke, Michie, Hart, & 
Clark, 2004) described psychopathy with three dimensions. 
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The first consists of an arrogant, deceitful interpersonal 
style (ADI) which is includes glibness or superficial 
charm, self-centeredness or a grandiose sense of self-
worth, lying, conning, manipulation, and deceitfulness 
(Cook & Michie, 2001; Cooke et al.,  2004). The second 
dimension is the deficient affective experience (DAE) 
comprised of low remorse, low guilt, weak conscience, 
callousness, low empathy, shallow affect, and a failure to 
accept responsibility for one’s actions (Cook & Michie, 
2001; Cooke et al., 2004). The final aspect is the 
impulsive or irresponsible behavioral style (IIB) which 
includes boredom, excitement-seeking, a lack of long-term 
goals, impulsiveness, failing to think before acting, and a 
parasitic lifestyle (Cook & Michie, 2001; Cooke et al.,  
2004). Close review of this description of psychopathy 
reveals that the three dimensions appear to simply consist 
of rewording of the original personality and behavior 
dimensions originally identified by Cleckley and then Hare. 
 The current study utilizes Hare’s two factor model of 
psychopathy as the basis for the definition of psychopathy. 
Paul Frick, in conjunction with other professionals, has 
completed considerable research in understanding severe 
antisocial behavior in youth, working to extend Hare’s two-
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factor model of psychopathy to younger populations (Frick & 
Hare, 2001; Hare, 1991).  
General Psychopathy Definition in Children 
 Psychopathy in children has been receiving increased 
attention in terms of definition, assessment, and 
trajectory (Frick, 1998; Lynam, 1997; Salekin et al., 2001; 
Seagrave & Grisso, 2002). Psychopathic characteristics in 
children are often equated with or subsumed under the 
diagnoses of Conduct Disorder and Oppositional Defiant 
Disorder (Salekin et al., 2001). Similar to Antisocial 
Personality Disorder, CD and ODD do not include personality 
dimensions in their definitions. Because these personality 
dimensions are integral to the understanding of 
psychopathy, there is a need for further understanding of 
traits unique to psychopathy. 
  Research attempting to understand psychopathic traits 
in children has relied on research conducted with adults 
with psychopathy. Research has demonstrated that adults 
with psychopathy began exhibiting antisocial behaviors and 
psychopathic characteristics in childhood (Forth, Hart & 
Hare, 1990; Loeber, 1982). A factor analysis conducted by 
Frick and colleagues (1994) demonstrated two predominant 
factors that identified children with psychopathic 
characteristics: impulsivity/conduct problems (I/CP) and 
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callous/unemotional characteristics (CU). Frick and 
colleagues (1994) proposed that the callous/unemotional 
traits correspond with Factor 1 and that the 
impulsivity/conduct problems correspond to Factor 2 of 
Hare’s two-factor model. The impulsivity/conduct problems 
factor comprised behaviors including impulsivity, poor 
impulse control, and delinquent behaviors (Frick et al., 
1994). The callous/unemotional factor was characterized by 
lack of guilt, lack of empathy, and superficial charm 
(Frick et al., 1994). Frick and colleagues’ downward 
extension of psychopathic traits in children encompasses 
the constructual definitions utilized in this study, which 
will be discussed in more detail further on in this 
document. 
 Though it is useful to extend adult criteria downward 
to children, it must be noted that many researchers have 
argued that this downward extension is problematic (Lynam, 
1997; Salekin et al., 2001). Frick and colleagues (1994) 
found that the characteristics grandiose sense of self-
worth, failure to accept responsibility for own actions, 
and boredom susceptibility were related to the I/CP factor 
in children whereas in adults these behaviors were 
associated with more psychopathic behaviors. The 
researchers suggest that the differences could suggest 
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developmental differences in the manifestation of 
psychopathy in youth (Frick et al., 1994).  Lynam (1997) 
examined childhood psychopathy in 430 boys ages 12 and 13 
in order to assess whether childhood psychopathy resembled 
adult psychopathy. He found that children with psychopathic 
personalities were serious and stable offenders, impulsive, 
and more prone to externalizing than internalizing disorder 
(Lynam, 1997). These findings are consistent with findings 
concerning adult psychopathy and again suggest that 
psychopathy may manifest in youth. However, although an 
important reference, the downward extension of adult 
criteria should be utilized with caution due to the varying 
factor structures identified in youth. Further 
clarification of psychopathy in youth is warranted.  
Prevalence of Psychopathy 
 Psychopaths comprise 15-25% of criminals in the adult 
federal offender population (Hare, 1993) and are five times 
more likely than nonpsychopaths to engage in violent 
recidivism within 5 years of release (Serin & Amos, 1995). 
Psychopaths commit 50% more crimes than nonpsychopaths and 
are not only more likely to commit a violent offense but 
also to commit a wide variety of offences (Hare, 1993).  
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The prevalence of psychopathy in the young offender 
population has been estimated at 21.5%, similar to the 15-
30% estimate for adults (Salekin et al., 2004). 
Stability of Psychopathy 
 Personality is stable (Lynam, 1997). The stability 
appears greater between the ages of 18 and 32 (r=.55) than 
between the ages of 10 and 18 (r=.38) but there exists 
significant stability during adolescent years. According to 
Farrington, there is no dramatic change in personality or 
behavior at age 18; rather there exists a continuity from 
childhood to adulthood (Farrington, 1991). One specific 
example was found in a study conducted by Caspi (2000) 
where under-controlled children at age 3 significantly 
reported that they were reckless and careless, and enjoyed 
dangerous and exciting activities at age 18.  
 According to Cleckley (1976), Hare (1993), Cook and 
colleagues (2001), Frick (1994) and others, the definition 
of psychopathy includes personality. Since personality is 
stable and children exhibit personality traits similar to 
those displayed in adults, it follows that the child who 
most closely resembles the psychopath in childhood will 
closely resemble the psychopath in adulthood (Lynam, 1997). 
Research demonstrates that adult antisocial behavior and 
psychopathy are evidenced in childhood (Loeber, 1982; 
  
 
45 
Lynam, 1997). Porter and colleagues (2001) found that 
psychopathic offenders commit more violent and nonviolent 
crimes than nonpsychopaths from late adolescence to their 
late 40s.  Psychopathic traits in children have been found 
to predict severe and violent antisocial behavior in adults 
(Salekin, Neumann, Leistico, DiCicco & Duros, 2004). Viding 
(2004) argues that this finding suggests that psychopathy 
may be a developmental disorder in which specific 
personality traits can be assessed in children. Early 
identification of these youth would have important safety 
implications for the community as well as assisting our 
understanding of the etiology, development, and treatment 
regimens of psychopaths (Gacono & Hughes, 2004; Lynam, 
1997; Salekin et al., 2004). 
Theories of Psychopathy 
 Does psychopathy develop through nature, brain anatomy 
and biology, or through nurture, environment and parenting? 
The general consensus is that individuals with psychopathy 
are a homogeneous group and that not one theory can explain 
the process by which these individuals develop psychopathic 
characteristics (Blackburn, 2006). Theoretical perspectives 
that have considered antisocial behavior and psychopathy 
include evolutionary, genetics, developmental, social-
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learning, psychoanalytic, personality, neurobiological, and 
cognitive. 
 Evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory suggests that 
the basis of human nature includes adaptations taking the 
form of evolved psychological mechanisms for solving 
specific problems of survival or reproduction (Buss, 1999). 
Precise motives, goals, and strivings developed from these 
adaptations with the most universal being for status in the 
competition for resources (Buss, 1999). This competition 
entails impeding others’ likelihood of acquiring resources 
which can include stealing, cheating, attacking, 
humiliating, or guaranteeing compliance of others (Buss, 
1999). It is proposed that psychopathy represents an 
evolutionary process based on a cheating strategy that 
would have supported reproductive success in ancestral 
environments (Beck & Freeman, 1990). Basically, individuals 
who engaged in the cheating strategy would survive through 
frequency-dependent selection (Buss, 1999), maintaining 
themselves as a small frequency in a predominantly 
cooperative population (Blackburn, 2006).  
 Genetic theory. Genetic research has investigated twin 
and adoption studies in order to learn more about the 
etiology of antisocial and psychopathic behaviors. A meta-
analysis of 51 twin adoption and sibling designs found that 
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on average 41% of the variance in antisocial behavior is 
due to genetic factors, 16% is due to shared environmental 
factors, and 43% is due to non-shared environmental factor 
(Rhee & Waldman, 2002). Antisocial behavior, according to 
this meta-analysis, is moderately heritable (Rhee & 
Waldman, 2002). The Twins Early Development Study (TEDS) 
consisted of teacher ratings of more than 7000 seven year-
old twins. This study found that antisocial behavior in 
children with elevated levels of the callous/unemotional 
traits were under an extremely high genetic influence (.81) 
and no influence of the shared environment. Conversely, 
those children demonstrating antisocial behavior without 
evidencing callous/unemotional traits showed moderate 
genetic influence (.30) and substantial environmental 
influence (shared environment = .34; non-shared environment 
= .26) (Viding et al., 2005). These results indicate that 
the family-wide environmental influences that are not 
acting on the child’s genotype are important for the 
development of antisocial behavior when callous/unemotional 
traits are not present (Viding et al., 2005). Because 
environmental influences act in tandem with the genotype, 
as well as the environmental influences unique to the child 
(essentially, shared and nonshared environmental 
influences), it appears that the combination is more 
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important for the development of antisocial behaviors in 
children with elevated levels of callous/unemotional traits 
than children with antisocial behaviors absent of high 
levels of callous/unemotional traits where environment 
alone plays a more important role(Viding et al., 2005). 
 Attachment theory. Attachment theory emphasizes the 
quality of infant-caregiver relationships during the first 
year of life as a predictor of cognitive and social 
development (Bowlby, 1969). Attachment research 
demonstrates that cold rejecting parents or disrupted 
families tend to produce cold, callous children who are 
unable to develop warm relationships, have low empathy, and 
are likely to offend (Farrington, 2005). These children are 
naturally hedonistic and selfish (Farrington, 2005). They 
seek pleasure and avoid pain (Farrington, 2005). It is well 
recognized that empathy-producing, positive parenting 
practices lead to less antisocial behavior than punishment-
based, negative parenting practices (Blair, 2003). This 
relationship has been demonstrated in healthy individuals 
as well as those displaying conduct disorders without 
evidence of the emotional dysfunction of psychopaths 
(Blair, 2003). Conversely, children with conduct disorder 
who do demonstrate emotional dysfunction of psychopaths do 
not show the connection between parenting behaviors and 
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level of antisocial behavior (Wootton, Frick, & Shelton, 
1997). The emotional impairment found in individuals with 
psychopathy interferes with the natural socialization so 
that the individual does not learn to avoid antisocial 
behavior (Blair, 2003). 
 Role-taking theory. Gough’s role-taking theory 
attempts to explain psychopathy through the argument that 
individuals with psychopathy demonstrate impairment in 
role-taking abilities (Blackburn, 1984). Gough’s (1948) 
role-taking theory states that the self-concept and the 
capacity to examine oneself as an object emerge as a result 
of social interaction and communication. During the role-
taking process, the person develops a conception of the 
“generalized other” which advances through the integration 
of different conceptions of “me” (Blackburn, 2006). Role-
taking abilities are central to an individual’s ability to 
be sensitive to the reactions of others and are necessary 
for self-criticism and self-control (Blackburn, 2006). The 
argument is that the characteristics of the psychopath 
including ignoring the rights of others, impulsivity, 
emotional poverty, and the inability to form lasting 
interpersonal attachments could be accounted for by a 
pathological deficiency in role-taking ability (Blackburn, 
2006).   
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 Psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalytic theory has 
attempted to explain the development of the psychopath 
(Blackburn, 2006). The depiction of the psychopath as an 
egocentric, impulsive, guiltless, and unempathic individual 
has its roots in psychodynamic thinking (Blackburn, 2006). 
Freud discussed the process of socialization in early 
childhood with the development of the superego and argued 
that impaired socialization occurs when parents fail to 
meet the child’s emotional needs by way of rejection, 
neglect, or inconsistency (Blackburn, 2006). More recent 
psychodynamic theories stress the importance of object 
relations which is “the enduring patterns of interpersonal 
relationships derived from internal cognitive and affective 
representations” (Blackburn, 2006, p.36). In this view, the 
psychopath has a biologically predisposed excessive 
aggressive drive, which becomes the dominant interaction 
style in response to early traumatic experiences or 
distortions in attachment resulting from abuse and 
abandonment (Kernberg, 1996). The individual adopts rage 
and envy as primary affects and defends against a dangerous 
world by using grandiosity and devaluation (Kernberg, 
1996). The superego system uses primitive, punitive 
prohibitions with a reliance on immediate external cues and 
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basic self-interest for the regulation of interpersonal 
behavior (Kernberg, 1996).   
 Personality theory. Personality theories offer 
multiple explanations for the psychopathic personality 
including but not limited to Eysenck’s theory, the Big 5 
Personality Theory, and the Interpersonal Circumplex. Each 
will be discussed briefly. Eysenck’s (1977; 1996) theory 
focuses on three independent dimensions of personality 
including Neuroticism-Stability (N), Psychoticism-Superego 
(P), and Extraversion-Introversion (E). N, E, and P all 
have biological basis concerned with activity in the limbic 
and autonomic systems as well as cortical arousal (Eysenck, 
1996). Importantly, extraverts, compared to introverts, 
demonstrate low arousal, form conditioned responses less 
readily, and require more extreme stimulation to maintain a 
“hedonic tone” (Eysenck, 1996). Basically, the theory 
argues that individuals with psychopathy, similar to 
typical criminals, exhibit lower arousal and weaker 
conditionability and will demonstrate higher mean scores on 
all three dimensions, N, E, and P (Eysenck, 1996). 
Blackburn (2006) explains that supportive research for this 
theory is lacking in that support is unsubstantial for the 
central theoretical links between extraversion, its 
physiological substrate, and the process of socialization.    
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 Antisocial behavior and psychopathic personality has 
been related to the Big 5 Personality Theory or Five Factor 
Model (FFM). The 5 personality factors included in this 
theory include extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness (Farrington, 
2005). Extraversion is “a trait characterized by a keen 
interest in other people and external events, and venturing 
forth with confidence into the unknown" (Ewen, 1998, p. 
289). Agreeableness is defined as straightforwardness, 
altruism, modesty, and tendermindedness on the positive end 
and deceitfulness, exploitiveness, arrogance, and 
callousness on the negative end (Farrington, 2005). 
Conscientiousness is defined as dutifulness, achievement 
striving, self-discipline, and deliberation on the positive 
end with poor dependability, aimlessness, hedonism, and 
carelessness at the negative end (Farrington, 2005). 
Neuroticism is defined as impulsiveness and angry hostility 
which includes self-consciousness with glibness and 
shamelessness on the negative end and vulnerability with 
fearlessness at the opposite end (Farrington, 2005). 
Openness refers to how willing people are to make 
adjustments in notions and activities in accordance with 
new ideas or situations (Ewen, 1998). Three of these 
factors were found to be connected with psychopathy in 
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children and adolescents including agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and neuroticism. Agreeableness is 
related to Factor 1 in Hare’s definition. Conscientiousness 
is more related to Factor 2 and neuroticism is related to 
both Factor 1 and Factor 2, but more particularly Factor 2 
(Lynam et al., 2005). Psychopathy is negatively correlated 
with conscientiousness and agreeableness (Lynam et al., 
2005).  
 Another personality theory relating to psychopathy is 
the Interpersonal Circumplex (Lynam et al., 2005). The 
Interpersonal Circumplex describes personality with seven 
characteristics including assured-dominant, arrogant-
calculating, cold-hearted, aloof-introverted, unassured-
submissing, warm-agreeable, and gregarious-extraverted 
(Lynam et al., 2005). According to this theory, psychopaths 
tend to be cold-hearted and arrogant-calculating (Lynam et 
al., 2005). 
 Neurobiological theory. Neurobiological theories also 
describe the development of antisocial behavior and 
psychopathic personality. Specific theories concerning 
psychopathy include the Left Hemisphere Activation 
Hypothesis (LHA), the Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Hypothesis, 
and the Somatic Marker Hypothesis. Each will be discussed 
briefly. The Left Hemisphere Activation Hypothesis (LHA) 
  
 
54 
states that individuals with psychopathy have deficits in 
cognitive processing that are state-specific and occur only 
under circumstances that selectively and differentially 
activate the left hemisphere resources (Kosson, 1998). In 
general, information processing will be disrupted in 
psychopaths when the left hemisphere is substantially 
activated by processing demands (Kosson, 1998). The 
foundation of this hypothesis comes from the work of Hare 
and Jutai (1988, p. 329) who speculated that individuals 
with psychopathy may demonstrate “weak or unusual 
lateralization of language function, and that psychopaths 
may have fewer left hemisphere resources for processing 
language than do normal individuals”. Studies examining 
language function prompted Hare and Jutai’s speculation. 
For example, in one study, individuals were presented with 
word stimuli to both the left and right visual fields and 
were expected to state whether the word matched a 
previously presented word, a semantic category, or an 
abstract category (Hare & Jutai, 1988). The study found 
that individuals with psychopathy demonstrated difficulty 
in the area of abstract category discrimination if the word 
was presented to the right visual field (Hare & Jutai, 
1988). However, these same individuals demonstrated 
superior performance when the stimuli were presented to the 
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left visual field (Hare & Jutai, 1988). Dichotic listening 
tasks also demonstrated an unusual lateralization in 
individuals with psychopathy (Hare & McPherson, 1984). 
These tasks required individuals to report what they heard 
when words were played to the right or left ear (Hare & 
McPherson, 1984). Individuals with psychopathy demonstrated 
impairment when reporting words that were played to the 
right ear but not the left (Hare & McPherson, 1984). These 
findings were replicated in adolescents demonstrating 
psychopathic traits (Raine et al., 1990). While these 
studies appear to demonstrate support for the Left 
Activation Hypothesis, Blair and colleagues (2005) argue 
that the hypothesis lacks specificity in that it does not 
fully explain why the left hemisphere should disrupt 
cortical functioning, which systems in the left hemisphere 
disrupt cortical functioning when it is over-activated, and 
how greater left hemisphere activation should be 
quantified.  
 The second hypothesis is the Frontal Lobe Dysfunction 
Hypothesis. The frontal lobe and executive dysfunction have 
long been related to antisocial behavior (Barratt, 1994; 
Elliot, 1978; Gorenstein, 1982; Moffitt, 1993). This 
conclusion has been made from three types of data. The 
first examined patients with acquired lesions of the 
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frontal cortex that evidenced emotion and personality 
changes such as euphoria, irresponsibility, lack of affect, 
lack of concern for the present and/or future, and 
increased aggression (Hecaen & Albert, 1978). These 
individuals demonstrated increased levels of reactive but 
not instrumental aggression, which contradicts the 
psychopathic personality who demonstrates predominantly 
instrumental aggression (Blair et al., 2005). Studies with 
these patients have found that the orbital and medial 
cortices, but not the dorsolateral cortex were involved in 
regulating reactive aggression (Blair et al., 2005). 
Gorenstein (1982) found psychopaths’ performance relative 
to a control group to be comparable to patients with 
lesions in the frontal lobe on the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Task and the Necker Cube Reversals but not the Sequential 
Matching Memory Task (Gorenstein, 1982). Blair et al. 
(2005) point out that these studies demonstrate key 
differences between individuals with lesions in the 
orbitofrontal cortex and those with psychopathy.   
 The second type of patient examined in developing the 
Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Hypothesis are those individuals 
with antisocial behavior who show deficits in executive 
functions (Blair et al., 2005). However, making causal 
inferences from this research is difficult because many of 
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the studies failed to distinguish among specific areas of 
the brain (Blair et al., 2005). Specifically, much of the 
literature concentrates on tasks examining the functions of 
the executive functions commonly linked to orbitofrontal 
and medial frontal cortex and not the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex that are involved in regulation of 
reactive aggression (Damasio, 1994; Grafman et al., 1996; 
Volavka, 1995). Research has found that psychopaths do not 
show executive dysfunction on measures that specifically 
examine the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; however, they 
do show executive dysfunction on tasks linked to the 
orbital frontal cortex (Kandal & Freed, 1989). Meaning, 
psychopaths do not demonstrate deficits in functioning 
related to the regulation of reactive aggression 
(dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) but do demonstrate 
deficits in tasks assessing orbital frontal cortex 
dysfunction such as response reversal and response control.  
 The third type of study examined violent individuals 
who demonstrated significantly reduced levels of cerebral 
blood flow (CBF) in the medial and frontal cortex (Blair et 
al., 2005). Lower levels of normalized CBF in the orbital 
frontal cortex (BA 47) correlates with a history of 
aggression (Dolan et al., 2002). Negative correlations have 
been found between the callous-unemotional (Factor 1) 
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dimensions and frontal and temporal perfusion (Soderstrom 
et al., 2002), which means the higher the callous-
unemotional characteristics, the less blood flow observed 
in the frontal and temporal regions. This research 
demonstrates support that Frontal Lobe Dysfunction is 
evident in individuals with psychopathy.  
 A third hypothesis is the Somatic Marker Hypothesis. 
The Ventromedial Frontal Cortex is involved in linkages 
between factual knowledge and bio-regulatory states 
(Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000). When emotionally 
significant decisions are made either involving reward or 
punishment, bodily states provide affective coloring that 
automatically biases an individual toward or away from the 
available response options (Blair et al., 2005). The bodily 
feedback or somatic marker provides an automatic way of 
labeling an option as good or bad and influencing the 
likelihood that that response is made (Blair et al., 2005). 
Patients with lesions to the ventromedial frontal cortex 
fail to show autonomic responses to visually presented 
social stimuli under passive viewing conditions (Damasio et 
al., 1990). Patients with ventromedial damage show deficits 
on the four pack card task, continuing to choose from the 
disadvantaged package and failing to show skin conductance 
before the choices of packs (Damasio et al., 1990). 
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Children and adults with psychopathy show deficits on the 
card task; however, they do not show deficits on the 
autonomic responses to social stimuli and therefore, they 
appear to generate somatic markers (Blair, 1999). 
Therefore, the evidence for the Somatic Marker Hypothesis 
remains divided. 
 Multiple areas of the brain are implicated in the 
development of antisocial behavior including the ventro-
lateral section, the orbital frontal cortex, and the 
amygdala (Blair et al., 2005). The ventro-lateral section 
of the brain is related to response control which is 
defined as a resolution of response competition in tasks 
where there is no clear expectation of reward or punishment 
(Blair et al., 2005). Tasks that focus on response control 
includes go/no go and the stop task and allow for a direct 
test of whether a non-emotion based difficulty exists in 
the control of motor responses (Blair et al., 2005). Two 
out of three studies that have examined response control in 
psychopathic individuals have shown that these individuals 
have difficulty with the go/no go task (LaPierre et al., 
1995; Roussy & Touplin, 2000). One study using the stop 
task showed that psychopaths demonstrate more impairment on 
withholding their responses following the stop signal than 
controls (Roussy & Touplin, 2000). This demonstrates a lack 
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of response control in individuals with psychopathic 
traits. 
 The orbital frontal cortex is involved in response 
reversal (Blair et al., 2005). Response reversal is defined 
as changing a response to a stimulus as a function of a 
change in a contingency (Rolls, 1997). The individual 
learns to withhold a response that, although previously 
rewarded, is now punished (Rolls, 1997). This task is 
distinct from passive avoidance tasks in that response 
reversal requires a change or reversal in the response, 
whereas, passive avoidance demands learning to respond to 
one stimulus and withhold a response to another stimuli but 
never reverse the responses (Newman & Kosson, 1986). The 
orbital frontal cortex is critical to this reversal (Blair 
et al., 2005). Response reversal is a function of the 
degree to which there is a mismatch between the expectation 
of reinforcement and the presence of a reinforcer (Cools, 
Clark, Owen & Robbins, 2002). Blair et al. (2005) argue 
that clear evidence does not exist that individuals with 
psychopathy demonstrate a weakness in this skill. Research 
demonstrates adult psychopaths display significant 
impairment in response reversal tasks in which they must 
reverse their responding to the object that had previously 
elicited rewards but now elicits punishment (Mitchell, 
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Colledge, Leonard, & Blair, 2002); however, children with 
psychopathic traits do not demonstrate a deficit in 
response reversal (Blair, Colledge, & Mitchell, 2001). 
  It is suggested that one of the principal neural 
systems implicated in the psychopathic pathology is 
amygdala dysfunction (Patrick, 1994). In contrast to 
studies measuring orbital frontal cortex performance, 
performance on measures thought to require the amygdala has 
been found to be significantly impaired in both adults and 
children displaying psychopathy. The amygdala consists of 
two parts including the basolateral (BLA) and the central 
nuclei (CeN) (Johnston, 1923). The amygdala is one of the 
most vital areas of the brain for emotional processing 
(LeDoux, 1998). The integrated emotion systems (IES) model 
explains how the amygdala interacts with other portions of 
the brain to affect emotion processing (Blair, Mitchell, & 
Blair, 2005). There are three major connection systems 
involving the amygdala (Price, 2003). First, a 
predominantly forebrain system including the olfactory 
cortex, ascending taste/visceral pathways, posterior 
thalamus, and sensory association cortical areas provide 
sensory input to both parts of the amygdala (Price, 2003). 
The amygdala most likely modulates sensory processing due 
to the reciprocal nature of many of the connections of the 
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sensory input structures and the amygdala (Price, 2003). 
Second, a system of projections to the brainstem exists in 
which changes, mostly extending from the CeN, of the 
visceral function relating to emotional stimuli are made 
(Blair et al., 2005). Finally, a system of reciprocal 
connections to the forebrain including the ventromedial 
frontal, rostral insular, rostral temporal cortex, medial 
thalamus, and the ventromedial basal ganglia allow the 
amygdala, mostly the BLA, to influence goal-directed 
behavior (Blair et al., 2005).  
 It is necessary to first understand the learning 
functions of the amygdala, which will be used to explain 
amygdala dysfunction found in individuals with psychopathy. 
The amygdala permits three conditioned stimulus 
associations to be formed (Everitt et al., 2003). These 
associations include conditioned stimulus (CS) – 
unconditioned response (UR) associations, conditioned 
stimulus (CS) - affect representation associations (i.e. 
fear or the expectation of reward), and conditioned 
stimulus (CS) – valenced sensory properties of the 
unconditioned stimulus (US) associations (Everitt et al., 
2003). The amygdala is necessary for the formation of the 
CS-UR and CS-reinforcement associations, but not the CS-CR 
associations (Blair et al., 2005). Evidence suggests that 
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individuals with psychopathy demonstrate impairment in the 
formation of the CS-UR and CS-reinforcement associations, 
as they are the configurations in which the amygdala is 
essential (Blair et al., 2005).  
 The amygdala is involved in many processes that when 
impaired yield the functional impairments demonstrated in 
individuals with psychopathy (Blair, 2003). The first 
process is the expression of basic emotional reactions for 
which there are three types of evidence for amygdala 
dysfunction in individuals with psychopathy (Blair et al., 
2005). First, amygdala dysfunction has been evidenced 
through impaired aversive conditioning tasks in individuals 
with psychopathy (Flor et al., 2002; Hare, 1970). 
Individuals with psychopathy when compared to controls fail 
to exhibit a conditioned skin conductance response to 
typically aversive stimuli (Flor et al., 2002). Blair and 
colleagues (2005) argue that although it is not yet 
understood if this is evidence of an impaired CS-UR or CS-
affect representation association, either implicates 
amygdala dysfunction. Blair and colleagues (2005) cite that 
recent neuro-imaging completed by Veit and colleagues 
(2002) demonstrates reduced amygdala activity during 
aversive conditioning tasks in individuals with 
psychopathy.   
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 Second, data suggests that the amygdala is involved in 
modulating startle responses by conditioned stimuli (CS) 
(Angrilli et al., 1996; Davis, 2000). Startle responses 
have been related to anxiety levels in both animals and 
humans (Davis, 2000). Everitt and colleagues (2003) suggest 
that a visual prime CS can increase the brainstem neuron 
activity which would intercede in the startle reflex 
through the CeN by means of the BLA as a result of a CS-
affect representation. Research argues that dysfunction in 
either the BLA or CeN would induce a reduced escalation of 
the startle reflex by visual primes seen by those with 
psychopathy (Leventon et al., 2000; Pastor et al., 2003; 
Patrick et al., 1993).  
Third, the amygdala is involved in the activation of 
autonomic responding (Blair et al., 2005). Individuals with 
psychopathy demonstrate appropriate skin conductance 
responses to visual threats; however, display reduced skin 
conductance responses to facial expressions of sadness 
(Blair, 1999; Blair et al,. 1997), imagined threat scenes 
(Patrick et al., 1994), anticipated threat (Hare 1982), and 
emotionally evocative sounds (Verona et al., 2004). Blair 
and colleagues (2005) argue that individuals with 
psychopathy must demonstrate impairment in skin conductance 
responses when they are related to the amygdala due to the 
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fact that visual threats have been shown to be more 
disrupted in individuals with orbital frontal cortex 
lesions than the amygdala (Tranel and Damasio, 1994). 
 The second process the amygdala is related to is 
stimulus selection or attention (Blair et al., 2005). 
Attention is the consequence of competition for neural 
representation between multiple stimuli (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; Duncan, 1998). Attention is given to the stimuli that 
win the competition through both top-down influences such 
as directed attention and bottom-up sensory processes 
including stimulus salience (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; 
Duncan, 1998). Research demonstrates that the amygdala 
augments attention to emotional information as compared to 
neutral information (Anderson & Phelps, 2001). Basically, 
reciprocal connections from affect representation and CS 
representations should bring about improved performance if 
the CS is the target stimulus for goal-directed behavior 
and impaired performance if the CS distracts from goal-
directed behavior (Blair et al., 2005). This process is 
found in healthy individuals on tasks requiring 
identification of emotional words; however, individuals 
with psychopathy demonstrate reduced reaction times to 
emotional words as well as evoked related potential 
differences between neutral and emotional words (Day & 
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Wong, 1996; Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Williamson et al., 
1991).  
 The amygdala, specifically the BLA, is involved in 
instrumental learning which occurs in individuals learning 
to perform an action to a stimulus if the action results in 
reward and to withhold performing an action to a stimulus 
if the action results in punishment (Blair, 2006; Blair et 
al., 2005). Some instrumental learning tasks involve the 
formation of CS-affect representation and CS-valenced 
sensory properties of stimulus associations such as passive 
avoidance learning tasks (Blair et al., 2005). Passive 
avoidance tasks require participants to learn to respond to 
good stimuli and avoid responding to bad stimuli (Blair, 
2006; Blair et al., 2005). When individuals form positive 
CS-affect associations they will respond to the stimulus; 
conversely, negative CS-affect associations result in the 
participant avoiding the stimulus (Blair et al., 2005). 
Individuals with psychopathy demonstrate impaired 
performance on these tasks, displaying difficulty in 
forming negative CS-affect associations (Blair et al., 
2004; Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman & Schmitt, 1998). Other 
instrumental learning tasks involve stimulus-response 
associations, which are not linked to the amygdala, 
including object discrimination and conditional learning 
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tasks (Blair et al., 2005). Individuals with psychopathy do 
not demonstrate impaired performance on these tasks, which 
is expected due to the fact that they are not related to 
amygdala functioning (Blair et al., 2005).  
 Finally, the amygdala is implicated in the development 
of moral socialization (Blair et al., 2005). Socialization 
occurs through a process in which caregivers and others 
reinforce behaviors that are desired and punish behaviors 
that should be discouraged (Blair et al., 2005). This 
process occurs through aversive conditioning and 
instrumental learning, notably two tasks for which 
individuals with psychopathy demonstrate impairment (Blair 
et al., 2005). The US or punisher most often present when 
antisocial behavior occurs, especially during childhood, is 
the distress of the victim (Blair et al., 2005). Therefore, 
sadness and fearfulness of a victim acts as a US which 
elicits aversive conditioning and instrumental learning 
(Blair et al., 2005). Negative actions then must be 
associated with an aversive unconditioned stimulus such as 
the distress of the victim in order to learn not to commit 
the negative actions (Blair et al., 2005). Additionally, 
learning avoidance of engaging in moral transgressions 
entails either personally committing or witnessing another 
commit a moral transgression and subsequently be punished 
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by the aversive response, namely the victim’s distress 
(Blair et al., 2005). Individuals with psychopathy 
demonstrate significant impairment in processing sad and 
fearful expressions, exhibiting reduced autonomic responses 
to these expressions (Aniskiewicz, 1979; Blair et al., 
1997). Children with psychopathic traits, in particular, 
demonstrate an impaired ability to recognize sad and 
fearful expressions (Blair et al., 2001).  
 Appropriate moral socialization, evidenced through an 
understanding of the distinction between moral (victim-
based) and conventional (social disorder-based) 
transgressions, can be demonstrated in children as early as 
3.5 years old (Smetana, 1993; Turiel et al., 1987). 
Typically developing children are best able to distinguish 
between moral and conventional transgressions when they are 
to imagine situations in which no rules prohibit the 
offenses (Blair et al., 2005). Both adults with psychopathy 
and children demonstrating psychopathic traits are least 
likely to exhibit the ability to discriminate under the no 
rules condition (Blair, 1995; Blair et al., 1997). Adults 
with psychopathy also show less understanding of situations 
that are likely to generate guilt; although, they do 
demonstrate comprehension of emotions such as happiness, 
sadness, and embarrassment (Blair, 1995). The amygdala 
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responds to fear and sadness of victims, permitting the 
formation of moral transgression-victims’ distress 
associations (Blair et al., 2005). Individuals who 
demonstrate decreased fearfulness due to amygdala 
dysfunction, such as individuals with psychopathy, would 
not find the distress of others aversive and thus will have 
decreased ability to socialize (Wootton et al., 1997). The 
above research concerning various brain regions, especially 
the amygdala, and hypotheses demonstrate that there is much 
support for the neurologically based theory when examining 
individuals with psychopathy. 
 Cognitive theory. Another perspective to consider when 
examining the psychopathic personality is cognitive 
theories. Cognitive theories focus on the concept of an 
independent self, decision making and thinking, the stored 
repertoires that have been learned during early 
development, and the extent to which children are 
influenced by immediate gratification as opposed to long-
term consequences (Farrington, 2005).  
 Kegan (1986) used the work of Piaget and Kohlberg to 
explain how psychopathy reflects a failure of cognitive 
development. Prior to adolescence, a child possesses a 
concept of an independent self and is capable of 
recognizing others’ needs and take their role but are 
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unable to coordinate his/her own needs and feelings with 
those of another (Kegan, 1986). Right actions meet one’s 
own needs and the child fails to experience guilt as 
internal self-punishment (Kegan, 1986). Kegan (1986) 
suggests within this preadolescent stage, which corresponds 
with Piaget’s concrete operational stage and Kohlberg’s 
preconventional stage, individuals with psychopathy have a 
developmental delay. During this stage, moral and self-
serving values are not differentiated (Kegan, 1986). The 
disturbance in typical developmental growth, according to 
Kegan (1986), results from a lack of familial and peer 
group support for development beyond this stage. This 
theory appears to limit its explanation of psychopathy in 
that it is uncertain whether lower moral development could 
be completely responsible for the prominent psychopathic 
characteristics (Blackburn, 2006).  
 Beck’s (1976) theory views psychopathy as cognitive 
distortion which closely relates to Lazarus’s (1991) more 
recent theory that suggests cognitive appraisal of the 
situation determines both the arousal and experience of 
emotion. During a rapid, preconscious appraisal process, 
evaluation of the situation for meaning occurs, defined by 
the relation of the situation to the individual’s personal 
beliefs or expectations and goals (Lazarus, 1991). Beck 
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(1976) argues for specific emotions as the consequence of 
definite cognitive appraisal about the influence of events 
on one’s personal domain or schema. Specifically, the 
psychopath, views the self as a strong, autonomous loner, 
who possesses core beliefs to look out for oneself, avoid 
victimization by being the aggressor, and break social 
rules because they are entitled to while others are viewed 
as exploitative and deserve exploitation in return or as 
weak and vulnerable to be preyed upon (Beck, 1976). These 
attributes are mediated by dysfunctional schemas concerning 
the self, the world, and the future that continue to be 
maintained through selective, confirmatory experiences 
(Beck, 1976).    
 Newman and colleagues’ (Gorenstein, 1991; Gorenstein & 
Newman, 1980; Newman, 1998; Patterson & Newman, 1993) 
response modulation theory focuses on the impulsivity and 
lack of restraint characteristics of the psychopath and 
argues that cognitive processing deficits impair 
individuals with psychopathy from accommodating the meaning 
of contextual cues when involved in goal-directed 
behaviors. Response set modulation consists of a system 
that uses automatic attentional processes to initiate self-
regulation (Vitale et al., 2005) or a relatively automatic 
shift of attention from the execution of a dominant 
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response to relevant secondary and/or contextual cues that 
might be used to modify ongoing response (Newman, 1998). 
Failure in response set modulation results in disinhibited 
behaviors, including passive avoidance tasks (Vitale et 
al., 2005). Individuals with psychopathy demonstrate 
difficulty in response set modulation in terms of passive 
avoidance tasks (Farrington, 2005). In particular, 
individuals with psychopathy display impairment in their 
abilities to avoid tasks for which they are punished for 
(Farrington, 2005).  
 The Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis assumes that moral 
socialization is achieved through the use of punishment 
(Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989; Trasler, 1978). According to 
moral socialization, a healthy individual is frightened by 
punishment and associates fear with an action that resulted 
in punishment, making it less likely to engage in the 
action in future (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989; Trasler, 
1978). Because of less aversive arousal to punishment, 
individuals with psychopathy create weaker cognitive 
associations and thus are more likely to engage in the 
punished action in the future (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989; 
Trasler, 1978).  
 The Behavior Inhibition System (BIS), a unitary fear 
system, generates autonomic responses to punished stimuli 
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(through classical conditioning) and inhibits responding 
following punishment (through instrumental conditioning) 
(Blair et al., 2005). The problem with the both BIS and 
DFH, according to Blair and colleagues (2005) is the claim 
that a unitary fear system exists; however, research 
strongly suggests that this is not the case. No single fear 
system exists but rather there is a series of partially 
separable neural systems engaged in the specific forms of 
processing that are subsumed under the term fear (Blair et 
al., 2005). Additionally, fear theories may not predict the 
very high level of antisocial behavior shown by individuals 
with psychopathy (Blair et al., 2005). 
 The Violence Inhibition Mechanism model is another 
cognitive theory. The activation of this system by distress 
cues, such as sad and fearful expressions of others, 
results in increased autonomic activity, attention, and 
activation of the brainstem threat response system, often 
resulting in a freezing response (Blair et al., 2005; 
Blair, 2001; Blair, 1995). Many social animals find the 
distress experiences of conspecifics (organisms belonging 
to the same species of another organism) aversive and will 
make instrumental responses to terminate unpleasant 
occurrences to similar species (Blair et al., 2005). Most 
humans are also predisposed to find the distress of 
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conspecifics (other human species) aversive and are 
punished by signals of another human’s sadness or fear, 
which reduces the probability of an individual engaging in 
such actions (Blair, 1995; Blair et al., 1997). According 
to the VIM, moral socialization occurs via the pairing of 
the activation of the mechanism to distress cues and the 
acts which caused the distress cues, such as moral 
transgressions (Blair, 2001). Classical conditioning then 
establishes the representations of moral transgressions as 
the triggers to the violence inhibition mechanism (Blair, 
2001). Blair (2001) suggests that dysfunction exists in the 
mechanism of individuals with psychopathy in that the 
representations of harm do not become triggers for the VIM, 
hypothesizing the signal to the learning systems 
responsible for emotionally aversive stimuli is not 
activated (Blair, 2001). Basically, the unconditioned 
stimulus signal is weakened impairing the ability to form 
the unconditioned stimulus – conditioned stimulus 
associations (Blair, 2001). The sad or fearful facial 
expressions of others do not pair with the triggering of 
the violence inhibition mechanism. The VIM offers another 
perspective from which to understand individuals with 
psychopathy.  
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Current Study Theory 
 The current study recognizes that one theory will not 
explain the development of individuals with psychopathy and 
that many theories explain facets of the psychopathic 
personality disorder in viable and significant methods. The 
current study draws from the personality, developmental, 
and cognitive perspectives of psychopathy. It is the 
position of this paper that individuals with psychopathy 
are born with a predisposition and temperament that 
interacts with it’s environment in a way that typical moral 
socialization processes including empathy development are 
impaired, which further damages the individuals ability to 
continue through the development processes of learning 
positive interactions and cognitive processes thus 
influences future decision making and actions. The 
individual begins a cycle of reinforcement of negative 
behaviors and cognitions through the person’s lack of 
empathy and inaccurate evaluations of the consequences of 
his or her negative behaviors.   
Specific Components of Psychopathy in Children 
 
 Factor analyses demonstrate the emergence of two 
psychopathic factors in a sample of 160 clinic-referred 
children (Frick et al., 1994) and three (Frick et al., 
2000) dimensions of psychopathy in a community sample of 
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1,136 elementary school-age. The three factors in the 
community sample included callous-unemotional traits, 
narcissistic traits, and impulsive behaviors (Frick et al., 
2000). While the clinic-referred sample also demonstrated 
callous-unemotional traits, less evidence surfaced for a 
discrepancy between the narcissism and impulsivity 
dimensions (Frick, et al., 1994). The factors found to be 
most related to psychopathic traits in adults and in 
children included the impulsivity/conduct problems factor 
and the callous-unemotional factor (Frick et al., 1994). 
Other studies have also shown that in both clinic-referred 
children (Christian et al., 1997) and adjudicated 
adolescents (Caputo, Frick, & Brodsky, 1999), the 
narcissism and impulsivity dimension do not differentiate 
within severely antisocial youth. Due to the inconsistency 
in findings concerning the dimensions of psychopathy in 
youth, the current study utilizes the three-factor model 
identified by Frick and colleagues (2000) including the 
impulsivity/conduct problems, callous-unemotional traits, 
and narcissism traits in order to further identify 
psychopathic characteristics in a sample of aggressive 
community youth.  
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Impulsivity/Conduct Problems 
 The behaviors associated with psychopathy include 
impulsivity and antisocial behaviors and relate to Factor 2 
in Hare’s two-factor model of psychopathy (Hare, 1993). In 
children, factor analysis reveals the impulsivity/conduct 
problems factor includes impulsivity, poor impulse control, 
and delinquent behaviors (Frick et al., 1994). The 
understanding of impulsivity suffers from poor 
operationalizing and measurement of the construct (Loeber 
et al., 2001). The Pittsburgh Youth Study attempted to 
improve both of these areas with a multisource and 
multimethod approach to impulsivity (Loeber et al., 2001). 
The study found that impulsivity does not exist as a 
unidimensional construct and can be broken down into two 
correlated but distinct types, cognitive impulsivity and 
behavioral impulsivity (Loeber et al., 2001). Behavioral 
impulsivity includes a lack of behavioral control, 
disinhibited, and undercontrolled behavior (Loeber et al., 
2001). Cognitive impulsivity consists of effortful and 
planful cognitive performance, specifically, mental control 
and mental effort to change adaptively between mental sets 
(Loeber et al., 2001). Loeber and colleagues (2001) found 
both types of impulsivities to be significantly and 
positively related to conduct problems in adolescents, with 
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behavioral impulsivity having a stronger relationship with 
conduct problems. Cognitive and behavioral impulsivity 
accounts for 16% of conduct problems when controlling for 
both IQ and SES (Loeber et al., 2001). Loeber and 
colleagues (2001) argue that the relation between 
behavioral impulsivity and conduct problems implies that 
children with poor self-control may be more likely to 
display externalizing behaviors. Subsequently, behaviorally 
undercontrolled individuals may steal and fight on the spur 
of the moment when the rewards associated with a behavior 
appear large and the potential of negative consequences in 
the future seem small (Loeber et al., 2001). 
 Another view of impulsivity includes its relation to a 
deficit in the section of the brain associated with 
executive functioning. It has been hypothesized that 
psychopathic behavior may be a result of underactivity in 
the neurobiological system that is receptive to cues of 
punishment and “frustrative reward” (Loney, Frick, 
Clements, Ellis, & Kerlin, 2003). Interestingly, children 
with psychopathic traits demonstrate behavioral and 
neurocognitive profiles similar to those of adults (Viding, 
2004). Researcher demonstrates psychopaths’ executive 
functions of the brain to be impaired (Gorenstein, 1982). 
These functions control an individual’s ability to plan, 
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sustain attention, concentrate, and inhibit inappropriate 
or impulsive behaviors (Gorenstein, 1982), which may offer 
insight into the development of the impulsivity/conduct 
problem facet of the psychopathic personality. 
 Antisocial behaviors or conduct problems encompass the 
second component of Factor 2 (impulsivity/conduct problems) 
in children with psychopathic traits (Frick et al., 1994). 
Conduct problems include such behaviors as aggressive 
conduct that causes harm or threatens physical harm to 
others, nonaggressive behaviors that causes property loss 
or damage, serious violations of rules, bullying, 
threatening, intimidating, frequent physical fights, 
physical cruelty to people, mugging, armed robbery, etc. 
(DSM-IV; APA, 1994). Conduct problems do not distinguish 
individuals with psychopathy from other individuals 
demonstrating antisocial behavior, except that individuals 
with psychopathy evidence greater patterns of proactive or 
instrumental aggression as discussed earlier in this 
chapter (Cornell et al., 1996).  
 Symptoms of both ADHD (not including the inattentive 
type) and Conduct Disorder include those of impulsivity and 
antisocial behaviors, which are the basis for defining 
Factor 2 psychopathy in youth. The impulsivity related to 
externalizing disorders includes a difficulty in inhibiting 
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activated responses and acting without considering 
consequences (Fowles & Dindo, 2006). Researchers argue that 
the combination of early-onset Oppositional Defiant 
Disorder or Conduct Disorder, hyperactivity or ADHD (not 
including inattentive type) and neuropsychological deficits 
often develops into adult psychopathy (Lynam, 1998; 
Moffitt, 1993; Moffitt & Caspi, 2001; Moffitt & Lynam, 
1994).  
Callous/Unemotional Trait 
 The second component of psychopathy consists of the 
personality dimension, which corresponds with Factor 1 of 
Hare’s two factor model. The main trait associated with 
psychopathy in children is the callous-unemotional (CU) 
factor (Frick et al., 1994). According to factor analysis, 
the callous-unemotional factor includes components such as 
a lack of guilt, lack of empathy, and superficial charm 
(Frick et al., 1994). Antisocial youth in juvenile forensic 
facilities (Caputo et al., 1999), outpatient mental health 
clinics (Christian et al., 1997; Frick et al., 1994), and 
in school-based samples (Frick et al., 2003) who 
demonstrate elevated levels of the CU factor appear to 
display a particularly severe, aggressive, and stable 
pattern of conduct problems (Frick & Marsee, 2006). 
Specifically, clinic-referred children with conduct problem 
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diagnoses demonstrated a more severe and varied pattern of 
conduct problems when evidencing elevated CU traits 
compared to clinic-referred children with conduct problems 
who did not demonstrate elevated levels of CU traits 
(Christian et al., 1997). Nonreferred community children 
with both conduct problems and CU traits showed more 
aggression overall and were more likely to demonstrate 
proactive and instrumental patterns of aggression than 
children with conduct problems, not evidencing CU traits 
(Frick et al., 2003).  
 A longitudinal study demonstrated that children who 
exhibit both CU traits and conduct problems have a greater 
number and variety of conduct problems after one year than 
those children with only conduct problems (Frick, Cornell, 
Barry, Bodin, & Dane, 2003a). The children with CU traits 
and conduct problems demonstrated higher levels of self-
reported delinquency and aggression, particularly proactive 
aggression (Frick et al., 2003a). Children with both 
conduct problems and CU traits exhibit significantly more 
conduct problems and a greater variety of conduct problems 
than those children with conduct problems alone (Christian 
et al., 1997). The children that exhibit both conduct 
problems and CU traits also tend to engage in more thrill-
seeking behavior, are less sensitive to punishment cues 
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when there is the possibility of reward, and react less to 
threatening and emotionally distressing stimuli than 
children without CU traits (Frick et al., 2003a).  
 In order to fully understand the callous-unemotional 
traits in children exhibiting psychopathic characteristics, 
it is vital to investigate the models explaining how this 
trait develops. There are multiple explanations of the 
preference for novel and dangerous activities, lack of 
emotional responsiveness to negative emotional material, 
and lack of sensitivity to cues to punishment found in the 
CU trait (Frick & Marsee, 2006) including low fearfulness 
(Rothbart & Bates, 1998), low behavioral inhibition (Kagan 
& Snidman, 1991), low harm avoidance (Cloninger, 1987), or 
high daring (Lahey & Waldman, 2003); however, these 
explanations, seem to bypass the basic developmental 
process underlying their theories: empathy development.  
 Empathy has been defined in various ways including 
simply cognitive, simply affective, and a combination of 
cognitive and affective factors. Cognitively, empathy 
includes an ability to understand the affective and 
cognitive state of another individual (Borke, 1971; 1973). 
The individual is aware of and understands another person’s 
feelings and can discern another’s thoughts (Borke, 1971; 
1973). The affective definition states that empathy is a 
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vicarious matching of an emotional response, feeling the 
same emotions of another and feeling sympathetic or 
compassionate toward another (Feshbach & Roe, 1968). The 
combination of the cognitive and affective definition is 
conceptualized as: (a) the interaction between an awareness 
of another’s feelings, thoughts, and intentions and the 
vicarious response of others (Hoffman, 1977), (b) a process 
that causes a person to have feelings that are more 
congruent with another’s situation than with his/her own 
(Hoffman, 2000), and (c) the individual’s emotional 
response that stems from another’s emotional state that is 
congruent with the other individual’s emotional 
state/situation; the empathic reaction can be a response to 
an overt cue of another’s emotional state such as a facial 
expression or an indirect cue such as the features of 
another’s situation (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987).  
 There are a number of ways to describe emotional 
development. The following description outlines how empathy 
develops when examining empathy through the affective 
definition. From this perspective there are four steps to 
empathy development (Hoffman, 1984), beginning with 
emotional expression or the intensity of the experienced 
and displayed emotion (Hoffman, 1984). Positive affect or 
emotional expression leads to appropriate behavior whereas 
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negative affect (fear, sad, etc) leads to less favorable 
behavior (Hoffman, 1984). Increased levels of negative 
affect can affect an individual’s empathetic response with 
decreased levels of emotional expression relating to low 
levels of empathy and moderate levels of emotional 
expressivity relating to greater empathetic responding 
(Hoffman, 1984). The second phase in affective empathy 
development is emotional insight, defined as the 
recognition that one’s own emotions directly influence the 
ability to display empathy (Hoffman, 1984). During this 
phase, an increased level of accuracy in the reflection of 
others develops when the other people respond positively to 
a child’s emotions (Hoffman, 1984). This stage focuses on 
self introspection concerning one’s own emotions than 
examining others. The third step of role-taking contributes 
directly to an individual’s ability to understand someone 
else’s emotions (Hoffman, 1984). This ability should have a 
positive impact on empathy development, increasing the 
individual’s empathetic responding (Hoffman, 1984). Role-
taking influences a person’s prosocial behavior in that it 
augments empathy rather than directly motivating prosocial 
behavior (Hoffman, 1984). Emotion regulation comprises the 
final phase of affective empathy development (Hoffman, 
1984). Emotional regulation determines whether a response 
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leads to sympathy or distress in an individual (Hoffman, 
2005). Sympathy allows a person to feel sorrow or concern 
for another based on the perception of another’s emotional 
state (Hoffman, 1984). Personal distress consists of a 
self-focused aversive emotional response that results from 
apprehension of another’s emotional state (Hoffman, 1984). 
Examples of an emotional response include a raised brow, 
licking one’s lips, touching one’s face, and increased 
heart rate (Hoffman, 1984).  
 Research demonstrates aggressive and antisocial 
behavior correlates with dysfunctional parenting and low 
intelligence more strongly for aggressive children without 
CU traits than those with CU traits (Loney, Frick, Elis & 
McCoy, 1998; Wootton et al., 1997). This difference between 
aggressive children with and without CU traits may lend 
support to the argument that a different developmental 
pathway or process underlies their aggressive and 
antisocial behavior (Frick, Cornell, Bodin, Dane, Barry, & 
Loney, 2003b). Consequently then these studies indicate 
that children who are aggressive and antisocial that do not 
exhibit CU traits may have difficulty regulating their 
behaviors and emotions related to high levels of emotional 
reactivity (Frick et al., 2003b). Poor emotional regulation 
can result from a number of factors such as poor 
  
 
86 
socialization, low intelligence which may make it more 
difficult to delay gratification and anticipate 
consequences, or problems with response inhibition due to 
temperamental troubles (Frick et al., 2003b). Emotional 
regulation difficulties can lead to impulsive and 
aggressive acts that the child has difficulty controlling 
but for which he or she does show remorse for afterward 
(Frick et al., 2003b). Children who exhibit CU traits lack 
the remorse for their actions that children who are 
aggressive but without CU traits are capable of 
demonstrating.  
 Frick and colleagues (2003b) examined children from 
the community who demonstrated conduct problems with and 
without the presence of CU traits and their relationship 
with emotional and behavioral dysregulation. They found 
that children with conduct problems excluding CU traits 
demonstrated evidence of emotional and behavioral 
regulation (Frick et al., 2003b). The children who 
exhibited both conduct problems and CU traits scored the 
highest on measures of impulsivity-hyperactivity, which the 
researchers termed behavioral dysregulation (Frick et al., 
2003b). These same children also demonstrated a lack of 
behavioral inhibition in that they showed a preference for 
novel and dangerous activities and a decreased sensitivity 
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to punishment cues when a reward response set was 
formulated (Frick et al., 2003b). This study claimed to be 
the first to show that children demonstrating CU traits 
without conduct problems also exhibited characteristics 
associated with behavioral inhibition, specifically in 
terms of the reward dominant response style (Frick et al., 
2003b). Frick and colleagues (2003b) suggested that this 
finding may indicate that the connection between CU traits 
and low behavioral inhibition may not be unique to a 
certain crowd of severely antisocial children. 
Interestingly, this study concluded the combination of 
emotional and behavioral dysregulation and conduct problems 
did not designate children as similar to adult psychopaths 
(Frick et al., 2003b). However, the presence of CU traits 
joined with emotional and behavioral inhibition and conduct 
problems distinguished a group of children sharing 
characteristics most similar to the adult psychopath (Frick 
et al., 2003b). The researchers only found an association 
between CU traits and low emotional reactivity in young 
children (Frick et al., 2003b). They offered several 
explanations for this finding. First, older children with 
conduct problems may be more heterogeneous regarding the 
developmental process which led them to demonstrate 
antisocial behaviors including age of onset (Frick et al., 
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2003b). Second, it is possible that a deficit in behavioral 
inhibition exists that may be related to a cognitive 
deficit in children with CU traits where they have 
difficulty shifting their goal-oriented response set (Frick 
et al., 2003b).  
 Cognitive empathy involves the individual’s awareness 
that an event is happening to another person, an 
examination of the causal attributions of an event, and the 
impact that has on another person (Hoffman, 1984). There 
are 3 developmental stages to cognitive empathy development 
(Hoffman, 1984). During the first stage of person 
permanence, children become aware of another person’s 
physical existence as completely separate from the self 
(Hoffman, 1984). At approximately six months of age, 
children internally reproduce images of objects (Hoffman, 
1984). By eighteen months, object permanence develops and 
by one year of age, children can keep a mental image of 
another person in their head (Hoffman, 1984). The second 
stage is perspective taking during which a child is able to 
understand the internal states of others with increased 
complexity (Hoffman, 1977, 2000). At approximately two or 
three years old, children begin to sense that they are 
physically distinct from others and are capable of 
attributing simple internal states to others (Hoffman, 
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1984). The final phase of cognitive empathy development 
occurs around three years of age (Hoffman, 1984). During 
this time, children are able to put themselves into another 
person’s shoes, demonstrating the ability to put themselves 
in another person’s place and imagine how he/she feels 
(Hoffman, 1984).  
 The CU factor specifically states that individuals 
with psychopathy demonstrate a lack of empathy; it is 
unknown at this point exactly how empathy development 
becomes impaired. Research demonstrates individuals with 
psychopathy demonstrate detached patterns of social 
interaction and poor ability to identify emotions in others 
(Soderstrom et al., 2002). Many models have attempted to 
address the CU trait including previously mentioned 
amygdala dysfunction, the dysfunctional fear hypothesis, 
and the violence inhibition mechanism (Blair, Mitchell, & 
Blair, 2005). One model suggests a connection between the 
elements of the CU trait and lower scores on measures of 
conscience development (Asendorpf & Nunner-Winkler, 1992; 
Kochanska, 2002). This model leads theorists to suggest 
that a temperamental style including the lack of emotional 
responsiveness to negative stimuli, preference for novel 
and dangerous activities, and the lack of sensitivity to 
cues to punishment may be involved with conscience 
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development (Frick & Morris, 2004). Research suggests that 
low behavioral inhibition in children may place the child 
at risk for poor conscience development in that the child 
may demonstrate deficiency in the early signs of empathetic 
concern involving emotional arousal brought about by the 
misfortune of others (Loney et al., 2003). The child then 
could be insensitive to forbiddance or approval of parents 
or other caregivers (Loney et al., 2003). Possibly 
resulting in the child developing an interpersonal style 
concentrated on the potential rewards contained in 
aggressive or antisocial acts toward others with the 
disregard for the prospective harm to himself/herself or 
others (Loney et al., 2003).  
 Kochanska and colleagues (1993, 1995, 1997; Kochanska, 
2002) proposed a specific model focusing on emotional 
arousal as a vital component to conscience development. 
This model suggests an optimal arousal for moral 
socialization is achieved through interactions of the 
child’s temperament and parenting received (Kochanska, 
2002). Studies demonstrate that children with fearfulness 
obtain higher scores on conscience development measures if 
they had experienced gentle, consistent, and nonpower 
assertive parenting; conversely, children displaying 
fearlessness did not obtain improved scores on measures of 
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conscience development when they experienced the same type 
of parenting (Kochanska, 2002). Another model suggests that 
the development of a negative arousal to punishment is 
dependent on the development of moral socialization and 
internalizing parental and societal norms (Kagan, 1998). 
Children with such temperaments that do not associate guilt 
or anxiety with anticipated or actual wrongdoing will 
experience a lack of anxiety which would typically inhibit 
their negative behavioral response (Kagan, 1998).  
 Research suggests that adults with psychopathic traits 
demonstrate difficulty processing emotional stimuli 
(Patrick, 1994). This finding extends to adolescents as 
well (Loney et al., 2003). Specifically, children 
exhibiting antisocial behavior and CU traits did not 
process affective stimuli similarly to those children 
evidencing only antisocial behavior (Loney et al., 2003). 
The adolescents with CU traits demonstrated a lack of 
facilitation to emotional words, which the researchers 
suggest implies a diminished reactivity to emotional 
stimuli in comparison to their peers with antisocial 
behaviors alone (Loney et al., 2003). This implies that 
children with both conduct problems and CU traits may 
display temperamental styles that have low emotional 
reactivity to aversive stimuli which can be identified 
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through physiological underactivity and poor responsiveness 
to punishment cues (Kagan & Snidman, 1991). Research 
demonstrates that antisocial and delinquent youth who also 
exhibit CU traits are less distressed by their behaviors’ 
negative effects on others, have more impaired empathetic 
concern and moral reasoning, expect more instrumental gain 
from their negative behaviors, and are more predatory in 
their violence than antisocial youth who do not display CU 
traits (Pardini et al., 2003). Aggressive children without 
CU traits tend to be highly reactive to emotional and 
threatening stimuli (Loney et al., 2003) and tend to react 
more strongly in social situations when provoked (Pardini 
et al., 2003).  
 Although many different perspectives have attempted to 
explain the CU trait found in individuals with psychopathy, 
there appears to be general agreement that low levels of 
fearful inhibitions can impair empathy development, moral 
socialization, and the development of conscience (Frick & 
Marsee, 2006). These theories have been demonstrated in 
research examining children who exhibit both conduct 
problems and CU traits (Frick & Marsee, 2006). For example, 
children with CU traits and conduct problems compared to 
children with only conduct problems tend to be less 
responsive to typical parental socialization practices 
  
 
93 
(Oxford, Cavell, & Hughes, 2003; Wootton et al., 1997), are 
less distressed by the negative effects of their behaviors 
on others (Blair, 1999; Frick et al., 1999; Pardini et al., 
2003), are more impaired in moral reasoning and empathic 
concern for others (Blair, 1999; Pardini et al., 2003), and 
are less able to recognize facial and vocal expressions of 
sadness of other children (Blair et al., 2001). 
Narcissism  
 A third characteristic thought to be associated with 
the psychopathic personality is narcissism. As stated 
previously, this characteristic has been evidenced in a 
community sample of youth evidencing psychopathic traits 
(Frick et al., 2000) and less so in clinic-referred samples 
demonstrating psychopathic traits (Frick et al., 1994). 
Although this characteristic has appeared in these samples, 
research has not focused on it as a main characteristic but 
has recognized the quality as a condition for a subtype of 
psychopathy (Poythress & Skeem, 2006). Narcissistic 
personality disorder regularly loads on the first factor of 
psychopathy in adults (Harpur et al., 1989). Narcissistic 
characteristics that are found on the first factor include 
such traits as a grandiose sense of self-importance, 
arrogant self-appraisal, lack of empathy, an unwillingness 
to recognize or identify with feelings or needs of others, 
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and interpersonal exploitation (Widiger, 2006). Although 
similarities exist, there are a number of key differences 
between the narcissistic personality disorder and 
antisocial personality disorder, under which the DSM-IV 
includes psychopathy (Widiger, 2006). First, those with a 
narcissistic personality disorder are often more grandiose 
while those with antisocial personality disorder are more 
exploitative, have a superficial value system, and engage 
in a recurrent pattern of antisocial behavior (Ronningstam, 
1999). Further, the exploitiveness found in those with 
antisocial personality disorder tends to be more of a 
conscious choice related to material or sexual gain 
compared to the more passive and self-image serving 
tendency found in those with narcissistic personality 
disorder (Ronningstam, 1999). One of the most important 
differences to recognize is that those with a narcissistic 
personality disorder demonstrate the ability to feel guilt 
and remorse; whereas those with psychopathic 
characteristics lack these emotions (Kernberg, 1998). 
Possibly, instead of considering these two disorders as 
separate or one in the same, they should be conceptualized 
as disorders on a continuum (Kernberg, 1998), which may 
explain why narcissistic characteristics are sometimes 
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evidenced and sometimes vacant in children with 
psychopathic traits.  
 To summarize, research has found evidence for the 
extension of the adult conceptualization of the 
psychopathic personality in children and more specifically 
have identified two predominant characteristics found in 
most samples of children including the impulsivity/conduct 
problems trait and the callous/unemotional characteristic. 
Multiple explanations have been offered to explain the 
development of the psychopathic traits in children such as 
temperament, poor parenting, amygdala dysfunction, and low 
fearfulness. This paper offers a supplemental explanation 
for the development of psychopathic characteristics, in 
particular that social-information/cognitive processing 
deficits relates to the development and/or maintenance of 
the psychopathic characteristics.  
Social-Cognitive Processes 
 
 The Center for Disease Control (2005) identified 
social cognitive deficits as a risk factor for increasing 
the probability of violence during adolescence and young 
adulthood. Social cognitive processes are defined as the 
mechanisms that lead to social behaviors that are the basis 
of social adjustment evaluations made by others (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994). Researchers argue that examining social 
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cognitions of children will help explain the construct of 
psychopathy in youth. That is, impaired social cognition 
offers a possible explanation for the evidence of 
persistent conduct problems of children with significant 
psychopathic, or in terms consistent with Frick and 
colleagues’ (1994) work, callous/unemotional (CU) traits. 
Pardini et al., (2003) demonstrated children high on CU 
traits had significant difficulty in modifying their social 
cognitions for goal-driven behavior when punished. 
Specifically, they concluded this group of children may 
have trouble considering the probability of various 
outcomes, particularly when outcomes are negative, of their 
antisocial behavior (Pardini et al., 2003). Further, some 
research shows individuals with significant psychopathic 
traits demonstrate adequate intellect (e.g., cognitive 
abilities) (Loney et al., 1998; Newman & Wallace, 1993), 
are free from symptoms of a thought disorder yet frequently 
fail to utilize good judgment in decision-making (Newman & 
Wallace, 1993). Second, research consistently finds errors 
made in social-information processing in the development 
and maintenance of delinquent behavior in antisocial 
children who are not evidencing psychopathy (Dodge, 
Lochman, Harnish, Bates, & Pettit, 1997). Thus, a more 
complete understanding of the factors shown to be 
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associated with psychopathy traits in youth is needed. 
Specifically how each factor (callous/unemotional, 
impulsivity and conduct problems, and narcissism) is 
related to social-information processing is underdeveloped. 
 The following is a discussion of Crick and Dodge’s 
(1994) popular social cognitive process and research 
examining the connection between the processes and 
individuals demonstrating aggressive and psychopathic 
characteristics. Crick and Dodge (1994) have developed a 
five step social cognitive process. The five steps 
including encoding, interpretation of cues, clarification 
of goals, response access or construction, and finally, 
response decision (Crick & Dodge, 1994). 
Steps 1 and 2  
 In steps one and two, encoding and interpretation of 
cues, social cues and schemas play an integral role. During 
these steps, children develop a mental representation of 
the social situation confronting them (Crick & Dodge, 
1994). They focus on particular cues in a situation, encode 
the cues, and then interpret them (Crick & Dodge, 1994). 
Any relevant knowledge from past experiences is recalled 
from memory and used as a guide for interpreting and 
understanding the present situation (Crick & Dodge. 1994). 
Children utilize schemata, which are memory structures that 
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organize information in a way that facilitates 
comprehension (Gerrig, 1988). Research demonstrates that 
individuals who are confronted with overwhelming stimulus 
information often relay on cognitive heuristics in order to 
simplify the cognitive tasks involved in processing that 
information (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Although the 
simplification process may make processing more efficient, 
it can also result in judgment and reasoning errors 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Perhaps for some children, the 
reliance on particular heuristics or schemata contributes 
to the display of problematic behavior and resulting social 
maladjustment (Crick & Dodge, 1994).  
 Tomlin (1987) showed that aggressive children are more 
likely than non-aggressive kids to base interpretations on 
their schemata (information that was not a part of the 
social stimuli presented). There exists a higher 
probability that aggressive children base their 
interpretations on social cues that occurred at the end of 
the social interaction and were less likely to recall cues 
that occurred at the beginning of the interaction (Tomlin, 
1987). Gouze (1987) found that aggressive boys attended to 
more aggressive social cues than non aggressive boys. Dodge 
and Newman (1981) found that aggressive boys used less 
social cues of any type than peers. Theories drawn from 
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these findings include: 1) maladjusted children have memory 
deficits that don’t allow them to store or recall presented 
social information adequately; 2) maladjusted children may 
selectively attend to particular social cues; 3) may have 
well-developed schemata for social interaction that 
interfere with ability/motivation to process and use 
immediate social cues because they feel that they already 
have it figured out so they do not need more info or 
because the schema evoked strong emotional reaction that 
preempted further processing of immediate cues (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994). 
 It is important then to examine children’s causal 
attributions to events when examining how they will process 
the information during encoding and interpretation. Causal 
attributions, defined as inferences made by individuals 
about the reasons why specific social events have occurred 
(Weiner & Graham, 1984), allow an individual to judge the 
motivations for social events, which is necessary 
information when attempting to understand or learn the 
connections between actions and reactions in social 
contexts (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Additionally, causal 
attributions aid in goal construction and response access 
and selection (Weiner & Graham, 1984). Research 
demonstrates socially adjusted kids create attributions 
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that lead to positive self-evaluations whereas maladjusted 
kids are more likely to have external attribution for 
positive social outcomes (Ames, Ames, & Garrison, 1977). 
The external attributions may keep the maladjusted kids 
from developing a positive social efficacy or competence 
even when they experience social success (Crick & Dodge, 
1994). However, research states that rejected children make 
internal attributions (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Crick and 
Dodge (1994) conclude that the evidence does not provide 
enough support for the connection between attributional 
styles and aggressive patterns.  
 Another vital aspect to steps one and two includes an 
individual’s attributions of intent. Attributions of intent 
initiate with children’s moral development, progressing 
into their social and aggressive behavior (Crick & Dodge, 
1994). Researchers hypothesize retaliatory aggressive 
behavior with peers relates to hostile attributions of 
peers intent, labeled “Hostile Attribution Bias” by Nasby, 
Hayden, and DePaule in 1979 (Crick & Dodge, 1994). During 
these interactions, aggressive behavior serves as a defense 
or retaliation against an act by a peer that is seen as 
intentionally harmful (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Several 
studies found evidence of hostile attribution bias in 
aggressive boys living in residential treatment centers 
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(Nasby, Hayden & DePaule, 1979), hyperactive-aggressive 
children in outpatient clinics (Milich & Dodge, 1984), 
school-based populations (McClaskey, 1988), incarcerated 
adolescent boys with undersocialized conduct disorder 
(Dodge, Price, Bachorowski, & Newman, 1990), and adolescent 
offenders in jail for violent acts (Slaby & Guerra, 1988). 
Crick and Dodge (1994) conclude it is likely hostile 
attribution biases antecede aggressive behavior and peer 
status but the reciprocal could be true as well (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994).  
 During the encoding and interpretation steps, children 
evaluate the accuracy of their outcome expectation and 
self-efficacy predictions that they made during previous 
interactions with peers (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Children may 
compare the predicted outcome with the outcome that was 
actually obtained (Crick & Dodge, 1994). These evaluations 
may lead to the strengthening of the children’s initial 
beliefs or the development of new beliefs (Crick & Dodge, 
1994).  
Step 3 
 Step three of the social cognitive process includes 
the clarification of goals (Crick & Dodge, 1994). The goals 
focus on arousal states that function as orientations 
toward producing or wanting to produce specific outcomes 
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(Crick & Dodge, 1994). Social situation goals may include 
internal (feel happy, regulate negative feeling, etc.) or 
external (first in line etc.) states or outcomes (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994). Children bring goal orientations/tendencies 
to peer situations but can revise goals and construct new 
goals in response to the immediate social stimuli (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994). Interpretations of the immediate social 
stimuli or internal/external cues influence their goal 
orientations (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Sources of goal 
orientation include feelings, temperament, adult 
instruction, cultural or subcultural norms, and media 
(Crick & Dodge, 1994). Subsequent response accessing and 
behavior also influence goal orientations (Crick & Dodge, 
1994). Research demonstrates that children who construct or 
pursue inappropriate goals are more likely to become 
socially maladjusted (Dodge, Asher & Parkhurst, 1989).  
Step 4 
 The fourth step of information processing, according 
to Crick and Dodge’s (1994) model, is the response access 
or construction phase. During this step, children access 
behavioral responses from their long term memory. Some 
responses consist of strategies for attaining the goal and 
others are responses to social stimuli that are not clearly 
goal driven (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Children’s choices for 
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social responses include their ideas about how they could 
behavior in a specific social situation (Crick & Dodge, 
1994). 
 Three aspects create children’ s response access 1) 
the number of behaviors generated in response to social 
stimuli (response repertoire) 2) the actual content of the 
responses and 3) the order in which children access 
particular types of responses (Crick & Dodge, 1994). 
Children who demonstrate aggressive behaviors access a 
fewer number of responses to social situations than peers 
(Asarnow & Callan, 1985; Dodge et al., 1986). Additionally, 
these children access responses that are more aggressive 
and less prosocial than peers for provocation, group entry, 
object acquisition, and friendship initiation situations 
(Asarnow & Callan, 1985; Dodge et al., 1986). Research 
shows, the response repertoires of aggressive kids are 
maladaptive across a broad range of social contexts (Crick 
& Dodge, 1994). Even when aggressive children can access an 
initial prosocial response, subsequent responses include 
more aggressive than nonaggressive peers and therefore, it 
appears that the responses available to children 
demonstrating aggressive behaviors at the response decision 
step includes many aggressive acts (Crick & Dodge, 1994). 
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Step 5 
 During the final information processing step, response 
decision, children engage in response evaluation (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994). Response evaluation consists of children’s 
assessments of the quality of social behaviors with respect 
to a specified, evaluative dimension (Crick & Ladd, 1990). 
The evaluation depends on the children’s moral rules or 
values (Crick & Dodge, 1994) Remember, individuals with 
psychopathy demonstrate difficulty developing moral 
socialization (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005). Favorable 
evaluations of a response are positively related to the 
subsequent behavioral enactment of that response (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994). Children who are socially maladjusted engage 
in maladaptive social behaviors partly because they 
evaluate the maladaptive behaviors favorably (Asarnow & 
Callan, 1985; Dodge et al., 1986). 
 Outcome expectancies also play a role in children’s 
response decisions (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Outcome 
expectancies are defined as children’s ideas about what is 
likely to occur in a social interaction after the enactment 
of a designated social response (Crick & Ladd, 1990). The 
expectation of a favorable or desired outcome for a 
particular behavior positively relates to enactment of the 
behavior (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Outcome expectancies serve 
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as an excitatory or an inhibitory function depending on 
whether the outcome expected is positive or negative, 
respectively (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Research demonstrates 
favorable expectations for an outcome of physical and 
verbal aggression is positively related to the display of 
observed, peer assessed, and self-reported aggressive 
behavior (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Importantly, this relation 
may be specific to children who use instrumental aggression 
(Crick & Dodge, 1992). Conversely, children who display 
aggressive behavior tend to expect less positive outcomes 
than peers who are not aggressive for prosocial behavior 
(Crick & Dodge, 1989; Dodge et al., 1986). 
 A tendency to respond frequently to reward stimuli and 
decrease avoidance of punishment stimuli when presented 
with conditions for both reward and punishment is the 
theory of reward dominance (Quay, 1992). Antisocial 
individuals will be more likely than non-antisocial 
individuals to persist in responding to stimuli that had 
previously been rewarded even if the punishment for the 
stimuli increased (O’Brien & Frick, 1996). Consistent with 
the reward-dominant response theory, studies show 
psychopathic offenders will continue to choose previously 
rewarded stimuli, such as choosing cards, even when the 
stimuli no longer produced rewards (Kosson & Newman, 1986). 
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In regards to adolescents, O’Brien and Frick (1996) found 
the reward-dominant response style was evident in a 
distinct subgroup of children with conduct problems and 
this subgroup closely resembled the construct of 
psychopathy. Pardini et al. (2003) found higher CU traits 
to be associated with higher expectation and values 
associated with positive consequences of aggression and 
decreased expectations and values related to the negative 
consequences of deviant behavior. Interestingly, no 
significant relationship existed between CU traits and 
using aggression against a provocative peer to prevent 
future conflicts (Pardini et al., 2003). Children with CU 
traits did have lower expectancies and values concerning 
inhibiting aggression even with the threat of punishment 
(Pardini et al., 2003). The researchers explained this 
result coincides with the idea that children with CU traits 
tend to experience less fear when punished for their 
negative behavior (Pardini et al., 2003). 
 Another aspect of the response decision is a self-
efficacy evaluation, defined as the degree to which 
individuals believe that they can successfully perform 
behaviors that are necessary for achieving the desired 
outcomes (Bandura, 1978). To select a generated response 
for enactment, children must first feel confident that they 
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can produce the behavior or interest (Crick & Dodge, 1994). 
Research demonstrates that children who engage in 
aggressive behavior feel more efficacious than peers about 
performing physically and verbally aggressive behaviors 
(Crick & Dodge, 1989; D.G. Perry et al., 1986). Again, this 
may be specific to children engaging in instrumental or 
proactive aggressive (Crick & Dodge, 1994).  
 Finally, a response is selected during which children 
select the most positively evaluated response to enact 
(Crick & Dodge, 1994). Children considered socially 
maladjusted are more likely to make response decisions that 
involve aggression or nonnormative behaviors and are less 
likely to make decisions involve friendly behaviors (Pettit 
et al., 1988). The types of behavior children considered 
socially maladjusted evaluate favorably are the same 
behaviors that they choose to enact (Crick & Dodge, 1994). 
Children’s response decisions are predictive of behaviors 
actually exhibit in peer interactions (Crick & Dodge, 
1994). 
 Dodge and colleagues (1997) hypothesized that social 
information processing patterns may distinguish between 
proactive and reactive aggression. To review, Bandura 
(1978) explained aggression as a goal-driven and 
instrumental behavior dependent on the expectation of 
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external rewards or reinforcement. Instrumental or 
proactive aggression occurs when the acquisition of a goal 
or external reward is more important than the individual 
who may be injured in the process of obtaining it 
(Woodworth & Porter, 2002). Reactive aggression involves 
impulsive, immediate, and emotion-driven reactions when an 
individual perceives to be threatened or in danger 
(Woodworth & Porter, 2002). Building off previous research 
which suggested that the early stages of cue-related 
processing patterns related to reactive aggressive and 
later stages of outcome-related processing related to 
proactive aggression, Dodge and colleagues (1997) believed 
that a child’s failure to attend to social cues, 
interpreting peers’ interactions as hostile, and a tendency 
to react aggressively to supposed provocations would more 
often lead to retaliatory aggression rather than proactive 
aggression. Subsequently, outcome-related processing that 
perceived positive consequences of aggressive behavior 
would be more correlated with proactive than reactive 
aggression (Dodge et al., 1997). The results were 
inconsistent in terms of the attention to social cues where 
the reactively aggressive group demonstrated more 
difficulty attending to relevant social cues than the 
proactively aggressive and non-aggressive groups (Dodge et 
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al., 1997). As predicted, the group of elementary students 
classified as proactively aggressive anticipated more 
positive intrapersonal consequences for aggression than the 
reactive aggression or non-aggression groups (Dodge et al., 
1997). The proactively aggressive group also indicated that 
it would be easier for them to engage in aggressive 
behavior than the non-aggressive group (Dodge et al., 
1997).  
 Other research found that youth displaying reactive 
aggressive demonstrate a bias at early stage of social-
information processing; whereas children engaging in 
proactive/predatory aggression demonstrate social 
information processing deficits at a later stage and expect 
significantly more positive expectations of their 
aggressive behavior than children demonstrating reactive 
aggression and also evaluate themselves as skilled in 
responding to others with aggression (Matthys, Cuperus, & 
Van Engeland, 1999), which leads to the use of aggression 
to obtain objects from others or establish social dominance 
over them (Connor, 2002).  
 From the research discussed on social cognitive 
processes, one can conclude that children who engage in 
antisocial and aggressive acts demonstrate impairment in 
the social information processes. Interestingly, many 
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deficits in social information processing are witnessed in 
those children demonstrating instrumental or proactive 
aggression, a characteristic also evident in individuals 
with psychopathy. With the exception of a few studies, 
research is lacking that specifically addresses social 
cognitive processes and psychopathic traits in youth.   
Purpose of the Current Study 
 
 The purpose of the current study was to expand 
previous research conducted by Pardini and colleagues in 
2003. Pardini and colleagues examined the definition of 
psychopathy in a sample of adjudicated youth as well as the 
relation of social-cognitive processes and psychopathic 
traits. The current study sought to clarify how the 
findings from an incarcerated sample of youth who exhibit 
various levels of psychopathy are comparable to youth who 
require treatment for aggression outside of the scope of 
services typically provided by a student’s home school 
district but who do not require incarceration. Much of the 
research on psychopathy utilizes incarcerated psychopaths 
for practical reasons such as the availability of the 
criminals (Kirkman, 2002). However, not all psychopaths are 
recidivist criminals in incarcerated settings (Cleckley, 
1976; Hare, 1993). Some psychopaths have no criminal record 
at all and are doctors, lawyers, and store owners in our 
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own neighborhoods; therefore, it is essential to study 
those psychopaths who are able to avoid the prisons and 
jails in order to fully understand psychopathy (Hare, 1993; 
Kirkman, 2002). Additionally, clinic-referred and forensic 
samples make it unclear whether the callous/unemotional 
traits found in antisocial children who exhibit these 
traits are also characteristic of all children 
demonstrating callous/unemotional traits or only those who 
demonstrate serious antisocial behavior and are thus 
adjudicated (Frick, et al. 2003b). By studying psychopathy 
in the community, there is not only the opportunity to 
expand the depth and breadth of knowledge in this area but 
also to assist in learning about the conditions in the 
social environment that creates or hinder the development 
of such a disorder (Kirkman, 2002). Additionally, if 
children with psychopathic traits can be correctly 
identified, then the social environment of a school would 
be an excellent place to study the functioning of the 
psychopaths who are, according to Lynam (1997), the “truly 
successful or noninstitutionalized people” and it’s 
possible that by studying those that show evidence of 
psychopathic traits but whose behavior has not reached the 
level for incarceration, we can eventually classify the 
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traits that are specific to psychopathy and those simply 
related to criminality (Kirkman, 2002; Lynam, 1997).  
 The current study examined psychopathy, via 
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissistic traits as they related to social-cognitive 
processes (e.g., values and outcome expectations) on a 
range of social interactions/events in a community sample 
of children with behavioral and emotional difficulties. The 
narcissism factor was included in this study as a 
preliminary investigation of the psychopathy factor 
structure in the current community sample due to the 
investigation which identified narcissism as a distinct 
factor in a community sample of 1,136 elementary school-age 
children (Frick et al., 2000). 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 The first research question investigated how much 
variance the callous/unemotional factor explained in both 
emotional (personal distress and empathic concern) and 
cognitive (perspective taking) empathy and likewise, how 
much variance the impulsivity/conduct problems factor 
explained in both emotional (personal distress and empathic 
concern) and cognitive (perspective taking) empathy and how 
much variance the narcissism factor explained in both 
emotional (personal distress and empathic concern) and 
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cognitive (perspective taking) empathy? The current study 
hypothesized that the callous/unemotional trait would 
predict emotional and cognitive empathy; however, the 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor would not. Because the 
narcissism factor has been found to load on Factor 1 of 
Hare’s two factor model (1993) as does the 
callous/unemotional factor (Harpur et al., 1989), it was 
hypothesized that the narcissistic factor could share 
variance with the callous/unemotional trait in predicting 
emotional and cognitive empathy. However, in the one study 
where the narcissism factor emerged in the community 
sample, the narcissism traits were more closely related to 
measures of impulsivity/conduct problems (Frick et al., 
2000). Therefore, it was also possible that the narcissism 
factor, similar to the hypothesis concerning the 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor, would not predict 
cognitive or emotional empathy.   
 The second research question examined whether the 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor predicted dysregulated 
behaviors (behavioral, cognitive, and emotional), the 
callous/unemotional factor predicted dysregulated behaviors 
(behavioral, cognitive, and emotional), and the narcissism 
factor predicted dysregulated behaviors (behavioral, 
cognitive, and emotional)? It was hypothesized that 
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impulsivity/conduct problems would explain variance in the 
dysregulated behaviors variables including behavioral, 
emotional, and cognitive dysregulation; however, the 
callous/unemotional factor would not. Again, previous 
findings were unclear concerning the narcissistic factor; 
therefore, it was unclear whether the narcissism factor 
would explain variance in dysregulated behaviors, as 
hypothesized with the impulsivity/conduct problems factor, 
or would not, as hypothesized with the callous/unemotional 
factor.  
 The third research question investigated how much 
variance in behavioral inhibition or fearfulness was 
uniquely explained by the callous/unemotional, 
impulsivity/conduct problems factors, and narcissism 
factor? It was hypothesized that the callous/unemotional 
trait would not explain variance within the behavioral 
inhibition or fearfulness variable and in fact would 
demonstrate a negative relationship; whereas, the 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor would predict 
behavioral inhibition/fearfulness. Again, previous findings 
were unclear concerning the narcissistic factor; therefore, 
it was unclear whether the narcissism factor would explain 
variance in behavioral inhibition, as hypothesized with the 
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impulsivity/conduct problems factor, or would not, as 
hypothesized with the callous/unemotional factor.    
 Finally, did callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissistic traits 
independently predict social-cognitive processes in 
community youth displaying aggressive behaviors? It was 
hypothesized that the callous/unemotional factor, but not 
the impulsivity/conduct problems factor would predict a 
higher value placed on aggressive acts and a disregard for 
the negative consequences of aggressive behavior. More 
specifically, the callous/unemotional factor would predict 
increased expectations and values associated with the 
positive outcomes of aggressive behavior and decreased 
expectations and values associated with the negative 
consequences for aggressive behavior. It was expected that 
the impulsivity/conduct problems factor would not be 
related to the outcome expectations or values. Again, 
previous findings were unclear concerning the narcissism 
factor; therefore, it was unclear whether the narcissism 
factor would explain variance in social cognition, as 
hypothesized with the callous/unemotional factor, or would 
not, as hypothesized with the impulsivity/conduct problems 
factor. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
General Purpose 
 The purpose of the current study was to expand 
previous research conducted by Pardini and colleagues in 
2003. Pardini and colleagues (2003) examined the definition 
of psychopathy in a sample of adjudicated youth as well as 
the relationship between social-cognitive processes and 
psychopathic traits. The current study examined if the 
findings from an incarcerated sample were similar to a 
community sample of youth who require treatment for 
aggression outside of their home school district but who do 
not require incarceration. The current study examined 
psychopathy, via callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism. The three-
factor structure was examined due to inconsistent findings 
of the psychopathy construct in children with two-factors 
(impulsivity/conduct problems and callous/unemotional 
traits) being found with clinic-referred sample (Frick et 
al., 1994) and three-factors (impulsivity/conduct problems, 
callous/unemotional traits, and narcissism) emerging with a 
community based sample (Frick et al., 2000). Further, as 
examined in the incarcerated sample, the role of social-
cognition (e.g., values and outcome expectations) when 
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presented with a range of social interactions/events was 
examined.  
 The current chapter 3 contains the methodology of the 
study including a description of the setting, instruments 
utilized, recruitment of participants, participants in 
general, procedures, research design, and the statistical 
analysis.  
Method 
Setting 
 The current study took place at an alternative 
education school in a metropolitan area as part of a 
school-wide program evaluation process. The school was 
conducting program evaluations that examine academic, 
behavioral and personality variables in order to examine 
the efficacy of the treatment programs set up in this 
alternative education center. The current study was 
permitted the use of a portion of the data collected during 
this school-wide program evaluation. The school services 
approximately 19 school districts in the surrounding 
metropolitan area from grades 5 through 12. Students at the 
school had been removed from their home school districts 
for a variety of reasons including behavioral and emotional 
concerns. Examples of behavioral concerns include truancy, 
physical aggression with teachers or peers, verbal 
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aggression, defiance, and rule-breaking behaviors. 
Emotional concerns include emotional dysregulation or 
behavioral reactions that are not consistent with normative 
developmental expectation. Some students presented with 
formal mental health diagnoses such as bipolar disorder, 
schizophrenia, and other severe emotional disturbances. 
Many, but not all of the students, also demonstrate poor 
academic progress in various areas. Length of stay at this 
alternative school is highly variable and determined by the 
needs of the individual students and how they were referred 
for attendance.  For example, some of the students attend 
the school for 45 days as an alternative placement as a 
result of specific concerns or suspensions (e.g., weapon or 
drug violations) when attending their home school district. 
These students are evaluated at the end of the 45 day 
placement to determine which setting is required for their 
academic and social success. As such, there are students 
who have been attending this school for months or years 
because this setting is the least restrictive setting that 
allows them to benefit from the educational environment. 
Some students may remain in this setting until they 
graduate due to their inability to prosper from a general 
education environment.  
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 The majority of the classrooms have a student to 
teacher ratio of approximately 15:1. Each classroom also 
provides a behavior specialist who assists the teacher in 
monitoring the students’ behaviors and providing support to 
work through concerns that may arise. There are 
approximately 140 total students attending the alternative 
school. The students follow a typical school day schedule. 
The school provides curriculum for grades 5 through 12; 
however, each grade is not necessarily represented by its 
own classroom. The students are placed in a specific 
classroom based on academic, behavioral, and emotional 
concerns. Much effort is made, especially in the mainstream 
classrooms, to create classrooms that encompass students 
from the same grade level.  
 There are 5 mainstream classrooms with a general 
science, social studies, english, math, and reading 
teacher. These students, while demonstrating emotional and 
behavioral difficulties, have been determined to be capable 
of coping with a more typical daily school schedule. The 
students from these classrooms change classes after each 
period among the 5 possible teachers. These students also 
participate in a gym class and attend a lunch period. The 
majority of the students enrolled at this school are 
involved in these classrooms. 
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 There are two semi-self contained classrooms with 
students who are typically enrolled at a high school grade 
level. These classrooms do not switch classes with the 
mainstream classrooms; however, they do switch between each 
other. The two teachers for these classrooms divide the 
general academic areas they specialize in. These students 
also engage in a gym period and attend a lunch time. The 
students in these classrooms tend to demonstrate more 
severe emotional and behavioral concerns and have been 
determined to need a more structured school day with less 
opportunity for an unstructured school environment.  
 There are three additional semi-self contained 
classrooms that include students who are enrolled in lower 
grades such as middle school to the beginning of high 
school. However, there are less specific criteria for being 
placed in these classrooms compared to the previously 
mentioned semi-self contained rooms. The group is more 
heterogeneous and these students show more instability in 
their behavioral and emotional states and their academic 
functioning is much slower. These students may switch 
classrooms among the three rooms for some but not all 
subjects. The five semi-self contained classrooms mentioned 
comprise approximately 40 to 50 students. Finally, the 
school runs a life skills program, for children diagnosed 
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with mental retardation, where there are approximately 5-10 
students at any given time. This classroom is self-
contained and follows a standardized life-skills 
curriculum. That is, an extremely structured environment 
with more adaptive and life-based curriculum. Many students 
in these rooms present with multiple disabilities including 
a diagnosis of mental retardation.  
 As noted, the information collected in this study was 
gathered as part of a comprehensive school-wide program 
evaluation. The examiner for the current study participated 
in data collection as part of the school team. This author 
served as a school psychology practicum student for the 
school. As an employee/practicum student, this author was 
asked to generate the packet of instruments to be utilized 
per the objective of the school’s program evaluation, which 
included an examination of various behaviors and 
personality traits of their students. The current study was 
a separate data analyses that was conducted with the 
permission of the school, and utilized specific elements of 
the existing school-wide data set. It should noted that 
data collection did not change or alter the students’ 
educational environment/placement.   
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Instruments 
 The instruments utilized in the data collection were 
standardized measures used to examine behavioral and 
personality characteristics in children. There were a total 
of eight instruments; however, for the purposes of this 
study, some subscales on each measure were not utilized.  
The rationale for using each measure, is provided in 
subsequent sections.  
 Demographic Questionnaire. This questionnaire gathered 
demographic information. Participants were asked to provide 
information that is detailed in their student files 
including sensitive personal information that is collected 
by school personnel. Of the data collected the following 
was used in this study: date of birth, age, ethnicity, 
gender, participation in gang activity, and history of 
incarceration. Other demographic information gathered 
through record review included participants’ IQ, current 
educational program, and current diagnosis.  
 Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD; Frick & 
Hare, 2001).  The APSD is a 20-item behavior rating scale 
with each item scored either 0 (Not at all true), 1 
(Sometimes true), or 2 (Definitely true).  It was adapted 
from Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (Hare, 1991) in 
order to measure psychopathic traits in youth. A factor 
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analysis revealed the APSD included three dimensions: a 7-
item Narcissism dimension, a 5-item Impulsivity dimension, 
and a 6-item Callous-Unemotional dimension that can 
identify community, clinic-referred and incarcerated 
samples of children (Frick, Bodin, & Barry, 2000). The 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor and the narcissism 
dimension were utilized in the current study. Due to the 
inconsistency in the research identifying two-factors in 
clinic-referred children (Frick et al., 1994) and three-
factors in community sample children (Frick et al., 2000), 
the narcissism factor was included in this study, although 
it was not included in the Pardini et al (2003) 
investigation. There is substantive support for the 
validity of the APSD for designating a distinct subgroup of 
antisocial youth with more severe and aggressive behavior 
and who show characteristics similar to adults with 
psychopathy (Frick et al., 2003; Frick et al., 1999).  
Although the published version of the APSD was designed to 
be completed by parents and teachers, the current study 
utilized the newly developed self-report version that has 
been used in research studies. Although there is less data 
on the self-report version of the APSD,  it is comprised of 
the same three factor structure (Vitacco, Rogers, & 
Neumann, 2003), it has been shown to designate a more 
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severe, chronic, and violent juvenile offender  (Caputo, et 
al., 1999; Kruh, Frick, & Clements 2005), with deficits in 
emotional functioning (Kimonis et al., 2004; Loney et al., 
2003) and who are insensitive to punishment in social 
situations (Pardini et al., 2003). Additionally, research 
suggests that the validity of self-report increases from 
childhood to adolescence when assessing most types of 
psychopathology, while the validity of parent and teacher 
ratings decreases (Kamphus & Frick, 1996). Thus, the self-
report version was selected for use with the current 
sample. 
 Internal consistency for the self-report version of 
the total APSD are reported at .78 - .81, which is 
comparable to the parent reports (.85 - .89) (Munoz & 
Frick, personal communication, February 21, 2006). The 
coefficient alpha’s for the subscales of the self-report 
APSD are reported in the modest range from .50 to .68; 
whereas the internal consistency of the parent report was 
in the modest range: callous-unemotional = .72-.76, 
narcissism = .79 - .82, and impulsivity = .65-.75 (Munoz & 
Frick, personal communication, February 21, 2006). Due to 
modest internal consistency in the APSD self-report, item 
statistics were computed (Munoz & Frick, personal 
communication, February 21, 2006). Item statistics revealed 
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that item-total correlations across scales and time periods 
exceeded .20 with one item falling below .10; however, 
eliminating items did not demonstrate substantial increases 
in alpha for the subscales (Munoz & Frick, personal 
communication, February 21, 2006). Stability estimates for 
the self-report APSD total score was between .70 and .72 
for one year intervals and .64 across two years (Munoz & 
Frick, personal communication, February 21, 2006). 
Estimates were somewhat lower for subscales with one-year 
estimates ranging from .49 (Narcissism) to .63 
(Impulsivity) and two year estimates from .43 (Narcissism) 
to .58 (Impulsivity) with all p’s < .01 (Munoz & Frick, 
personal communication, February 21, 2006). 
 Predictive utility was also investigated for the APSD 
self-report and future antisocial behavior. Researchers 
found that both the parent and self-report versions of the 
APSD predicted antisocial behavior two years later (Munoz & 
Frick, personal communication, February 21, 2006). However, 
for both versions, the least predictive scale was the 
callous-unemotional scale (Munoz & Frick, personal 
communication, February 21, 2006). In order to address the 
psychometric limitations of the callous-unemotional 
subscale, Frick (2003) developed a measure specifically 
addressing that single construct, the Inventory of Callous-
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Unemotional Traits. The current study conducted a 
correlation in order to examine the relationship between 
the callous-unemotional trait from the APSD and the ICU in 
order to assure validity and reliability of the ICU 
measure. The measure with the highest reliability was 
included in the current study. Logic predicts that the ICU 
would produce greater reliability for the 
callous/unemotional construct due to the increase in items 
and will be the measure of the callous/unemotional trait in 
the current study.        
 Inventory of Callous-Unemotional Traits (ICU; Frick, 
2003). The ICU was based on the six-item CU scale found on 
the Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD; Frick & 
Hare, 2001). This scale was created in order to provide a 
more comprehensive assessment of the callous-unemotional 
trait by addressing the small number of items available on 
the APSD that examined the callous-unemotional factor, the 
limited 3-point scale ratings, and the dominate positively 
directed wording of the callous-unemotional APSD subscale 
(Essau, Sasagawa, & Frick, in press). The four items found 
to load consistently on the CU scale (i.e., “Is concerned 
about how well he/she does school or work”, “Feels bad or 
guilty when he/she does something wrong”, “Is concerned 
about the feelings of others”, “Does not show feeling or 
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emotions”) in both community and clinical samples were the 
foundation in creating the ICU (Frick et al., 2000). Three 
positively (e.g. “Easily admits to being wrong”) and three 
negatively worded (e.g. “Shows no remorse when he/she has 
done something wrong) items were developed from each 
original item which led to the creation of a 24-item scale 
with equal numbers of both positively and negatively worded 
items (Essau et al., in press). In order to further 
differentiate ICU traits, the rating scale for the items 
was expanded to a four point Likert scale ranging from “0” 
(“Not at all true”) to “3” (Definitely true”). Before 
calculating the total scores, the twelve positively worded 
items (items 1, 3, 5, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24) 
required reverse scoring (Essau et al., in press). Factor 
analysis found that the ICU described three dimensions of 
behavior including callousness, uncaring, and unemotional 
(Essau et al., in press). The callousness factor depicted 
an aspect of behavior that included lack of empathy, guilt, 
and remorse for misdeeds (Essau et al., in press). The 
uncaring factor captured a dimension of behavior that 
included a lack of caring about ones performance in tasks 
and for the feelings of other people (Essau et al., in 
press). The third factor, unemotional, depicted an element 
of behavior that focused on an absence of emotional 
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expression (Essau et al., in press). A confirmatory factor 
analysis found that the 3-factors loaded onto a higher-
order factor representing the “callous-unemotional” 
dimension and therefore, provided the best fit (Essau et 
al., in press). Although parent, teacher, and self-report 
versions of the ICU exist, the current study only used the 
self-report version. The current study utilized the entire 
measure. 
 Internal consistency for the entire ICU scale has been 
reported as good, with a coefficient alpha of .77 and a 
Guttman Split half reliability of .70 (Essau et al., in 
press). Internal consistency of the three subscales was 
also determined to be good for two out of the three with a 
coefficient alpha of .70 for the callousness factor, .73 
for the uncaring factor, and a marginal coefficient alpha 
of .55 for the unemotional factor (Essau et al., in press). 
Item-total correlation and coefficient alpha did not 
propose the deletion of any item would significantly 
increase the internal consistency of the scale (Essau et 
al., in press). The three scales demonstrated moderate 
inter-correlation with the callousness scale correlating 
with the unemotional scale at .21 (p < .001) and uncaring 
scale at .31 (p < .001) and the uncaring scale correlating 
with the unemotional scale at .20 (p < .001). Additionally, 
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construct validity was supported by the association of the 
ICU and the Big Five personality dimensions (Essau et al., 
in press).   
 Gender affects have been evidenced with this measure 
with significant main effects found for the total ICU 
scores (F (1, 1282) = 218.36, p < .001), as well as the 
callousness (F (1, 1340) = 152.23, p < .001), uncaring (F 
(1, 1413)= 84.48, p < .001), and unemotional (F (1, 1384)= 
139.81, p < .001) subscales (Essau et al., in press). In 
every case, the girls demonstrated significantly lower 
rates of callous-unemotional traits than boys (Essau et 
al., in press). 
 Abbreviated Dysregulation Inventory (Mezzich et al., 
1997). The Abbreviated Dysregulation Inventory is a self-
report measure designed to assess various types of 
dysregulation in adolescents including behavioral, 
emotional, and cognitive. Participants rate each item on a 
4-point scale (0 = “never true” to 3 = “always true”). 
Scale items are summed and then averaged, thus higher 
scores indicate increased levels of the dysregulation 
construct assessed. Adequate internal consistency 
coefficients were found for each subscale in previous 
studies (Mezzich et al., 1997). An internal consistency of 
.80 was previously found for the behavioral dysregulation 
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subscale (Pardini et al., 2003). The current study utilized 
all three dysregulation measures including behavioral (e.g. 
“I get very fidgety after a few minutes if I am supposed to 
sit still”), emotional (e.g. “I easily become emotionally 
upset when I am tired”), and cognitive (e.g. “I develop a 
plan for all my important goals”).   
 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). The 
IRI is a 28-item, self-report measure designed to measure 
cognitive and affective dispositions related to empathy. 
Four subscales comprise the IRI including perspective 
taking which “reflect(s) a tendency or ability of the 
respondent to adopt the perspective or point of view of 
other people” (e.g. “I try to look at everybody’s side of a 
disagreement before making a decision”), fantasy which 
measures “a tendency of the respondent to identify strongly 
with fictitious characters in books, movies or plays” (e.g. 
“When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in 
the place of a leading character”), empathic concern which 
measures “a tendency for the respondent to experience a 
feeling of warmth, compassion, and concern for others 
undergoing negative experiences” (e.g. “I often have tender 
concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me”), and 
personal distress which “indicate(s) the respondent 
experience(s) feelings of discomfort and anxiety when 
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witnessing the negative experiences of others (e.g. “Being 
in a tense emotional situation scares me) (Davis, 1980, p. 
4). The perspective taking scale comprises the cognitive 
component of empathy where empathic concern, fantasy, and 
personal distress scales comprise the affective components 
of empathy (Davis, 1980). In an attempt to more closely 
extend the findings of the previous study, the fantasy 
scale was excluded from the current study consistent with 
the Pardini et al., (2003) investigation. It should be 
noted that researchers (Davis & Franzoi, 1991) have found 
that the construct personal distress decreases during 
adolescence due to it measuring an early and egocentric 
precursor to empathy, similar to sympathy.  
 Items on the IRI were rated on a 5-point Likert type 
scale (1 = “does not describe me well” to 5 = “describes me 
very well). Scale items are summed and then averaged, thus 
higher scores indicate increased levels of the construct 
assessed. Acceptable internal consistency and predictive 
and convergent validity were displayed in previous studies 
(Davis, 1983; Davis & Franzoi, 1991). Adequate test-retest 
reliability was found (ranging from .62 - .71) in Davis’ 
(1980) initial presentation of the measure while working 
with college students. Internal reliabilities are reported 
to range from .71 to .77 (Davis, 1980). Good convergent and 
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discriminate validity were also reported through 
correlation of the IRI and existing tests of empathy and 
other studies, demonstrating good construct validity (Davis 
& Franzoi, 1991).      
 Early Adolescent Temperament Questionnaire- Revised: 
Short Form (EATQ-R; Capaldi & Rothbart, 1992). The EATQ-R 
short form is a self-report measure designed to assess 
temperament in early adolescence. The measure includes 12 
temperament scales including activation control, 
affiliation, attention, fear, frustration, surgency/high 
intensity pleasure, inhibitory control, perceptual 
sensitivity, pleasure sensitivity, shyness, aggression, and 
depressive mood. Only the seven-item fearfulness subscale 
was utilized in the current study as a measure of 
behavioral inhibition. The fear dimension of temperament is 
described as unpleasant affect related to anticipation of 
distress (Capaldi & Rothbart, 1992). Items consist of 
general statements (e.g. “I am nervous of some of the youth 
at school who push people into lockers and throw your books 
around”) followed by a 5-point Likert scale inquiring how 
true each statement was for the participant (1 = “almost 
always untrue of you” to 5 = “almost always true of you”). 
Items are summed and then averaged, thus higher scores 
indicate increasing levels of temperamental fear. Adequate 
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internal consistency and convergent validity have been 
found for this measure with participants aged 11 - 24 years 
(Capaldi & Rothbart, 1992). Coefficient alpha’s for the 
scales ranged from .65 - .82 in previous examinations 
(Capaldi & Rothbart, (1992); Putnam, Ellis, & Rothbart, 
1992). Specifically, the fear subscale evidenced a 
coefficient alpha of .74 and a test-retest correlation of 
.81 (Capaldi & Rothbart, 1992).  
 Outcome Expectancy Questionnaire (OEQ; Perry et al., 
1986). This version of the OEQ consisted of eight brief 
vignettes designed to measure juveniles’ expectations that 
aggressive behavior against a same-sex peer would produce 
various outcomes. In half of the vignettes, participants 
imagine using aggressive behavior to obtain tangible 
rewards from a same-sex peer (e.g. physically threatening a 
peer to get his/her money) and in the other half, 
participants were asked to imagine using aggression to 
retaliate against aversive treatment (e.g. kicking a person 
in the leg because he/she kicked you). After 
reading/hearing each vignette, participants were asked to 
rate the likelihood that various outcomes would occur on a 
4-point Likert scale (1 = “very sure the outcome would not 
occur” to 4 = “very sure the outcome would occur). For 
vignettes describing the use of aggression to obtain a 
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tangible reward, participants were asked to rate the 
likelihood that they would successfully obtain the desired 
outcome, be punished for their actions, feel bad about 
their actions, make the peer feel bad, and gain a sense of 
dominance over the peer. Equivalent questions were asked 
for vignettes depicting the use of aggression in 
retaliation against aversive behavior, except that 
participants rated the likelihood they would be successful 
in reducing the aversive treatment rather than obtain 
tangible rewards. Items on the scales are summed and 
averaged, higher scores indicate increased expectations 
that a particular outcome would occur. All scales were 
utilized in the current study. Studies utilizing similar 
measures were able to discriminate antisocial youth from 
controls (Hall et al., 1998; Perry et al., 1990). 
Reliability estimates for the outcome expectancy subscales 
have been variable (α = .56 - .83) (Hall et al., 1998; 
Pardini et al., 2003; Perry et al., 1990).  
 Outcome Values Questionnaire (OVQ; Boldizar et al., 
1989). This version of the OVQ consists of eight brief 
vignettes designed to assess the values that children place 
on the outcomes of aggression against a same-sex peer. The 
format of the stories followed that of the OEQ. The 
participants were presented with four vignettes depicting 
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the use of aggression to obtain tangible rewards and four 
vignettes describing the use of aggression in retaliating 
against aversive behaviors. Participants were asked to rate 
how much they would care if specific outcomes occurred as a 
result of their behaviors on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = 
“not care at all” to 4 = “really care a lot”). Participants 
were asked to rate how much they cared about obtaining a 
tangible reward, reduce the aversive treatment of a 
provocative peer, being punished for their actions, feeling 
bad about what he/she did, feeling bad about making the 
peer feel bad, and gaining a sense of dominance over the 
peer. Items for each scale were averaged, with higher 
scores indicating increased importance being placed on the 
outcome. The entire measure was utilized in the current 
study. Similar measures have discriminated between 
aggressive and non-aggressive youth (Hall et al., 1998). 
Reliability estimates for the outcome values subscales have 
been variable (α = .56 - .91) (Hall et al., 1998; Pardini 
et al., 2003; Perry et al., 1990).   
Recruitment 
 Assessment occurred during the 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 
school years. The assessment was conducted as a school-wide 
program evaluation process used to gather information 
concerning the students’ behaviors and personalities. 
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Participants were recruited by school personnel and then 
tested by trained school psychology practicum students 
working at the alternative education center in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements of their doctoral training 
program. The goal of the school-wide data collection 
project was to assess every student in the school capable 
of completing the battery of tests. Students in the life 
skills classroom could not be included in the assessment 
due to limited ability to complete the measures. All 
remaining students were assigned to complete the 
assessments. Of the approximate 130 remaining students, 
approximately 100 were able to complete the testing 
battery. Those who did not complete the assessments did not 
do so because of chronic absenteeism, or refusal to 
participate. 
 Although required by the school, examiners recruited 
participants by coordinating times with the teachers and 
going from class to class asking for volunteers to 
participate in the project. The administrators limited the 
number of students per testing period to no more than 8 
participants, with no minimum number. During this 
recruitment phase in the classrooms, the researchers 
explained that participation was voluntary and that they 
would be completing a lengthy battery of surveys that would 
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take approximately 1 ½ to 2 hours to complete. At this 
time, the students were informed that they would receive a 
candy bar of their choice as well as Kool-aid and/or pop 
along with the opportunity to participate.  Those who 
agreed to learn more about participating followed the 
administrators to the designated classroom which was 
isolated from surrounding rooms to minimize 
distractibility. The steps taken once the students were 
within the classroom are described in the procedures 
section.  
Participants 
 As previously stated, all attempts were made to 
include the entire school population that was capable of 
completing the battery, which included approximately 100 
students. The approximate 140 students at the school 
comprise both community adolescents and adolescents who 
live in residential placements (approximately 5% of the 
students live in residential placement). The purpose of the 
current study was to examine characteristics of the 
community based students and therefore, the adolescents 
living in residential placement were not included in the 
sample examined for this study. The school hosts 
approximately 32% female and 68% male students. The current 
study sample consisted of approximately 76 community based 
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participants (57 males and 19 females) with an age range of 
10 to 19 years old (mean = 15.36; SD = 1.69). The majority 
of participants for the current study were African American 
(approximately 63%), with the remainder identifying as 
Caucasian (approximately 17%) and multiracial groups (e.g., 
African American and Caucasian, Hispanic and African 
American, Hispanic, African American, and Caucasian, 
Indian, African American, and Caucasian, among others 
(approximately 20%). The racial make-up of the sample was 
representative of the entire school’s racial composition. 
 Client file information revealed the participants’ 
average Full-Scale IQ fell within the Low Average Range 
(68% of participants: mean = 86, SD = 13.78). However, it 
should be noted that Intelligence Quotient scores were not 
available for all students due to missing file information 
or because the student was involved in regular education 
and thus, had never been administered a cognitive ability 
measure. Approximately, 13% of participants identified 
themselves as gang involved. Approximately, 36% of 
participants reported a history of incarceration.  
Procedure 
 Participants were first presented with an assent form 
which explained the purpose of the data collection and 
their role in the process. Because information collected 
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was to be used in aggregate form, any single students 
individual answers would not be evaluated thus 
confidentiality was assured; the participants were 
instructed that their names would only appear on the assent 
form. The questionnaires were all numbered to protect their 
identities. Assent forms were separated from questionnaires 
following the administration. Participants were informed 
that participation was voluntary, would not affect grades 
or status at the educational placement, and they could 
discontinue administration at any time. Participants were 
informed that after completing the assessment, they would 
receive a candy bar. Breaks to stretch and walk around the 
room as well as Kool-aid/Soda were provided throughout the 
testing session on an as needed basis determined by the 
participant. 
 The administrators of the test battery included two 
doctoral level graduate students trained in test 
administration. The test battery was administered in a 
group format (maximum of 8 participants in a session). 
Although there were no more than 8 participants at a time, 
there were occasions that only one or two participants 
engaged in the test battery per testing session. Each 
participant was given the complete test battery, including 
the assent form and nine measures, when they agreed to 
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participate. Each test packet was arranged in the same 
order. However, a minority of participants would choose to 
skip certain measures and complete them in a different 
order. Test administrators were available at all times 
during the assessment period to assist all participants who 
needed help in reading some or all of the questionnaires or 
to answer questions regarding vocabulary, etc. Participants 
were encouraged to ask questions if they did not understand 
an item or could not read an item. The administrators 
continuously walked around the room assisting participants 
as needed and assuring that the participants were reading 
and taking their times with the test battery.  
Research Design and Statistical Analysis 
 The following section is a description of the research 
designs/statistical analyses utilized in this study 
including a priori analysis, descriptive statistics, t-
tests, and a series of multiple regressions.  
 An a priori statistical analysis was conducted to 
determine the number of participants needed to achieve 
adequate power and high power with medium and high effect 
sizes using three predictors. The GPower Program – Version 
2.0 developed by Franz Faul and Edgar Erdfelder (1992) was 
utilized in this analysis. 
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Table 3 
A priori Statistical Analysis 
___________________________________________________________ 
Effect Size Alpha Power Predictors N 
___________________________________________________________ 
.15   .05  .80   3  77 
.15   .05  .95   3  119 
.35   .05  .80   3  36 
.35   .05  .95   3  54 
___________________________________________________________ 
 Because of the limited research in this area, a 
conservative approach was used with the power analysis. 
Assuming a medium effect size, at the .05 level, a priori 
analysis results suggested a sample size of between 77 and 
100 participants would be needed to detect differences. 
 Demographic data, utilized to further describe the 
sample, showed age, IQ, ethnicity, current educational 
program, current diagnosis, prior incarceration, and gang 
affiliation for the current sample. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
___________________________________________________________ 
Descriptor   Mean   SD  Percent 
___________________________________________________________ 
Age     15.36  1.69 
Gender 
  Male          75% 
  Female          25% 
IQ     85.87  13.78 
Ethnicity      
  African American        63%  
  Caucasian         17% 
  Multi         20% 
Educ. Program 
  Regular          29% 
  Learning         20% 
  Emotional         51% 
Diagnosis 
  None          24% 
  LD           11% 
  ED           37% 
  MR            3% 
  LD/ED           7% 
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Table 4 (continued). 
___________________________________________________________ 
Descriptor   Mean   SD  Percent 
___________________________________________________________   
Other          13% 
Prior Incarc.         36% 
Gang Affil.         13% 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. These calculations are based on the current number of 
participants (N = 76). 
 Two-tailed independent samples t tests were conducted 
to investigate gender differences between male and female 
participants on the demographic variables listed above in 
an attempt to further describe the sample.  
 The main research design of the current study utilized 
a series of multiple regressions. The general purpose of 
multiple regression is to learn more about the relationship 
between several independent or predictor variables and a 
dependent or criterion variable (StatSoft, Inc. 1984-2003). 
Multiple regression is widely used in the social and 
natural sciences (StatSoft, Inc. 1984-2003). Multiple 
regression allows the researcher to ask the general 
question "what is the best predictor of ..." (StatSoft, 
Inc. 1984-2003). The current study asked which of the 
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psychopathic traits (callous/unemotional, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, or narcissism) best predicted 
level of empathy, dysregulation, behavioral inhibition, and 
social-cognitive processes in a sample of aggressive 
children. Multiple regression allows for the further 
clarifying of the predictor constructs and clarified these 
constructs in the current study sample. Additionally, the 
use of multiple regression in the current study was 
consistent with the Pardini et al. (2003) investigation 
from which the current study extended findings. 
 When deciding to run a multiple regression, it is 
important to recognize the problem of multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity occurs when moderate to high 
intercorrelations exist among the predictors (Stevens, 
2002). This is a problem for three reasons: 1) the 
predictors are accounting for much of the same variance, 
limiting the size of R, 2) due to the correlations among 
the predictors, it is difficult to determine the importance 
of each predictor, 3) it increases the variances of the 
regression coefficients, producing a more unstable 
prediction equation (Stevens, 2002). Multicollinearity was 
investigated through an examination of the simple 
correlations among the predictors and an examination of the 
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variance inflation factors for the predictors (Stevens, 
2002). If multicollinearity was expected, three methods 
could assist in combating it: 1) combining predictors that 
are highly correlated, 2) using a principal components 
analysis to reduce the number of predictors if there is a 
large set, 3) utilizing a technique called ridge regression 
(Stevens, 2002).  
 There were a number of selection models to choose 
from when entering variables for a multiple regression 
analysis, including simultaneous, forward, backward, and 
stepwise. In simultaneous selection all predictors are 
entered into the analyses at the same time. With forward 
selection, the model begins with no predictors entered 
(Stevens, 2002). The researcher enters the predictor with 
the highest correlation into the analysis first followed by 
the predictor that increases the R² (variance accounted for 
in the dependent variable) the most (Stevens, 2002). This 
process continues until all the predictors are entered or 
the increase in the R² is no longer significant (Stevens, 
2002). In backward selection, the model begins with all the 
predictors entered (Stevens, 2002). The predictor that 
contributes the least to the R² is removed first (Stevens, 
2002). This process is continued until the R² is reduced to 
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a point that it is no longer statistically significant 
(Stevens, 2002). Stepwise selection utilizes both the 
forward and backward selection methods (Stevens, 2002). 
Stepwise begins utilizing the forward selection method; 
however, through that method, predictors can be removed if 
they no longer demonstrate significance in the model 
(Stevens, 2002). This model allows for the constant 
assessment of each predictors importance (Stevens, 2002). 
The current study utilized the stepwise selection method 
when possible. This method was appropriate for the current 
study in that it allowed for each predictor, 
callous/unemotional, impulsivity/conduct problems, and 
narcissism, to be entered in the model in terms of their 
correlations and then removed when they did not contribute 
to the variance in the dependent variable being examined 
for the particular question. When the stepwise selection 
method yielded no significant results, the variables were 
entered simultaneously for explanatory purposes.       
 Before examining the predictor variables and the 
dependent variables, the interaction of gender and the 
predictor variables was examined. If gender served as a 
moderator to the predictor variables, it would have been 
included in each of the multiple regression analyses as an 
interaction variable. Each dependent variable was 
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independently regressed on to the C/U, I/CP, and narcissism 
factors for the purpose of examining the unique relation 
between each factor of psychopathy and various constructs. 
The β values reported for the C/U, I/CP, and narcissism 
factors represent the unique relationship between each 
factor of psychopathy and the dependent variable after 
controlling for the effects of the other factor. The 
overall R² reported represents the total variance the I/CP, 
C/U, and narcissism factor accounted for in the dependent 
variable. After conducting the primary regression analysis, 
post hoc tests would be conducted to determine whether the 
significant effects remained after controlling for 
demographic information including gender, minority status, 
intellectual abilities (Full Scale IQ), and the severity of 
the participants’ criminal behavior (i.e. prior 
incarceration, gang involvement).  
 The following table summarizes the research questions, 
corresponding variables, whether the variable is a 
predictor or a dependent variable, and the instruments 
utilized in measuring the variables. 
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Table 5 
Clarification of Variables 
___________________________________________________________ 
Question  Variable  Predictor/DV Instrument 
___________________________________________________________ 
1-4   CU factor  Predictor   ICU   
1-4   ICP factor Predictor   APSD 
1-4   Narcissism Predictor   APSD 
1   Empathic  DV    IRI 
   Concern   
1   Perspective  DV    IRI 
   Taking 
1   Personal   DV    IRI 
   Distress 
2   Behavioral DV    ADI 
   Dysregulation  
2   Emotional  DV    ADI 
   Dysregulation  
2   Cognitive  DV    ADI 
   Dysregulation   
3   Fearfulness DV    EAT-Q 
4   Tangible  DV    OEQ 
   Rewards      OVQ 
4   Reduction of  DV    OEQ 
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Table 5 (continued). 
___________________________________________________________ 
Question  Variable  Predictor/DV Instrument 
___________________________________________________________ 
   Aversive TX     OVQ 
4   Punishment DV    OEQ 
          OVQ 
4   Dominance  DV    OEQ 
          OVQ 
___________________________________________________________ 
 Four research questions were investigated in the 
current study.  
Research Questions 
 Question 1. How much variance does the 
callous/unemotional factor explain in both emotional and 
cognitive empathy and likewise, how much variance does the 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor explain in both 
emotional and cognitive empathy, and how much variance does 
the narcissism factor explain in both emotional and 
cognitive empathy? 
 Hypothesis. The current study hypothesized that the 
callous/unemotional trait would predict emotional and 
cognitive empathy; however, the impulsivity/conduct 
problems factor would not. Because the narcissism factor 
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has been found to load on Factor 1 of Hare’s two factor 
model (1993) as does the callous/unemotional factor (Harpur 
et al., 1989), it was hypothesized that the narcissistic 
factor may share variance with the callous/unemotional 
trait in predicting emotional and cognitive empathy. 
However, in the one study where the narcissism factor 
emerged in the community sample, the narcissism traits were 
more closely related to measures of impulsivity/conduct 
problems (Frick et al., 2000). Therefore, it may also be 
that the narcissism factor, similar to the hypothesis 
concerning the impulsivity/conduct problems factor, would 
not predict cognitive or emotional empathy.   
 Statistical Method. Stepwise Multiple Regression (3 
multiple regressions were run, each examining the three 
predictors and one DV at a time). Predictors included: 
Callous/unemotional factor, Impulsivity/conduct problems 
factor, and Narcissism factor. Dependent Variables 
included: Cognitive Empathy (Perspective Taking) and 
Emotional Empathy (Empathic Concern and Personal Distress). 
 Why Selected? Multiple regression is utilized in 
identifying constructs that can predict or explain the 
variance in other constructs. The purpose of this 
investigation was to further explain the construct of 
psychopathy. Multiple regression allows the factors of 
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psychopathy to be clarified by investigating how much they 
explain variables often associated with the psychopathy 
construct. In particular for Question 1: the emotional 
(empathic concern and personal distress) and cognitive 
(perspective taking) variables were regressed onto the 
callous/unemotional trait, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism factors in order to demonstrate the unique 
and shared variance these factors explain in empathy. 
 Assumptions. There are four main assumptions that 
apply to multiple regression analyses. 1) Linearity: 
assumes that the relationship between variables is linear. 
Practically, this assumption can almost never be confirmed; 
fortunately, multiple regression procedures are not greatly 
affected by minor deviations from this assumption 
(StatSoft, Inc., 1984-2003). However, examining a bivariate 
scatterplot of the variables is suggested (StatSoft, Inc., 
1984-2003). If curvature in the relationships is evident, 
the researcher can either transform the variables, or 
explicitly allow for nonlinear components, 2) Normality: 
assumes that the residuals (predicted minus observed 
values) are distributed normally. Even though most tests 
(specifically the F-test) are quite robust with regard to 
violations of this assumption, a review of the 
distributions of the major variables in the form of 
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histograms for the residuals and normal probability plots 
is suggested (StatSoft, Inc., 1984-2003), 3) Independence: 
assumes that errors are independent, that participants are 
responding independently of one another (Stevens, 2002), 
4)Homoscedasticity: assumes the residuals (errors in 
prediction) are evenly spread around the regression line or 
the variance of errors across all values of the predictors 
is constant (Stevens, 2002). This assumption can be 
assessed by examining the residual plots (Stevens, 2002). 
 Question 2. Does the impulsivity/conduct problems 
factor predict dysregulated behaviors (behavioral, 
emotional, and cognitive), does the callous/unemotional 
factor predict dysregulated behaviors (behavioral, 
emotional, and cognitive), and does the narcissism factor 
predict dysregulated behaviors (behavioral, emotional, and 
cognitive)?  
 Hypothesis. It was hypothesized that 
impulsivity/conduct problems would explain variance in the 
dysregulated behaviors variables including behavioral, 
emotional, and cognitive dysregulation; however, the 
callous/unemotional factor would not. Again, previous 
findings were unclear concerning the narcissistic factor; 
therefore, it was unclear whether the narcissism factor 
would explain variance in dysregulated behaviors, as 
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hypothesized with the impulsivity/conduct problems factor, 
or would not, as hypothesized with the callous/unemotional 
factor. 
 Statistical Method. Stepwise Multiple Regression (3 
multiple regressions were run, each examining the three 
predictors and one DV at a time). Predictors included: 
Callous/unemotional factor, Impulsivity/conduct problems 
factor, and Narcissism factor. Dependent Variables 
included: Dysregulated Behaviors (Emotional, Behavioral, 
and Cognitive). 
 Why Selected? Multiple regression is utilized in 
identifying constructs that can predict or explain the 
variance in other constructs. The purpose of this 
investigation was to further explain the construct of 
psychopathy. Multiple regression allows the factors of 
psychopathy to be clarified by investigating how much they 
explain variables often associated with the psychopathy 
construct. In particular for Question 2: the behavioral, 
emotional, and cognitive variables were regressed onto the 
callous/unemotional trait, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism factors in order to demonstrate the unique 
and shared variance these factors explain in dysregulation. 
 Assumptions. There are four main assumptions that 
apply to multiple regression analyses. Refer to question 1. 
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 Question 3. How much variance in behavioral inhibition 
or fearfulness is explained by the callous/unemotional, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism factors? 
 Hypothesis. It was hypothesized that the 
callous/unemotional trait would not explain variance within 
the behavioral inhibition or fearfulness variable and in 
fact would demonstrate a negative relationship; whereas, 
the impulsivity/conduct problems factor would predict 
behavioral inhibition/fearfulness. Again, previous findings 
were unclear concerning the narcissistic factor; therefore, 
it was unclear whether the narcissism factor would explain 
variance in behavioral inhibition, as hypothesized with the 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor, or would not, as 
hypothesized with the callous/unemotional factor.    
 Statistical Method. Stepwise Multiple Regression (1 
multiple regression was run, each examining the three 
predictors and one DV at a time). Predictors included: 
Callous/unemotional factor, Impulsivity/conduct problems 
factor, and Narcissism factor. Dependent Variable included: 
Behavioral Inhibition (fear). 
 Why Selected? Multiple regression is utilized in 
identifying constructs that can predict or explain the 
variance in other constructs. The purpose of this 
investigation was to further explain the construct of 
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psychopathy. Multiple regression allows the factors of 
psychopathy to be clarified by investigating how much they 
explain variables often associated with the psychopathy 
construct. In particular for Question 3: the fear variable 
was regressed onto the callous/unemotional trait, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism factors in 
order to demonstrate the unique and shared variance these 
factors explain in behavioral inhibition. 
 Assumptions. There are four main assumptions that 
apply to multiple regression analyses. Refer to question 1.
 Question 4. Do callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissistic traits 
predict social-cognitive processes in community youth 
displaying aggressive behaviors?  
 Hypothesis. It was hypothesized that the 
callous/unemotional factor, but not the impulsivity/conduct 
problems factor would predict a higher value placed on 
aggressive acts and a disregard for the negative 
consequences of aggressive behavior. More specifically, the 
callous/unemotional factor would predict increased 
expectations and values associated with the positive 
outcomes of aggressive behavior and decreased expectations 
and values associated with the negative consequences for 
aggressive behavior. It was expected that the 
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impulsivity/conduct problems factor would not be related to 
the outcome expectations or values. Again, previous 
findings were unclear concerning the narcissism factor; 
therefore, it was unclear whether the narcissism factor 
would explain variance in social cognition, as hypothesized 
with the callous/unemotional factor, or would not, as 
hypothesized with the impulsivity/conduct problems factor. 
 Statistical Method. Stepwise Multiple Regression (8 
multiple regressions were run with the three predictors and 
each of the 8 DVs). Predictors included: 
Callous/unemotional factor, Impulsivity/conduct problems 
factor, and Narcissism factor. Dependent Variables 
included: Outcome Expectancy (tangible rewards, reduction 
of aversive treatment, punishment, and dominance) and 
Outcome Value (tangible rewards, reduction of aversive 
treatment, punishment, and dominance).   
 Why Selected? Multiple regression is utilized in 
identifying constructs that can predict or explain the 
variance in other constructs. The purpose of this 
investigation was to further explain the construct of 
psychopathy. Multiple regression allows the factors of 
psychopathy to be clarified by investigating how much they 
explain variables often associated with the psychopathy 
construct. In particular for Question 4: the social-
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cognition (tangible reward, reduction of aversive 
treatment, punishment, and dominance) variables were 
regressed onto the callous/unemotional trait, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism factors in 
order to demonstrate the unique and shared variance these 
factors explain in social cognition. 
 Assumptions. There are four main assumptions that 
apply to multiple regression analyses. Refer to question 1.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 The results section is organized as follows. 
Descriptive statistics present information concerning all 
variables in this study including predictors and dependent 
variables. Following descriptive statistics, pre-analyses 
investigate correlations and significant differences among 
the variables in this study. Statistical assumptions for 
each research question are then examined in order to assure 
the appropriateness of running the main analyses for each 
research question. Lastly, the statistical results for each 
research question are offered. 
 Before examining the descriptive statistics, the 
callous/unemotional construct must be addressed. The 
current study examined the relationship between the 
callous-unemotional trait from the APSD and the ICU in 
order to determine the ICU measure could be used instead of 
the c/u scale on the APSD. The measure with the highest 
reliability was included in the current study. Because the 
ICU was created and expanded from the exact items found on 
the APSD, it would appear that the ICU would be a more 
thorough measure to examine the callous/unemotional trait. 
A pre-analysis examined the relationship between the APSD 
callous/unemotional factor and the ICU callous/unemotional 
  
 
159 
construct. The APSD callous/unemotional scale and the ICU 
measure were significantly positively correlated (r = .664, 
p < .001) at the p < .01 level which is indicative of 
moderate to strong criterion related validity or 
demonstrates that the ICU callous/unemotional measure 
demonstrates validity when compared to a previously 
established measure of callous/unemotional trait, the c/u 
scale on the APSD. Cronbach’s alpha indicates the current 
sample reliability of the APSD c/u scale was .397 and .760 
for the ICU. Therefore, it was determined from previous 
research discussed in chapter 3 concerning the construction 
of the ICU and the current correlation and reliability 
measures that the ICU appears to be the better measure for 
this study and will be utilized throughout all analyses 
when addressing the callous/unemotional traits.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics describe and summarize data. 
The descriptive statistics utilized included means, 
standard deviations, and internal consistency for each 
variable in the study. Descriptive statistics were run with 
the predictors: callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism. Results are 
presented in Table 6.  
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Predictor Variables 
___________________________________________________________ 
Predictor   Mean   Standard     Cronbach’s 
       Deviation  Alpha 
___________________________________________________________ 
C/U    31.947  8.806  .760   
I/CP    .888   .330   .441 
N    .718   .396   .645 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. C/U = callous/unemotional, I/CP = impulsivity/conduct 
problems, N = narcissism. 
 The C/U scores range from 0 to 72 with a higher number 
representing more callous/unemotional traits. The current 
sample reported callous/unemotional traits at a slightly 
lower level (mean = 31.947) than the middle range of the 
scale (middle = 36). The I/CP scale ranges from a total 
converted score (total raw score divided by number of scale 
items [5]) of 0 to 2 with a higher number representing more 
impulsivity/conduct problems reported. The current sample 
reported scores slightly lower (mean = .888) than the middle 
(middle=1) of the I/CP total converted scale range or on 
average the students reported median levels of 
impulsivity/conduct problems. The low reliability of the 
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I/CP variable should be considered when examining the 
results of this study. The N scale ranges from a total 
converted score (total raw score divided by number of scale 
items [7]) of 0 to 2 with a higher number representing more 
narcissism traits reported. The current sample reported 
scores somewhat lower (mean = .718) than the middle (middle 
= 1) of the N total converted scale range. 
 Descriptive statistics were also run for the dependent 
variables in the study. Results are presented in Table 7.  
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
___________________________________________________________ 
Dependent Variable  Mean  Standard     Cronbach’s  
       Deviation  Alpha 
___________________________________________________________ 
Empathic Concern   1.948 .656  .358 
Personal Distress   1.719 .641  .278 
Perspective Taking   1.821 .630  .207 
Behavioral Dysregulation  1.243 .560  .817 
Emotional Dysregulation  1.381 1.190 .795 
Cognitive Dysregulation  1.520 .584  .816 
Behavioral Inhibition  2.413 .7099 .520 
Outcome Expectancy 
 Tangible    2.918 .686  .582 
 Aversive Tx   2.568 .834  .612 
 Punishment   .437  .673  .792 
 Dominance    2.819 .672  .819 
Outcome Value 
 Tangible     2.023 .815  .681 
 Aversive Tx   2.220 .902  .734 
 Punishment   2.950 .759  .905 
 Dominance    2.168 .845  .885 
___________________________________________________________ 
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 The Empathic Concern scale ranged from a total 
converted (total raw score divided by number of scale items 
[6]) scale score of 0 to 4 with higher values indicating 
more empathic concern for others. The current sample 
reported scores slightly lower (mean = 1.948) than the 
middle (middle = 2) of the empathic concern total converted 
scale range or on average the students reported close to 
median levels of empathic concern. The low reliability of 
the variable empathic concern should be considered when 
interpreting the results of this study. The Personal 
Distress scale ranged from a total converted (total raw 
score divided by number of scale items [7]) scale score of 
0 to 4 with higher values indicating more feelings of 
personal distress. The current sample reported scores 
slightly lower (mean = 1.719) than the middle (middle = 2) 
of the personal distress total converted scale range or on 
average the students reported close to median levels of 
empathic concern. The low reliability of the variable 
personal distress should be considered when interpreting 
the results of this study. The Perspective Taking scale 
ranged from a total converted (total raw score divided by 
number of scale items [7]) scale score of 0 to 4 with 
higher values indicating more reported perspective taking. 
The current sample reported scores slightly lower (mean = 
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1.821) than the middle (middle = 2) of the perspective 
taking total converted scale range or on average the 
students reported close to median levels of perspective 
taking. The low reliability of the variable perspective 
taking should be considered when interpreting the results 
of this study. 
 The Behavioral Dysregulation scale ranged from a total 
converted (total raw score divided by number of scale items 
[10]) scale score of 0 to 3 with higher values indicating 
more reported behavioral dysregulation. The current sample 
reported scores slightly lower (mean = 1.243) than the 
middle (middle = 1.5) of the behavioral dysregulation total 
converted scale range or on average the students reported 
close to median levels of behavioral dysregulation. The 
Emotional Dysregulation scale ranged from a total converted 
(total raw score divided by number of scale items [10]) 
scale score of 0 to 3 with higher values indicating more 
reported emotional dysregulation. The current sample 
reported scores slightly lower (mean = 1.381) than the 
middle (middle = 1.5) of the emotional dysregulation total 
converted scale range or on average the students reported 
close to median levels of emotional dysregulation. The 
Cognitive Dysregulation scale ranged from a total converted 
(total raw score divided by number of scale items [10]) 
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scale score of 0 to 3 with higher values indicating more 
reported cognitive dysregulation. The current sample 
reported scores (mean = 1.520) at the middle (middle = 1.5) 
of the cognitive dysregulation total converted scale range 
or on average the students reported median levels of 
cognitive dysregulation. 
 The Behavioral Inhibition (fear) scale ranged from a 
total converted (total raw score divided by number of scale 
items [6]) scale score of 1 to 5 with higher values 
indicating more behavioral inhibition or fear. The current 
sample reported scores somewhat lower (mean = 2.413) than 
the middle (middle = 3) of the behavioral inhibition total 
converted scale range or on average the students reported 
somewhat lower than median levels of behavioral inhibition 
or fear. 
 The Outcome Expectancy measure was composed of four 
subscales including tangible (expectation of gaining a 
tangible reward by engaging in the negative behavior), 
aversive treatment (expectation of reducing future aversive 
treatment by engaging in the negative behavior), punishment 
(expectation of being punished or getting in trouble for 
actions by engaging in the negative behavior), and 
dominance (expectation of demonstrating dominance or 
showing who is in charge/the boss by engaging in the 
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negative behavior). The Outcome Expectancy Tangible scale 
ranged from a total converted (total raw score divided by 
number of scale items [4]) scale score of 1 to 4 with 
higher values indicating more expectation of gaining a 
tangible reward. The current sample reported scores 
slightly higher (mean = 2.918) than the middle (middle = 
2.5) of the tangible total converted scale range or on 
average the students reported slightly higher than median 
levels of expectation of gaining a tangible reward by 
engaging in the negative behavior. The Outcome Expectancy 
Aversive Treatment scale ranged from a total converted 
(total raw score divided by number of scale items [4]) 
scale score of 1 to 4 with higher values indicating more 
expectation of gaining a tangible reward. The current 
sample reported scores (mean = 2.568) at the middle (middle 
= 2.5) of the aversive treatment total converted scale 
range or on average the students reported median levels of 
expectation of reducing future aversive treatment by 
engaging in the negative behavior. The Outcome Expectancy 
Punishment scale ranged from a total converted (total raw 
score divided by number of scale items [8]) scale score of 
1 to 4 with higher values indicating more expectation of 
being punished or getting in trouble for the negative 
behavior. The current sample reported scores (mean = .437) 
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at the lower end of the aversive treatment total converted 
scale range or on average the students reported low levels 
of expectation of being punished or getting in trouble for 
engaging in the negative behavior. The Outcome Expectancy 
Dominance scale ranged from a total converted (total raw 
score divided by number of scale items [8]) scale score of 
1 to 4 with higher values indicating more expectation of 
demonstrating dominance or showing who is in charge/the 
boss by engaging in the negative behavior. The current 
sample reported scores slightly higher (mean = 2.819) than 
the middle (middle = 2.5) of the aversive treatment total 
converted scale range or on average the students reported 
slightly higher than the median level expectation of 
demonstrating dominance or showing who is in charge/the 
boss by engaging in the negative behavior.  
 The Outcome Value measure was composed of four 
subscales including tangible (the value placed in or how 
much the student cares about gaining a tangible reward by 
engaging in the negative behavior), aversive treatment (the 
value placed in or how much the student cares about 
reducing future aversive treatment by engaging in the 
negative behavior), punishment (the value placed in or how 
much the student cares about being punished or getting in 
trouble for actions by engaging in the negative behavior), 
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and dominance (the value placed in or how much the student 
cares about demonstrating dominance or showing who is in 
charge/the boss by engaging in the negative behavior). The 
Outcome Value Tangible scale ranged from a total converted 
(total raw score divided by number of scale items [4]) 
scale score of 1 to 4 with higher values indicating more 
value placed in gaining a tangible reward. The current 
sample reported scores slightly lower (mean = 2.023) than 
the middle (middle = 2.5) of the tangible total converted 
scale range or on average the students reported slightly 
lower than median levels of value placed in gaining a 
tangible reward by engaging in the negative behavior. The 
Outcome Value Aversive Treatment scale ranged from a total 
converted (total raw score divided by number of scale items 
[4]) scale score of 1 to 4 with higher values indicating 
more expectation of gaining a tangible reward. The current 
sample reported scores slightly lower (mean = 2.220) than 
the middle (middle = 2.5) of the aversive treatment total 
converted scale range or on average the students reported 
slightly lower than median levels of value placed in 
reducing future aversive treatment by engaging in the 
negative behavior. The Outcome Value Punishment scale 
ranged from a total converted (total raw score divided by 
number of scale items [8]) scale score of 1 to 4 with 
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higher values indicating more value placed in being 
punished or getting in trouble for the negative behavior. 
The current sample reported scores somewhat higher (mean = 
2.950) than the middle (middle = 2.5) of the aversive 
treatment total converted scale range or on average the 
students reported somewhat higher than median levels of 
value being placed in being punished or getting in trouble 
for engaging in the negative behavior. The Outcome Value 
Dominance scale ranged from a total converted (total raw 
score divided by number of scale items [8]) scale score of 
1 to 4 with higher values indicating more value being 
placed in demonstrating dominance or showing who is in 
charge/the boss by engaging in the negative behavior. The 
current sample reported scores slightly lower (mean = 2.168) 
than the middle (middle = 2.5) of the aversive treatment 
total converted scale range or on average the students 
reported slightly lower than the median level of value 
placed in demonstrating dominance or showing who is in 
charge/the boss by engaging in the negative behavior.   
Preliminary Statistical Analyses 
 The first pre-analysis examined the differences, if 
any, between male (N = 57) and female (N = 19) participants 
on demographic variables. This analysis was conducted in 
order to further describe the sample. Independent sample t-
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tests were conducted with the continuous demographic 
variables; whereas, chi-square analyses investigated non-
continuous demographic variables. Results are presented in 
Tables 8 (continuous demographic variables) and 9 (non-
continuous demographic variables). The results of the pre-
analyses examining gender differences should be interpreted 
with caution due to the difference in number of males to 
females. If no significant gender differences are evident, 
it is possible the lack of females compared to males did 
not allow for a true comparison between genders.  
Table 8 
Gender Differences on Continuous Demographic Variables 
___________________________________________________________ 
 Levene’s Test   t-test for Equality of Means 
 For Equality of  
 Variances 
___________________________________________________________ 
 F  Sig.  t  df Sig.  Mean Diff 
Age .454  .503  -1.619 74 .110  -.772  
IQ .040  .842  1.948 50 .057  8.600 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. These statistics are those assuming equal variances. 
Degrees of freedom are listed as less than 74 when 
demographic data was missing from some participants.  
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 The mean age for females was 16 with a standard 
deviation of 1.706. The mean age for males was 15.325 with 
a standard deviation of 1.817. The mean IQ for females was 
79.25 with a standard deviation of 13.692. The mean IQ for 
males was 87.85 with a standard deviation of 13.337. T-test 
results indicate no significant gender differences on the 
continuous demographic variables of age and IQ. These 
results should be interpreted with caution due to the 
difference in the number of males (N = 57) and females (N = 
19) in this study.  
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Table 9 
Gender Differences on Non-Continuous Demographic Variables 
___________________________________________________________ 
   %Males %Females Value df Asymp.Sig 
          (2-sided) 
___________________________________________________________ 
Educ. Prog.     2.572 2  .276 
 Regular 24.6  42.1 
 Learning 19.3  21.1 
 Emotional 56.1  36.8  
Ethnicity      .364  2  .834 
 Afr.Amer. 64.9  57.9 
 Caucasian 15.8  21.1 
 Mixed 19.3  21.1 
Diagnosis      -8.162 5  .148 
 No Diag. 20.8  38.9  
 LD  15.1  0.0 
 ED  41.5  33.3 
 MR  1.9  5.6 
 LD & ED 9.4  0.0 
 Other 11.3  22.2 
Incar.      -3.842 1  .050 
 Previous 42.1  16.7  
 No Prev. 57.9  83.3 
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Table 9 (continued). 
___________________________________________________________ 
   %Males %Females Value df Asymp.Sig 
          (2-sided) 
___________________________________________________________ 
Gang       1.193 1  .275 
 Involved 16.4  5.9 
 Not Inv. 83.6  94.1 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. Pearson chi-square analyses are utilized. Afr.Amer. = 
African American. No Diag. = no diagnosis. LD = learning 
disability. ED = emotional disturbance. MR = mentally 
retarded. LD & ED = learning disability and emotional 
disturbance. Incar. = incarceration. No Prev. = no previous 
incarceration. Not Inv. = not involved.  
 Results indicate no significant gender differences 
between genders on the non-continuous demographic variables 
of education program, ethnicity, diagnosis, prior 
incarceration, and gang involvement. These results should 
be interpreted with caution due to the difference in the 
number of males (N = 57) and females (N = 19) in this 
study.  
 The second pre-analysis examined gender differences on 
the three predictor variables. If gender differences exist, 
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gender will be included in the multiple regression analyses 
as an interaction variable. Independent samples t-tests 
were utilized to investigate this difference. Results are 
presented in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Gender Differences on Predictor Variables 
___________________________________________________________ 
  Levene’s Test  t-test for Equality of Means 
  For Equality of  
  Variances 
___________________________________________________________ 
  F  Sig.  t  df Sig.   Mean 
Diff 
C/U  1.501 .224  1.769 74 .081     4.070 
I/CP  .302  .584  .830  74 .409  .073 
N  .110  .741  1.610 74 .112  .167 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. These statistics are those assuming equal variances.  
 Results indicate no significant differences between 
genders among the three predictor variables, 
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism. Therefore the interaction of gender and any 
of the three predictors will not need to be included as an 
interaction variable in the multiple regression analyses. 
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These results should be interpreted with caution due to the 
difference in the number of males (N = 57) and females (N = 
19) in this study.  
 The third pre-analyses for this study included the 
investigation of any demographic variables that are 
significantly associated with the predictor variables. 
Demographic variables were examined in order to determine 
if any demonstrated possible covariate status for the main 
analyses, meaning the demographic variable was found to be 
significantly correlated with a predictor variable. 
Demographic variables considered consisted of Sex (male or 
female), Age, Race (African American, Caucasian, Hispanic, 
Mixed/Multi-racial, Other), Intelligence Quotient (IQ), 
Education Program (Regular Education, Learning Support, 
Emotional Support, or Both Learning Support and Emotional 
Support), Diagnosis (no diagnosis, learning disability, 
emotional disturbance, mental retardation, both learning 
disability and emotional disturbance, and other), Prior 
Incarceration, and Gang Affiliation. Pearson correlation 
analysis was utilized with the variables age and IQ due to 
their continuous variable status. Sex, prior incarceration, 
and gang affiliation are all dichotomous variables thus 
requiring the Pearson correlation method. Correlation 
results are presented in Table 11. Race, educational 
  
 
176 
program, and diagnosis are all variables with more than two 
groups; therefore, one-factor ANOVAs were utilized to 
examine whether these variables are related to the 
continuous independent variables. ANOVA results are 
presented in Table 12.   
Table 11 
Correlation Matrix of Demographics and Predictor Variables 
___________________________________________________________ 
Demographics 
 ______________________________________________________ 
  Age  Sex  IQ  Incar Gang  
 ______________________________________________________ 
PVs 
___________________________________________________________ 
C/U  -.155 -.201 .331*   -.019   -.354**  
I/CP  -.241* -.096 .277*     .076   -.236** 
N  -.361* -.184 .423**    .074 -.165  
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. * p < .05 ** p < .01  
 Results indicate significant relationships at the p = 
.05 level between age of participant and 
impulsivity/conduct problems (r = -.241) and narcissism (r 
= -.361). This relationship indicates that as the age of 
the participants increase, they report less 
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impulsivity/conduct problems and less narcissism. 
Significant relationships were also found between all three 
predictors and IQ of participants, which indicates that as 
IQ increases so does the participants’ reporting of 
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism. Gang involvement was significantly 
negatively correlated with both callous/unemotional traits 
and impulsivity/conduct problems. The students indicating 
gang involvement also indicated less callous/unemotional 
traits and less impulsivity/conduct problems.   
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Table 12 
ANOVA Results for Demographics and Predictor Variables 
___________________________________________________________ 
     Demographics 
 ______________________________________________________ 
   Race  Educ. Prog. Diagnoses 
 ______________________________________________________ 
PVs 
___________________________________________________________ 
C/U   .371    .446   .425  
I/CP   .171   .936   .652 
N   .747   .579   .100 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. PVs = predictor variables. Values listed are the p 
(significance) values found in the ANOVA summary table. 
 Results indicate no significant ANOVA analyses. This 
indicates the groups were not significantly different and 
therefore related with each independent variable. 
 A fourth pre-analysis examines the relationship among 
the predictor variables, callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism. Although it 
is important for predictor variables to be related in 
multiple regression analyses, a moderate or high 
relationship could result in multicollinearity. 
  
 
179 
Correlations are examined among the predictor variables and 
results are presented in Table 13.  
Table 13 
Correlations among the Predictor Variables 
___________________________________________________________ 
   C/U   I/CP   N 
C/U   ---   .361**  .389**  
I/CP      ---   .396** 
N         --- 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. ** p < .01 
 Results indicate that all three predictor variables 
are significantly correlated at a low to moderate level. 
Thus, multicollinearity will be investigated during these 
analyses by considering the correlations found above and 
investigating the variance inflation factors of the 
predictors. 
Assumptions and Main Analyses 
 The following section reports the results of the tests 
of assumptions and the main analyses for each of the four 
research questions. 
 Research Question 1 
 The first research question examined the amount of 
variance each predictor, the callous/unemotional factor, 
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impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism explained in 
both emotional and cognitive empathy. Three separate 
multiple regression analyses were utilized in this research 
question to examine how psychopathic characteristics in 
youth were related to levels of empathy. The predictor 
variables consisted of the callous/unemotional factor, 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor, and the narcissism 
factor. The dependent variables for this study were 
emotional (empathic concern & personal distress) and 
cognitive (perspective taking) empathy.  
 Before running the main multiple regression analyses, 
the tests of assumptions were examined. These results are 
for all three of the multiple regressions examined in the 
first research question. First, the independence assumption 
is considered and determined not to be violated based on 
the design of the study and the administration of the tests 
to small groups of students seated randomly and distanced 
from one another. It is also suggested to examine the 
Durbin-Watson statistic to examine the independence 
assumption in order to examine the autocorrelation of 
errors over the sequence of cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). Values should be between 1.5 and 2.5. The Durbin-
Watson statistic was examined for all three multiple 
regression analyses in the first research question. All 
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values were found to be between the suggested 1.5 and 2.5 
and therefore, any correlation among the residuals is 
acceptable or the cases are found to be independent. 
 Second, the test of normality was investigated 
utilizing histograms and normal probability plots for each 
dependent variable. The results indicate that all dependent 
variables followed a normal distribution based on the 
histogram graph and the cumulative probability graphs 
follow a straight line on the normal probability plots. 
Skewness and Kurtosis were also examined to investigate the 
normality assumption. Two methods were utilized to examine 
whether the skewness and kurtosis were skewed. Both methods 
utilized the skewness values obtained from SPSS. The first 
method suggested comparing the skewness/kurtosis value with 
twice the standard error of skewness/kurtosis including the 
range from +/- twice the standard error of 
skewness/kurtosis (Price, 2000). If the value for 
skewness/kurtosis fell within this range, the 
skewness/kurtosis is considered not seriously violated 
(Price, 2000). For example, the skewness value for the 
variable empathic concern was -.544 and the standard error 
was .276. Two times the standard error (2 * .276) equals 
.552. So the range that the skewness value should fall 
between to not be considered seriously violated is -.552 to 
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.552, which is does and therefore skewness is not seriously 
violated. The second method to investigate whether or not 
skewness and kurtosis were violated involved dividing the 
skewness and kurtosis SPSS values by the corresponding 
standard error to obtain a z-score. If the z-score fell 
outside the +/- 3 range, it was determined that the 
skewness or kurtosis was violated. Skewness was found to be 
within the expected range for all three dependent 
variables. Kurtosis for perspective taking and personal 
distress was found to be within the expected range. 
Kurtosis for empathic concern was found to be outside of 
the expected range for the first method, however, not 
significantly. Using an alpha level of .001 is considered 
conventional but conservative to evaluate the significance 
of skewness and kurtosis with small to moderate samples 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The kurtosis for empathic 
concern was 1.907 outside of the -1.09 to 1.09 range (z-
score = 3.50 outside of the +/-3 range); however, the 
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality found this to be non 
significant at the .001 alpha level (p = .002). Therefore, 
the normality assumption was not violated for all three 
dependent variables.  
 Third, the test of linearity was investigated in order 
to determine whether the relationship between the 
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independent and dependent variables were linear. This was 
accomplished through the examination of plots that 
displayed the residuals versus the predicted dependent 
variable. Each dependent variable was examined. All three 
dependent variables evidenced points scattered randomly 
around the line originating from the mean of the residuals 
and therefore, do not violate the assumption of linearity. 
Fourth, the assumption of homoscedasticity was examined by 
looking at the residual scatter plots and whether or not 
the points scatter evenly about the line originating from 
the mean of the residuals. The examination of the scatter 
plots of each of the dependent variables indicated points 
evenly scattered and therefore, there is no violation of 
homoscedasticity. Finally, multicollinearity was assessed 
due to the moderate correlation among the independent 
variables. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was examined 
for this purpose. The VIF for the independent variables 
were all below 10 and therefore, multicollinearity is not 
an issue. No assumptions were violated for the three 
multiple regressions and therefore all three multiple 
regression main analyses can be run.  
 Demographic statistics and the correlation matrix for 
all three predictor variables and dependent variables for 
research question 1 are presented in Table 14. 
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Table 14  
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics: Three 
Predictors and Dependent Variables (Empathic Concern, 
Personal Distress, Perspective Taking) 
___________________________________________________________ 
   Mean  SD  1  2  3  
Emp. Conc. 1.948 .656  -.577*** -.210*   -.357** 
Per. Dist. 1.719 .641  -.107 .000     -.107 
Pers. Tak. 1.820 .630  -.324*   -.102     -.106 
 
Predictor Var.    
1. C/U  31.947 8.806 ---  .361*** .389*** 
2. I/CP  .888  .330    ---  .396*** 
3. Narcissism .718  .396      ---  
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. N = 76. Emp. Conc. = Empathic Concern; Per. Dist. = 
Personal Distress; Pers. Tak. = Perspective Taking.  
*** p < .001 ** p = .002 * p < .05  
 Results indicate empathic concern was significantly 
negatively correlated with all independent variables. 
Perspective taking was significantly negatively correlated 
with callous/unemotional traits.  
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 Each dependent variable was independently regressed 
onto the three predictor variables. Results are presented 
separately in Tables 14-18.  
 The first regression analysis for the first research 
question examined the independent variables 
(callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism) and the dependent variable empathic concern 
(a measure of emotional empathy). Stepwise analyses were 
utilized for this multiple regression. Results are 
presented in Table 15. 
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Table 15 
Stepwise Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Empathic Concern 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model  B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1   
C/U   -.043 .007  -.577 -6.072 .000 
Excluded IVs    
I/CP          -.022 .983 
Narc.        -1.532 .130 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), 
callous/unemotional. Dependent Variable: empathic concern. 
R² = .333, F (1,74) = 36.874, p < .001. 
 
 Stepwise analyses indicate Model 1 to include the 
independent variable callous/unemotional. The variables 
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism were removed 
from the model due to insignificant contribution to the 
variance of empathic concern (emotional empathy). This 
model explains 33.3% of the variance in emotional empathy. 
Results indicate Model 1 (including only the 
callous/unemotional variable) significantly predicts 
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empathic concern (F = 36.874, p < .001). 
Callous/unemotional traits explain 33.3% of variance in 
empathic concern. This suggests the higher level of 
callous/unemotional traits significantly predicts lower 
levels of empathic concern for others or emotional empathy. 
Results of this analysis should be interpreted with caution 
due to the low reliability found for the variable empathic 
concern (Cronbach’s Alpha = .358). Additionally, although 
the regression analysis did not identify narcissism as a 
significant predictor variable, it should not be ruled out 
as important in explaining empathic concern due to its 
significant relationship/effect size (-.357, p = .002) with 
this dependent variable.   
 The second regression analysis examined the 
independent variables and the dependent variable personal 
distress (a measure of emotional empathy). Stepwise 
analyses were attempted but did not produce any significant 
models. Enter analyses were then attempted with all three 
independent variables. Results are presented in Table 16.  
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Table 16 
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Personal Distress 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model  B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1   
C/U  -.007  .010  -.095 -.727 .470  
I/CP   .142  .254   .073  .560 .577 
N  -.160  .215  -.099 -.745 .459 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. R² = .021, F (3,72) = .507, p = .679. 
 Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not 
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then 
attempted with all three independent variables. All three 
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in 
insignificant results (F = .507, p = .679). The model 
explains an insignificant 2.1% of the variance in personal 
distress (emotional empathy). This suggests any model of 
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism did not significantly predict personal 
distress or one measure of emotional empathy. Results of 
this analysis should be interpreted with caution due to the 
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low reliability found for the variable personal distress 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .278).  
 The third regression analysis examined the independent 
variables and the dependent variable perspective taking 
(cognitive empathy). Stepwise analyses were utilized. 
Results are presented in .. 
Table 17 
Stepwise Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Perspective Taking 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model  B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1   
C/U   -.023 .008  -.324 -2.945 .004 
Excluded IVs          
I/CP         .017  .142 
Narc.        .023  .195 
__________________________________________________________ 
Note. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), 
callous/unemotional. Dependent Variable: perspective 
taking. R² = .105, F (1,74) = 8.675, p = .004. 
 As predicted, the callous/unemotional trait 
significantly negatively correlated with perspective taking 
(Table 13; r = -.324). 
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 Stepwise analyses indicate Model 1 to include the 
independent variable callous/unemotional. The variables 
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism were removed 
from the model due to insignificant contribution to the 
variance of perspective taking (cognitive empathy). This 
model explains 10.5% of the variance in cognitive empathy. 
Results indicate Model 1 (including only the 
callous/unemotional variable) significantly predicts 
perspective taking (F = 8.675, p = .004). This model 
suggests higher levels of callous/unemotional traits 
significantly predicts lower levels of perspective taking 
or cognitive empathy. Results of this analysis should be 
interpreted with caution due to the low reliability found 
for the variable perspective taking (Cronbach’s Alpha = 
.207).  
 Research Question 2 
 The second research question examined if the 
callous/unemotional factor, impulsivity/conduct problems 
factor, and narcissism factor predict dysregulated 
behaviors (behavioral, emotional, and cognitive. The 
predictor variables were callous/unemotional factor, 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor, and narcissism factor. 
The dependent variables were behavioral dysregulation, 
emotional dysregulation, and cognitive dysregulation. Three 
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multiple regression analyses were run with the three 
predictors and each dependent variable separately.  
 Before running the main multiple regression analyses, 
the test assumptions were examined. First, the independence 
assumption is considered and determined not to be violated 
based on the design of the study and the administration of 
the tests to small groups of students seated randomly and 
distanced from one another for all three dependent 
variables. It is also suggested to examine the Durbin-
Watson statistic to examine the independence assumption in 
order to examine the autocorrelation of errors over the 
sequence of cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Values 
should be between 1.5 and 2.5. The Durbin-Watson statistic 
was examined for all three multiple regression analyses in 
the second research question. All values were found to be 
between the suggested 1.5 and 2.5 and therefore, any 
correlation among the residuals is acceptable or the cases 
are found to be independent.  
 Second, the test of normality was investigated 
utilizing histograms and normal probability plots for each 
dependent variable. The results indicate that the dependent 
variables behavioral dysregulation and cognitive 
dysregulation followed a normal distribution based on the 
histogram graph and the cumulative probability graphs 
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follow a straight line on the normal probability plots. 
Skewness and Kurtosis were also examined to investigate the 
normality assumption. Two methods were utilized to examine 
whether the skewness and kurtosis were skewed. Both methods 
utilized the skewness values obtained from SPSS. The first 
method suggested comparing the skewness/kurtosis value with 
twice the standard error of skewness/kurtosis including the 
range from +/- twice the standard error of 
skewness/kurtosis (Price, 2000). If the value for 
skewness/kurtosis fell within this range, the 
skewness/kurtosis is considered not seriously violated 
(Price, 2000). For example, the skewness value for the 
variable empathic concern was -.544 and the standard error 
was .276. Two times the standard error (2 * .276) equals 
.552. So the range that the skewness value should fall 
between to not be considered seriously violated is -.552 to 
.552, which is does and therefore skewness is not seriously 
violated. The second method to investigate whether or not 
skewness and kurtosis were violated involved dividing the 
skewness and kurtosis SPSS values by the corresponding 
standard error to obtain a z-score. If the z-score fell 
outside the +/- 3 range, it was determined that the 
skewness or kurtosis was violated. Skewness and kurtosis 
were found to be within the expected range for the 
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dependent variables: behavioral dysregulation and cognitive 
dysregulation. These results indicate no violation of the 
normality assumption for the dependent variables of 
behavioral dysregulation and cognitive dysregulation. 
 The assumption of normality was found to be violated 
with the dependent variable of emotional dysregulation. 
Examination of the histogram graph and cumulative 
probability graphs indicate the presence of an outlier. 
Skewness (5.132) and kurtosis (36.792) were found to be 
outside of the expected range. According to the first 
method of examining skewness and kurtosis, the skewness was 
outside of the expected -.552 to .552 range and the 
kurtosis was outside of the expected -1.09 to 1.09 range. 
According to the second method of examining skewness and 
kurtosis, the skewness z-score (18.594) was outside the +/-
3 range and the kurtosis z-score (67.508) was also outside 
the +/- range.  
 There are many suggestions to correct violations of 
normality such as removing outlier cases and transforming 
variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). It was determined 
that the most efficient way to correct this violation would 
be to remove the outlier case (case 30). Removing this case 
resulted in the correction of the normality assumption. The 
dependent variable emotional dysregulation followed a 
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normal distribution based on the histogram graph and the 
cumulative probability graphs follow a straight line on the 
normal probability plots. With the removal of case 30, 
skewness and kurtosis were found to be within the expected 
ranges with both methods for emotional dysregulation.  
  Third, the test of linearity was investigated in order 
to determine whether the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables were linear. This was 
accomplished through the examination of plots that 
displayed the residuals versus the predicted dependent 
variable. Each dependent variable was examined. All three 
dependent variables evidenced points scattered randomly 
around the line originating from the mean of the residuals 
and therefore, do not violate the assumption of linearity.  
 Fourth, the assumption of homoscedasticity was 
examined by looking at the residual scatter plots and 
whether or not the points scatter evenly about the line 
originating from the mean of the residuals. The examination 
of the scatter plots of the dependent variables behavioral 
and cognitive dysregulation indicated points evenly 
scattered and therefore, there is no violation of 
homoscedasticity for those two dependent variables. 
Homoscedasticity was found to be violated for the dependent 
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variable emotional dysregulation. The removal of the 
outlier case corrected this violation. 
  Multicollinearity was also assessed due to the 
moderate correlation among the independent variables. The 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was examined for this 
purpose. The VIF for the independent variables were all 
below 10 and therefore, multicollinearity is not an issue. 
No assumptions were violated for two of the multiple 
regressions behavioral and cognitive dysregulation and 
therefore multiple regression main analyses can be run. The 
normality and homoscedasticity assumptions were violated 
for the dependent variable emotional dysregulation. 
Removing the outlier case resulted in correction of these 
violations and therefore, the multiple regression main 
analyses will be run minus the one outlier case.   
 Demographic statistics and the correlation matrix for 
all three predictor variables and dependent variables for 
research question 2 are presented in Table 18. 
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Table 18  
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics: Three 
Predictors and Dependent Variables (Behavioral 
Dysregulation, Emotional Dysregulation, and Cognitive 
Dysregulation) 
___________________________________________________________ 
   Mean  SD  1  2  3  
Beh. Dys.  1.243 .560  .134  .134  .130 
Emot. Dys. 1.266 .647  .018  .118  .072 
Cog. Dys.  1.519 .584  .277* .108     -.079 
 
Predictor Var.    
1. C/U  31.947 8.806 ---  .361*** .389*** 
2. I/CP  .888  .330    ---  .396*** 
3. Narcissism .718  .396      ---  
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. N = 76 for behavioral dysregulation and cognitive 
dysregulation. N = 75 for emotional dysregulation. Beh. 
Dys.= Behavioral Dysregulation; Emot. Dys.= Emotional 
Dysregulation; Cog. Dys.= Cognitive Dysregulation.  
*** p < .001 * p < .05  
 Results indicate cognitive dysregulation was 
significantly correlated with callous/unemotional traits. 
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 The first regression analysis examined the independent 
variables and the dependent variable behavioral 
dysregulation. Stepwise analyses were attempted but did not 
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then 
attempted with all three independent variables. Results are 
presented in Table 19. 
Table 19 
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Behavioral Dysregulation 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model  B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1   
I/CP  .132  .221  .078  .599  .551  
C/U  .005  .008  .079  .607  .546 
N  .097  .187  .069  .520  .604 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. R² = .030, F (3,72) = .741, p = .531. 
 Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not 
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then 
attempted with all three independent variables. All three 
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in 
no significance (F = .741, p = .531). The model explains an 
insignificant 3% of the variance in behavioral 
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dysregulation. Callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism do not 
significantly predict behavioral dysregulation. 
 The second regression analysis examined the 
independent variables (callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) and the 
dependent variable emotional dysregulation. As previously 
mentioned, the one outlier case was removed from the main 
regression analysis. 
 Stepwise analyses were attempted but did not produce 
any significant models. Enter analyses were then attempted 
with all three independent variables. Results are presented 
in Table 20. 
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Table 20 
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Emotional Dysregulation 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model  B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1   
I/CP  .396  .254  .204   1.559 .123  
C/U  -.005 .010  -.062  -.473 .638  
N  .026  .216  .016   .118  .906  
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. R² = .038, F (3,71) = .941, p = .426. 
 Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not 
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then 
attempted with all three independent variables. All three 
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in 
no significance (F = .941, p = .426). The model explains an 
insignificant 3.8% of the variance in emotional 
dysregulation. Callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism do not 
significantly predict emotional dysregulation.  
 The third regression analysis examined the independent 
variables (callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct 
problems, and narcissism) and the dependent variable 
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cognitive dysregulation. Stepwise analyses were utilized. 
Results are presented in Table 21. 
Table 21 
Stepwise Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Cognitive Dysregulation 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model  B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1   
C/U   .018  .007  .277   2.484 .015 
Excluded IVs           
I/CP           .070 .945 
Narc.        -1.848 .069  
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), 
callous/unemotional. Dependent Variable: cognitive 
dysregulation. R² = .077, F (1,74) = 6.170, p = .015. 
 Stepwise analyses indicate Model 1 to include the 
independent variable callous/unemotional. The variables 
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism were removed 
from the model due to insignificant contribution to the 
variance of cognitive dysregulation. This model explains 
7.7% of the variance in cognitive dysregulation. Results 
indicate Model 1 (including only the callous/unemotional 
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variable) significantly predicts cognitive dysregulation (F 
= 6.170, p = .015). Higher levels of callous/unemotional 
traits significantly predict higher levels of cognitive 
dysregulation. 
 Interpretation of the three previous regression 
analyses should consider the low reliability of the I/CP 
variable (Cronbach’s Alpha = .441) and the affect this may 
have had on its predictive relationship with the dependent 
variables. 
 Research Question 3 
 The third research question investigated how much 
variance in behavioral inhibition or fearfulness is 
explained by the callous/unemotional, impulsivity/conduct 
problems, and narcissism factors. One multiple regression 
analysis was run to examine whether the predictor variables 
(callous/unemotional, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
narcissism) explained a low level of fear or behavioral 
inhibition (dependent variable) in community aggressive 
youth.  
 Before running the main multiple regression analyses, 
the test assumptions were examined. First, the independence 
assumption is considered and determined not to be violated 
based on the design of the study and the administration of 
the tests to small groups of students seated randomly and 
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distanced from one another. It is also suggested to examine 
the Durbin-Watson statistic to examine the independence 
assumption in order to examine the autocorrelation of 
errors over the sequence of cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). Values should be between 1.5 and 2.5. The Durbin-
Watson statistic was examined for all three multiple 
regression analyses in the second research question. All 
values were found to be between the suggested 1.5 and 2.5 
and therefore, any correlation among the residuals is 
acceptable or the cases are found to be independent.  
 Second, the test of normality was investigated 
utilizing histograms and normal probability plots for each 
dependent variable. The results indicate that the dependent 
variable followed a normal distribution based on the 
histogram graph and the cumulative probability graphs 
follow a straight line on the normal probability plots. 
Skewness and kurtosis were also investigated to examine the 
assumption of normality. Two methods were utilized to 
examine whether the skewness and kurtosis were skewed. Both 
methods utilized the skewness values obtained from SPSS. 
The first method suggested comparing the skewness/kurtosis 
value with twice the standard error of skewness/kurtosis 
including the range from +/- twice the standard error of 
skewness/kurtosis (Price, 2000). If the value for 
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skewness/kurtosis fell within this range, the 
skewness/kurtosis is considered not seriously violated 
(Price, 2000). For example, the skewness value for the 
variable empathic concern was -.544 and the standard error 
was .276. Two times the standard error (2 * .276) equals 
.552. So the range that the skewness value should fall 
between to not be considered seriously violated is -.552 to 
.552, which is does and therefore skewness is not seriously 
violated. The second method to investigate whether or not 
skewness and kurtosis were violated involved dividing the 
skewness and kurtosis SPSS values by the corresponding 
standard error to obtain a z-score. If the z-score fell 
outside the +/- 3 range, it was determined that the 
skewness or kurtosis was violated. Skewness and kurtosis 
for the dependent variable behavioral inhibition or fear 
were found to be within the expected range. These results 
indicate no violation of the normality assumption.  
 Third, the test of linearity was investigated in order 
to determine whether the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables were linear. This was 
accomplished through the examination of plots that 
displayed the residuals versus the predicted dependent 
variable. The dependent variable evidenced points scattered 
randomly around the line originating from the mean of the 
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residuals and therefore, did not violate the assumption of 
linearity.  
 Fourth, the assumption of homoscedasticity was 
examined by looking at the residual scatter plot and 
whether or not the points scatter evenly about the line 
originating from the mean of the residuals. The examination 
of the scatter plot of the dependent variable indicated 
points evenly scattered and therefore, there is no 
violation of homoscedasticity. Finally, multicollinearity 
was also assessed due to the moderate correlation among the 
independent variables. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
was examined for this purpose. The VIF for the independent 
variables were all below 10 and therefore, 
multicollinearity is not an issue. No assumptions were 
violated for the multiple regression and therefore the main 
analysis can be run.  
 Demographic statistics and the correlation matrix for 
all three predictor variables and the dependent variable 
for research question 3 are presented in Table 22. 
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Table 22  
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics: Three 
Predictors and Dependent Variable (Fear/Behavioral 
Inhibition) 
___________________________________________________________ 
   Mean  SD  1  2  3  
Fear/Beh. Inh. 2.413 .709  -.376*** -.063 -.050 
 
Predictor Var.    
1. C/U  31.947 8.806 ---  .361*** .389*** 
2. I/CP  .888  .330    ---  .396*** 
3. Narcissism .718  .396      ---  
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. N = 76. Fear/Beh. Inh.= Fear/Behavioral Inhibition. 
*** p < .001  
 Results indicate fear/behavioral inhibition was 
significantly negatively correlated with 
callous/unemotional traits.  
 The multiple regression analysis for the third 
research question examined the independent variables 
(callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism) and the dependent variable fear (behavioral 
inhibition). Stepwise analyses were utilized for this 
multiple regression. Results are presented in Table 23. 
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Table 23 
Stepwise Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Fear (Behavioral Inhibition) 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model  B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1   
C/U   -.039 .009  -.376 -3.490 .001 
Excluded IVs 
I/CP         .084  .725 
Narc.        .967  .337  
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), 
callous/unemotional. Dependent Variable: fear/behavioral 
inhibition. R² = .141, F (1,74) = 12.183, p = .001. 
 Stepwise analyses indicate Model 1 to include the 
independent variable callous/unemotional. The variables 
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism were removed 
from the model due to insignificant contribution to the 
variance of fear or behavioral inhibition. This model 
explains 14.1% of the variance in fear/behavioral 
inhibition. Results indicate Model 1 (including only the 
callous/unemotional variable) significantly predicts 
empathic concern (F = 12.18, p = .001). Callous/unemotional 
  
 
207 
traits explain 14.1% of variance in empathic concern. 
Higher levels of callous/unemotional traits significantly 
presents lower levels of behavioral inhibition or fear. 
 Research Question 4 
 The final research question examined whether the 
predictors callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct 
problems, and narcissistic traits predict social-cognitive 
processes in community youth displaying aggressive 
behaviors. The dependent variable social-cognitive 
processes were defined further into outcome expectancies 
and outcome values. Each of these two variables were broken 
into 4 subcategories including gaining tangible rewards, 
reducing aversive treatment, receiving punishment for 
his/her actions, and demonstrating who is the boss or in 
charge. Therefore, eight multiple regression analyses were 
run with three predictors and all eight dependent variables 
examined separately. 
 Before running the main multiple regression analyses, 
the test assumptions were examined. The results of the test 
assumptions for the first four multiple regressions 
concerning the outcome expectancy variables are discussed 
here. First, the independence assumption is considered and 
determined not to be violated based on the design of the 
study and the administration of the tests to small groups 
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of students seated randomly and distanced from one another. 
It is also suggested to examine the Durbin-Watson statistic 
to examine the independence assumption in order to examine 
the autocorrelation of errors over the sequence of cases 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Values should be between 1.5 
and 2.5. The Durbin-Watson statistic was examined for all 
four multiple regression analyses in the outcome expectancy 
component of research question four. All values were found 
to be between the suggested 1.5 and 2.5 and therefore, any 
correlation among the residuals is acceptable or the cases 
are found to be independent.  
 Second, the test of normality was investigated 
utilizing histograms and normal probability plots for each 
dependent variable. The results indicate that the dependent 
variable followed a normal distribution based on the 
histogram graph and the cumulative probability graphs 
follow a straight line on the normal probability plots. 
Skewness and kurtosis were also investigated to examine the 
assumption of normality. Two methods were utilized to 
examine whether the skewness and kurtosis were skewed. Both 
methods utilized the skewness values obtained from SPSS. 
The first method suggested comparing the skewness/kurtosis 
value with twice the standard error of skewness/kurtosis 
including the range from +/- twice the standard error of 
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skewness/kurtosis (Price, 2000). If the value for 
skewness/kurtosis fell within this range, the 
skewness/kurtosis is considered not seriously violated 
(Price, 2000). For example, the skewness value for the 
variable empathic concern was -.544 and the standard error 
was .276. Two times the standard error (2 * .276) equals 
.552. So the range that the skewness value should fall 
between to not be considered seriously violated is -.552 to 
.552, which is does and therefore skewness is not seriously 
violated. The second method to investigate whether or not 
skewness and kurtosis were violated involved dividing the 
skewness and kurtosis SPSS values by the corresponding 
standard error to obtain a z-score. If the z-score fell 
outside the +/- 3 range, it was determined that the 
skewness or kurtosis was violated. Skewness and kurtosis 
for the outcome expectancy dependent variables reduce 
aversive treatment, being punished for his/her actions, and 
showing who is in charge or the boss was found to be within 
the expected range as well as kurtosis for the outcome 
expectancy dependent variable gaining a tangible reward. 
Skewness for the outcome expectancy dependent variable 
gaining a tangible reward was found to be outside of the 
expected range, however, not significantly. Using an alpha 
level of .001 is considered conventional but conservative 
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to evaluate the significance of skewness and kurtosis with 
small to moderate samples (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The 
skewness for the outcome expectancy gaining a tangible 
reward was .588 outside of the -.552 to .552 range 
according to the first method (z-score = 2.13 within the 
+/- range according to the second method); however, the 
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality found this to be non 
significant at the .001 alpha level (p = .003). These 
results indicate no violation of the normality assumption 
for all four outcome expectancy dependent variables.   
 Third, the test of linearity was investigated in order 
to determine whether the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables were linear. This was 
accomplished through the examination of plots that 
displayed the residuals versus the predicted dependent 
variable. Each dependent variable was examined. The 
dependent variables evidenced points scattered randomly 
around the line originating from the mean of the residuals 
and therefore, did not violate the assumption of linearity. 
Fourth, the assumption of homoscedasticity was examined by 
looking at the residual scatter plot and whether or not the 
points scatter evenly about the line originating from the 
mean of the residuals. The examination of the scatter plot 
of the dependent variables indicated points evenly 
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scattered and therefore, there is no violation of 
homoscedasticity. Finally, multicollinearity was also 
assessed due to the moderate correlation among the 
independent variables. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
was examined for this purpose. The VIF for the independent 
variables were all below 10 and therefore, 
multicollinearity is not an issue. No assumptions were 
violated for the multiple regressions and therefore the 
main analyses can be run.  
 Demographic statistics and the correlation matrix for 
all three predictor variables and the dependent variables 
for research question 4 are presented in Table 24. 
  
 
212 
Table 24  
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics: Three 
Predictors and Outcome Expectancy Dependent Variables 
(Tangible, Reduce Aversive Treatment, Trouble/Punished, 
Boss/In Charge). 
___________________________________________________________ 
   Mean  SD  1  2  3  
Tangible  2.918 .686  .151  .055  .120 
Avers. Tx. 2.568 .834  .050  -.082 -.008 
Trbl/Punish. 2.437 .673  .166  -.055 .113  
Boss/In Charge 2.189 .672  .158  .121  .221* 
 
Predictor Var.    
1. C/U  31.947 8.806 ---  .361*** .389*** 
2. I/CP  .888  .330    ---  .396*** 
3. Narcissism .718  .396      ---  
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. N = 76. Avers.Tx. = Aversive Treatment; Trbl/Punish = 
Trouble/Punished. * p < .05 *** p < .001  
 Results indicate the outcome expectancy variable 
showing who is the boss or in charge was positively 
correlated with narcissism at the .05 level. 
 The first multiple regression analysis for the outcome 
expectancy research question examined whether the 
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independent variables (callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) predicts the 
dependent variable gaining a tangible reward. Stepwise 
analyses were attempted but did not produce any significant 
models. Enter analyses were then attempted with all three 
independent variables. Results are presented in Table 25. 
Table 25 
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Outcome Expectancy: Obtaining a 
Tangible Reward 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1    
C/U  .010  .010  .128  .986  .327 
I/CP  -.046 .271  -.022 -.169 .867 
N  .136  .229  .079  .505  .554 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. R² = .028, F (3,72) = .681, p = .567. 
 Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not 
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then 
attempted with all three independent variables. All three 
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in 
insignificance (F = .681, p = .567). The model explains an 
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insignificant 2.8% of the variance in the expectancy of 
obtaining a tangible reward (outcome expectancy: tangible). 
Callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism do not significantly predict the outcome 
expectancy of gaining a tangible reward. 
 The second multiple regression analysis for the 
outcome expectancy research question examined whether the 
independent variables (callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) predict the 
outcome expectancy dependent variable reducing aversive 
treatment. Stepwise analyses were attempted but did not 
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then 
attempted with all three independent variables. Results are 
presented in Table 26. 
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Table 26 
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Outcome Expectancy: Reducing Aversive 
Treatment 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1    
C/U  .009  .012  .091  .695  .489 
I/CP  -.292 .332  -.116 -.881 .381 
N  .004  .280  .002  .015  .988 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. R² = .014, F (3,72) = .342, p = .795. 
 Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not 
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then 
attempted with all three independent variables. All three 
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in 
insignificance (F = .342, p = .795). The model explains an 
insignificant 1.4% of the variance in the outcome 
expectancy of reducing aversive treatment. 
Callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism did not significantly predict the outcome 
expectancy of reducing aversive treatment.  
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 The third multiple regression analysis for the outcome 
expectancy research question examined whether the 
independent variables (callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) predict the 
dependent variable outcome expectancy: getting in trouble 
or being punished. Stepwise analyses were attempted but did 
not produce any significant models. Enter analyses were 
then attempted with all three independent variables. 
Results are presented in Table 27. 
Table 27 
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Outcome Expectancy: Getting in Trouble 
or Punished 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1    
C/U  .014  .010  .184  1.432 .156 
I/CP  -.334 .263  -.164 -1.273 .207 
N  .181  .222  .107  .818  .416 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. R² = .052, F (3,72) = 1.311, p = .278. 
 Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not 
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then 
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attempted with all three independent variables. All three 
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in 
insignificance (F = 1.311, p = .278). The model explains an 
insignificant 5.2% of the variance in the outcome 
expectancy of getting in trouble or being punished. 
Callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism did not significantly predict the outcome 
expectancy of getting in trouble or being punished. 
 The fourth multiple regression analysis for the 
outcome expectancy research question examined whether the 
independent variables (callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) predict the 
dependent variable outcome expectancy: showing who is the 
boss or in charge. Stepwise analyses were attempted but did 
not produce any significant models. Enter analyses were 
then attempted with all three independent variables. 
Results are presented in Table 28. 
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Table 28 
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Outcome Expectancy: Showing who is the 
Boss or who’s in charge 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model  B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1    
C/U  .006  .010  .080  .623  .535 
I/CP  .042  .261  .021  .160  .874 
N  .309  .221  .182  1.398 .166 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. R² = .055, F (3,72) = 1.408, p = .247. 
 Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not 
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then 
attempted with all three independent variables. All three 
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in 
insignificance (F = 1.408, p = .247). The model explains an 
insignificant 5.5% of the variance in the outcome 
expectancy of showing who’s the boss or who’s in charge. 
Callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism do not significantly predict the outcome 
expectancy of showing who the boss is or who is in charge.  
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 The next section of research question four examined 
whether the predictors callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissistic traits 
predict outcome value social-cognitive processes in 
community youth displaying aggressive behaviors. The 
outcome values variable was also broken down into 4 
subcategories including gaining tangible rewards, reducing 
aversive treatment, receiving punishment for his/her 
actions, and demonstrating who is the boss or in charge. 
Before running the main multiple regression analyses, the 
test assumptions were examined. The results of the test 
assumptions for the set of four multiple regressions 
concerning the outcome values variables are discussed.  
 First, the independence assumption is considered and 
determined not to be violated based on the design of the 
study and the administration of the tests to small groups 
of students seated randomly and distanced from one another. 
It is also suggested to examine the Durbin-Watson statistic 
to examine the independence assumption in order to examine 
the autocorrelation of errors over the sequence of cases 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Values should be between 1.5 
and 2.5. The Durbin-Watson statistic was examined for all 
four multiple regression analyses in the outcome expectancy 
component of research question four. All values were found 
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to be between the suggested 1.5 and 2.5 and therefore, any 
correlation among the residuals is acceptable or the cases 
are found to be independent.  
 Second, the test of normality was investigated 
utilizing histograms and normal probability plots for each 
dependent variable. The results indicate that the outcome 
values dependent variables of getting in trouble or 
punished and showing who is the boss or in charge followed 
a normal distribution based on the histogram graph and the 
cumulative probability graphs follow a straight line on the 
normal probability plots. The outcome values dependent 
variables of tangible reward and reducing aversive 
treatment evidenced non-normal distributions that appeared 
slightly positively skewed. Skewness and kurtosis were also 
investigated to examine the assumption of normality. Two 
methods were utilized to examine whether the skewness and 
kurtosis were skewed. Both methods utilized the skewness 
values obtained from SPSS. The first method suggested 
comparing the skewness/kurtosis value with twice the 
standard error of skewness/kurtosis including the range 
from +/- twice the standard error of skewness/kurtosis 
(Price, 2000). If the value for skewness/kurtosis fell 
within this range, the skewness/kurtosis is considered not 
seriously violated (Price, 2000). For example, the skewness 
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value for the variable empathic concern was -.544 and the 
standard error was .276. Two times the standard error (2 * 
.276) equals .552. So the range that the skewness value 
should fall between to not be considered seriously violated 
is -.552 to .552, which is does and therefore skewness is 
not seriously violated. The second method to investigate 
whether or not skewness and kurtosis were violated involved 
dividing the skewness and kurtosis SPSS values by the 
corresponding standard error to obtain a z-score. If the z-
score fell outside the +/- 3 range, it was determined that 
the skewness or kurtosis was violated. Skewness and 
kurtosis for the outcome values dependent variables being 
punished for his/her actions and showing who is in charge 
or the boss was found to be within the expected ranges. 
Kurtosis was within expected ranges for the outcome values 
dependent variables gaining a tangible reward and reducing 
aversive treatment; however, skewness for these two 
variables was found to be significantly outside of the 
expected range according to the first method of examining 
skewness. Using an alpha level of .001 is considered 
conventional but conservative to evaluate the significance 
of skewness and kurtosis with small to moderate samples 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The skewness for the outcome 
value gaining a tangible reward was .604 outside of the -
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.552 to .552 range for the first method (z-score=2.188 
within the +/-3 range for the second method); the Shapiro-
Wilk test of normality found this to be significant at the 
.001 alpha level (p < .001). The skewness for the outcome 
value reducing aversive treatment was .569 outside of the -
.552 to .552 range according to the first method (z-score = 
2.062 within the +/-3 for the first method); the Shapiro-
Wilk test of normality found this to be significant at the 
.001 alpha level (p < .001).  
 There are many suggestions to correct violations of 
normality such as removing outlier cases and transforming 
variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Square root 
transformations are suggested for positive skews that 
differ moderately from normal (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) 
as is the case here. Square root transformations were 
performed with both the outcome value dependent variables 
of gaining a tangible reward and reducing aversive 
treatment. For the outcome values dependent variable of 
gaining a tangible reward, the new skewness was .256, 
within the -.552 to .552 range (z-score = .928 within the 
+/-3 range). For the outcome values dependent variable of 
reducing aversive treatment, the new skewness was .284, 
within the -.552 to .552 range (z-score = 1.029 within the 
+/- 3 range). Both square root transformations were 
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successful, reducing the skewness to within the expected 
ranges.  
 Third, the test of linearity was investigated in order 
to determine whether the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables were linear. This was 
accomplished through the examination of plots that 
displayed the residuals versus the predicted dependent 
variable. Each dependent variable was examined. The 
dependent variables evidenced points scattered randomly 
around the line originating from the mean of the residuals 
and therefore, did not violate the assumption of linearity. 
Fourth, the assumption of homoscedasticity was examined by 
looking at the residual scatter plot and whether or not the 
points scatter evenly about the line originating from the 
mean of the residuals. The examination of the scatter plots 
of the dependent variables indicated points evenly 
scattered and therefore, there is no violation of 
homoscedasticity. Finally, multicollinearity was also 
assessed due to the moderate correlation among the 
independent variables. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
was examined for this purpose. The VIF for the independent 
variables were all below 10 and therefore, 
multicollinearity is not an issue. In summary, assumptions 
were not violated for the outcome values dependent 
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variables of getting in trouble or being punished and 
showing who is the boss or in charge. The normality 
assumption was violated for both the outcome values 
dependent variables of gaining a tangible reward and 
reducing aversive treatment. Square root transformations 
successfully corrected this violation. All other 
assumptions for these two variables were not violated. Main 
analyses are investigated below.  
 Demographic statistics and the correlation matrix for 
all three predictor variables and the dependent variables 
for research question 4 are presented in Table 29. 
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Table 29  
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics: Three 
Predictors and Outcome Values Dependent Variables 
(Tangible, Reduce Aversive Treatment, Trouble/Punished, 
Boss/In Charge). 
___________________________________________________________ 
   Mean  SD  1  2  3  
Tangible  1.394 .283  .287** .187  .242* 
Avers. Tx. 1.460 .299  .175  -.077 .027 
Trbl/Punish. 2.950 .759  .372*** .134  .147  
Boss/In Charge 2.168 .845  .010  .074  .048 
 
Predictor Var.    
1. C/U  31.947 8.806 ---  .361*** .389*** 
2. I/CP  .888  .330    ---  .396*** 
3. Narcissism .718  .396      ---  
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. N = 76. Avers.Tx. = Aversive Treatment; Trbl/Punish = 
Trouble/Punished. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001  
 Results indicate callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism were 
significantly correlated with the outcome value dependent 
variable of gaining a tangible reward. Callous/unemotional 
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traits were also correlated with the outcome value 
dependent variable of getting in trouble or being punished. 
 The first multiple regression analysis for the outcome 
values research question examined whether the independent 
variables (callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct 
problems, and narcissism) predict the dependent variable 
tangible reward. Stepwise analyses were utilized for this 
multiple regression. Results are presented in Table 30. 
Table 30 
Stepwise Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Outcome Values: Obtaining a Tangible 
Reward 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model  B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1   
C/U   .009  .004  .287  2.578 .012 
Excluded IVs 
I/CP         .805  .424 
Narc.        1.276 .206  
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), 
callous/unemotional. Dependent Variable: outcome value: 
tangible. R² = .082, F (1,74) = 6.647, p = .012. 
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 Stepwise analyses indicate Model 1 to include the 
independent variable callous/unemotional. The variables 
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism were removed 
from the model due to insignificant contribution to the 
variance of outcome value: tangible. This model explains 
8.2% of the variance in value of obtaining a tangible 
outcome. Results indicate Model 1 (including only the 
callous/unemotional variable) significantly predicts the 
value of obtaining a tangible outcome (F = 6.647, p = 
.012). Callous/unemotional traits explain 8.2% of variance 
in the value of obtaining a tangible outcome. Higher levels 
of callous/unemotional traits significantly predict higher 
levels of value in obtaining a tangible outcome. Although 
the regression analysis did not identify narcissism as a 
significant predictor variable, it should not be ruled out 
as important in explaining the outcome value of obtaining 
tangible reward due to its significant relationship/effect 
size (.242, p < .05) with this dependent variable.   
 The second multiple regression analysis for the 
outcome values research question examined whether the 
independent variables (callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) predict the 
outcome values dependent variable: reducing aversive 
treatment. Stepwise analyses were attempted but did not 
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produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then 
attempted with all three independent variables. Results are 
presented in Table 31. 
Table 31 
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Outcome Values: Reducing Aversive 
Treatment 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model  B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1    
C/U  .008  .004  .233   1.812    -.074 
I/CP  -.146 .117  -.161  -1.252 .215 
N  .000  .098  .001   .004  .997 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. R² = .053, F (3,72) = 1.345, p = .267. 
 Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not 
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then 
attempted with all three independent variables. All three 
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in 
non significant results (F = 1.345, p = .267). The model 
explains an insignificant 5.3% of the variance in the 
outcome value of reducing aversive treatment. 
Callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
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and narcissism do not significantly predict the outcome 
value of reducing aversive treatment.  
 The third multiple regression analysis for the outcome 
values research question examined whether the independent 
variables (callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct 
problems, and narcissism) predict the dependent variable 
getting in trouble or being punished. Stepwise analyses 
were utilized for this multiple regression. Results are 
presented in Table 32. 
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Table 32 
Stepwise Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Outcome Values: Getting in 
Trouble/Being Punished 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model  B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1   
C/U   .032  .009  .372  3.448 .001 
Excluded IVs 
I/CP         -.005 .996 
Narc.         .020  .984  
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), 
callous/unemotional. Dependent Variable: outcome value: 
getting in trouble/being punished. R² = .138, F (1,74) = 
11.889, p = .001. 
 
 Stepwise analyses indicate Model 1 to include the 
independent variable callous/unemotional. The variables 
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism were removed 
from the model due to insignificant contribution to the 
variance of outcome value: getting in trouble/being 
punished. This model explains 13.8% of the variance in the 
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value of getting in trouble/being punished. Results 
indicate Model 1 (including only the callous/unemotional 
variable) significantly predicts the value of obtaining a 
tangible outcome (F = 11.889, p = .001). 
Callous/unemotional traits explain 13.8% of variance in the 
value of getting in trouble/being punished. Higher levels 
of callous/unemotional traits significantly predicted 
higher outcome value of not caring about getting in trouble 
or being punished.  
 The fourth multiple regression analyses for the 
outcome values research question examined whether the 
independent variables (callous/unemotional traits, 
impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism) predict the 
outcome values dependent variable: showing who’s the boss 
or who’s in charge. Stepwise analyses were attempted but 
did not produce any significant models. Enter analyses were 
then attempted with all three independent variables. 
Results are presented in Table 33. 
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Table 33 
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Independent 
Variables Predicting Outcome Values: Showing who’s the boss 
or who’s in Charge 
___________________________________________________________ 
Model  B  SEB  β  t  Sig. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1    
C/U  -.003  .013  -.028 -.210 .834 
I/CP  .184   .337   .072 .544  .588 
N  .064   .285  .030  .224  .823 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. R² = .006, F (3,72) = .156, p = .926. 
 Again, stepwise analyses were attempted but did not 
produce any significant models. Enter analyses were then 
attempted with all three independent variables. All three 
variables entered into the regression analyses resulted in 
insignificance (F = .156, p = .926). The model explains an 
insignificant .6% of the variance in the outcome value of 
showing who’s the boss or who’s in charge. 
Callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism did not significantly predict the outcome 
value of showing who the boss is or who is in charge.  
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Follow-up Regression Analyses 
 Follow-up regression analyses originally proposed in 
chapter 3 to be used to examine if the significant effects 
remained after controlling for significantly related 
demographic variables were not included do to the fact that 
the number of participants with data including all three 
significant demographic variables (age, IQ, and gang 
involvement) decreased the sample size to 49 and with 4 
predictor variables to enter into the regression analyses 
it was determined that any results from these analyses 
would be suspect.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the analyses 
presented in chapter 4. Findings are compared to current 
research. Limitations of the current study are discussed 
including recommendations for future research.  
Research Findings 
 As hypothesized, youth who reported more 
callous/unemotional traits also reported significantly less 
empathic concern for others and less perspective taking. 
Callous/unemotional traits predicted these youth reporting 
difficulty in relating to and understanding how another 
person feels. These youth (reporting more 
callous/unemotional traits) unexpectedly reported 
significantly more cognitive dysregulation. Thus youth 
reporting callous/unemotional traits reported difficulty 
with such things as making a plan for important goals, 
putting plans into action, and consider consequences of 
behaviors. Further endorsing callous/unemotional traits did 
significantly predict cognitive dysregulation contrary to 
prediction. Additionally, as hypothesized, this group 
evidencing more callous/unemotional traits reported 
significantly less behavioral inhibition/fear and 
unexpectedly, callous/unemotional traits significantly 
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predicted behavioral inhibition/fear. Therefore, youth 
reporting callous/unemotional traits also reported having 
less fear in situations typical of inducing such a feeling 
such as fear when driving with someone who is speeding or 
fear when entering a darkened room.   
Reporting all three characteristics (IVs) 
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
or narcissism did not significantly predict personal 
distress (the second measure of emotional empathy), or 
behavioral or emotional dysregulation. In other words, 
these variables did not predict negative feelings in 
distressing situations (personal distress), difficulty in 
controlling one’s behaviors (behavioral dysregulation), or 
difficulty in controlling one’s emotions (emotional 
dysregulation).  
Social-cognitive processes associated with increased 
expectations and values associated with the positive 
outcomes of aggressive behavior and decreased expectations 
and values associated with the negative consequences for 
aggressive behavior were examined in terms of psychopathic 
traits. Reporting all three characteristics (IVs) 
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism did not predict positive expectations for 
the outcome of their behaviors (expecting to receive a 
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tangible reward, expecting to reduce aversive treatment, 
and expecting to demonstrate dominance) or decreased 
expectations in terms of the negative consequences of their 
aggressive behaviors (expecting to not get in trouble or 
punished). However, youth reporting more 
callous/unemotional traits did predict the value placed in 
obtaining tangible rewards and not getting in trouble or 
being punished by engaging in aggressive behaviors. These 
youth (reporting callous/unemotional traits) cared about 
being able to obtain the tangible reward as well as not 
getting in trouble or punished for their aggressive 
behaviors. 
Results of the current study should be interpreted 
with caution in terms of the low reliability of the 
variables impulsivity/conduct problems (Cronbach’s Alpha = 
.441), empathic concern (Cronbach’s Alpha = .358), personal 
distress (Cronbach’s Alpha = .278), and perspective taking 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .207).  
Additionally, the practical significance of the 
narcissism variable in predicting or explaining variance in 
both the empathic concern and outcome value of gaining a 
tangible reward should be considered. Although regression 
analyses for both of these variables did not identify 
narcissism as a significant predictor, narcissism 
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demonstrated a significant correlation with these variables 
that could result in a meaningful effect if the sample size 
had been larger.  
Results Compared with Pardini et al. (2003) study 
 The current study was designed to extend the findings 
reported by Pardini, Lochman, and Frick in 2003. The 
current sample investigated aggressive adolescents who were 
served in the community as compared to Pardini’s (2003) 
sample examining adjudicated youth. All of the measures 
used in the 2003 study were included in this study along 
with several updates. For example, the current study used 
the three factor model when examining psychopathic traits 
including callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct 
problems, and narcissism whereas the previous study used 
the two factor callous/unemotional traits and 
impulsivity/conduct problems. Also, the current study 
examined three types of dysregulation including emotional, 
behavioral, and cognitive as compared to the Pardini et al. 
(2003) study, which included only the behavioral 
dysregulation scale. Unique to the current study is an 
updated ICU measure (Frick, 2003). These similarities and 
differences are considered in the interpretation of 
findings with the community-based adolescents (current 
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study) and adjudicated adolescents in residential treatment 
settings (previous study).  
 Several findings were consistent across the samples. 
First, callous/unemotional traits and not 
impulsivity/conduct problems (or narcissism) was 
significantly negatively related to and predictive of both 
empathic concern and perspective taking. 
Callous/unemotional traits did not significantly relate or 
predict behavioral dysregulation. The callous/unemotional 
trait demonstrated a negative relationship with personal 
distress; however, this relationship was not found to be 
significant. Callous/unemotional traits insignificantly 
related to less personal distress or less negative affect 
when confronted with typically stress inducing situations 
such as medical emergencies. Finally, callous/unemotional 
traits were significantly negatively related to and 
predictive of behavioral inhibition/fear. In other words, 
youth reporting callous/unemotional traits also report a 
lack of unpleasant affect in the anticipation of distress 
(behavioral inhibition/fear).   
In contrast, several findings were not consistent 
across community and adjudicated samples. 
Impulsivity/conduct problems were not significantly related 
to or predictive of behavioral dysregulation. Unlike 
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adjudicated youth, community youth reporting 
impulsivity/conduct problems did not report significant 
behavioral dysregulation or the inability to control 
behaviors such as staying in their seat, remaining on-task, 
and refraining from arguing with others. Unlike the Pardini 
et al. (2003) study, neither callous/unemotional traits nor 
impulsivity/conduct problems demonstrated a significant 
relationship with personal distress and neither was 
predictive of personal distress when entered into a 
regression analysis.  
 Regression analyses concerning psychopathic traits and 
social cognitive processes resulted in findings that are 
inconsistent with the Pardini (2003) study. For example, 
Pardini et al., (2003) found that callous/unemotional 
traits were positively related to the outcome expectancy 
variables gaining a tangible reward and showing who is the 
boss or in charge and negatively related to getting in 
trouble/punished. In the community sample, the 
callous/unemotional factor was positively related to all 
outcome expectancy variables but not significantly. In the 
previous study, callous/unemotional traits significantly 
predicted the outcome expectancy of gaining tangible 
rewards, getting in trouble/punished, and demonstrating 
dominance; however, none of these predictions were 
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evidenced in the current study. Callous/unemotional traits 
were not found to be significantly related to or predictive 
of the expectation that aggression would reduce future 
aversive treatment.  
 Consistent with the previous study, 
impulsivity/conduct problems were not found to be 
significantly related to or predictive of any of the 
outcome expectation subscales in the current study.  
 In terms of the outcome values placed on aggressive 
behaviors, the Pardini et al. (2003) study found 
callous/unemotional traits to be positively related to 
outcome values of tangible rewards and demonstrating 
dominance and negatively related to values placed on 
getting in trouble or being punished. The current study 
found callous/unemotional traits to be significantly 
positively related to and predictive of the outcome value 
placed on obtaining tangible rewards and not getting in 
trouble/being punished. It should be noted that the 
interpretation of the findings from the community sample 
and the adjudicated sample concerning the expectation of 
getting in trouble or being punished was similar in that 
both the adjudicated and community samples reporting 
callous/unemotional traits placed more value in not getting 
in trouble or being punished.    
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 Consistent with the Pardini and colleagues (2003) 
study, the impulsivity/conduct problems was not 
significantly related to or predictive of any of the four 
outcome value subscales.   
Results Compared to other Relevant Literature 
 These results contribute to the current literature 
base discussed in chapter 2. First, the current study did 
not appear to support the three factor model of 
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism previously found with community samples of 
elementary students (Frick et al., 2000). Neither the 
impulsivity/conduct problems nor the narcissism trait 
predicted any of the dependent variables. It is especially 
important to note that the impulsivity/conduct problems 
variable was not predictive of behavioral impulsivity as 
found in past research (Loeber et al., 2001; Frick et al., 
1994). The narcissism variable had been included as an 
exploratory variable in order to investigate how it related 
to and/or predicted variables typically associated with 
psychopathic traits. The narcissism variable did not result 
in any significant predictions and even very few 
significant relationships with the dependent variables; 
therefore, from this study, it appears that the narcissism 
factor alone does not distinguish psychopathic traits in 
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this sample of community youth. Narcissism as defined by 
this construct may have meaning for younger children but 
not for adolescents. It may be that the narcissism factor 
is more predictive when combined with the 
impulsivity/conduct problems factor. Previous research 
demonstrated difficulty in discriminating between the 
impulsivity/conduct problems and narcissism variables 
(Caputo et al., 1999; Christian et al., 1997; Frick et al., 
1994) and therefore, it is possible that separating the 
narcissism and impulsivity/conduct problems in the current 
study reduced the predictability of these constructs when 
examined together. Further, it is possible that impulsivity 
may manifest differently in younger community samples. 
 Second, consistent with previous research (Frick et 
al., 2003; Soderstrom et al., 2002; Blair, 1999) the 
current study found a relationship between less empathy and 
callous/unemotional traits. Callous/unemotional traits were 
found to predict low levels of both emotional and cognitive 
empathy. Therefore, the current participants reporting more 
callous/emotional traits also reported less of an ability 
to understand the affective and cognitive state of another 
individual as well as feel the same emotions of another 
(Borke, 1971; 1973) and/or feeling sympathetic or 
compassionate toward another (Feshbach & Roe, 1968). This 
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demonstrates that aggressive community youth reporting 
callous/unemotional traits demonstrate a similar 
relationship with low levels of empathy as adjudicated 
(Pardini et al., 2003), clinic-referred (Frick et al., 
1994) and community (Frick et al., 2003b) youth as well as 
adults (Soderstrom et al., 2002; Hare, 1993). This 
consistent finding has implications for both categorizing 
and planning for interventions with aggressive youth.
 Third, the current study found a connection between 
callous/unemotional traits and cognitive dysregulation that 
was not evidenced in previous research studies. Cognitive 
dysregulation has been related to conduct problems (Loeber 
et al., 2001), and found in both children with psychopathic 
traits and adult psychopaths (Viding, 2004). Similarly, 
researchers have also demonstrated impairments in adult 
psychopaths’ executive functions which control an 
individual’s ability to plan, sustain attention, 
concentrate, and inhibit inappropriate or impulsive 
behaviors (Gorenstein, 1982). However, cognitive 
dysregulation/impulsivity has not specifically related to 
the callous/unemotional trait alone. This finding could be 
suggestive of how callous/unemotional traits are defined in 
community youth. The separation of the impulsivity/conduct 
problems and narcissism traits may have affected the 
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impulsivity/conduct problem variable’s ability to predict 
cognitive dysregulation. Additionally, impulsivity/conduct 
problems were not related to dysregulation as expected. In 
previous research, the presences of both the 
callous/unemotional trait and conduct problems when 
compared with conduct problems alone predicted higher 
levels of impulsivity-hyperactivity or behavioral 
dysregulation (Frick et al., 2003b). The current study 
lacked support for this finding with neither the 
callous/unemotional trait or impulsivity/conduct problems 
predicting behavioral dysregulation. In the current sample 
of community aggressive youth, dysregulation related 
differently than typically expected and warrants further 
study. 
 Fourth, the current study’s finding concerning less 
fear evidenced in those displaying callous/unemotional 
traits is consistent with previous research (Frick et al., 
2003b; Rothbart & Bates, 1998; Kagan & Snidman, 1991) where 
children evidencing callous/unemotional traits also 
demonstrate less behavioral inhibition. Although not 
examined specifically in this study, it is possible as 
previously theorized (Frick & Morris, 2004; Loney et al., 
2003) that these community youth’s reported less 
fear/behavioral inhibition affected their conscience 
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development and/or their ability to develop empathy and 
thus resulted in the reported callous/unemotional traits.   
 Finally, the current study findings offered 
inconsistent evidence for a connection between psychopathic 
traits and social cognitive processes. The current research 
did not demonstrate the connection between 
callous/unemotional traits and the expectation of reward as 
found in previous research (O’Brien & Frick, 1996; Kosson & 
Newman, 1986). However, consistent with previous research 
(Pardini et al., 2003) callous/unemotional traits were 
related to the youth reporting that they cared about 
gaining the tangible reward as well as getting in trouble. 
Interestingly, previous research has suggested that a lack 
of behavioral inhibition may affect a child’s development 
of empathy, leading to an interpersonal style focused on 
the possible rewards of their aggressive acts rather than 
the harm they may cause to themselves or others (Loney et 
al., 2003). While the youth in this study reported a 
relationship between callous/unemotional traits and 
behavioral inhibition, they did not report an expectation 
of obtaining a tangible reward. Therefore, the current 
study may offer clarification for the previous research in 
that community youth reporting callous/unemotional traits 
may not “expect” to receive a tangible reward through their 
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aggressive acts but may place a high value in obtaining the 
reward. In other words, they may not assume they will get 
the reward but they do really care about being able to 
obtain the reward.  
Limitations 
 As in all studies, the current study is not without 
its limitations. One of the first limitations is the use of 
self-report data. Rutter (2005) argues that self-report 
measures draw on subjective judgments of their own 
emotional concern and regard for another’s feelings. It is 
unclear how similarly young people view themselves in 
comparison with the way others view them (Rutter, 2005). 
However, multivariate taxonic analyses suggest that youth 
self-report were significantly more valid than parent and 
teacher reports (Vasey, Kotov, Frick, & Loney, 2005). 
Additionally, Loney and colleagues (2003) offer substantial 
evidence supporting the use of self-report measures to 
assess psychopathic features in adolescents. Evidence 
suggests that there is actually an increase in the 
reliability of child self-report data during adolescence on 
most types of child psychopathology, whereas parent and 
teacher report validity decreases (Kamphaus & Frick, 1996). 
Second, accurate parent report is often unavailable due to 
many out of home placements (Loney et al., 2003). Finally, 
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self-report measures, such as the Antisocial Personality 
Screening Device, have demonstrated success in 
differentiating subgroups of juvenile offenders and 
assessing psychopathic traits in adolescent and young adult 
samples (Caputo et al., 1999; Kruh, Frick & Clements, 2005; 
Loney et al., 2003; Silverthorn, Frick & Reynolds, 2002; 
Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Lynam et al., 1999; Salekin et 
al., 2003).  
 Other cautions include sample considerations. First, 
results can only be applied to community samples that are 
placed in an alternative education setting. Caution should 
be used when considering findings in relation to other 
groups such as incarcerated or adjudicated youth or those 
who live in the community but attend typical educational 
settings. Finally, it should be acknowledge that none of 
these samples are totally pure. That is, a student who is 
now in the community may have been adjudicated or 
incarcerated in the past. Relatedly, although the sample 
size was adequate it was not large. A larger sample may 
have provided stronger effect sizes. Further, a larger 
sample size may have improved internal consistencies for 
some of the variables. For example, impulsivity/conduct 
problems, empathic concern, personal distress, perspective 
taking, behavioral inhibition, and outcome expectancy of 
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gaining a tangible reward were in the low ( < .60) range 
which may have affected the reliability of these variables.  
 This sample included both males and females. While 
there were no gender effects in the sample, researchers are 
unclear how psychopathic traits look in females (Verona & 
Vitale, 2006). Study results need to be interpreted with 
the caution that there is lack of knowledge concerning 
females and psychopathic traits, especially adolescent 
females and psychopathic traits.  
 Finally, although psychopathy has been described as a 
stable, unchangeable, and biologically based personality 
trait that defines those that will be lifelong criminals 
(Pardini et al, 2003). This is not a conclusion that should 
be applied to the participants in this study. The existence 
of psychopathic traits in the youth in this study should 
not be used for diagnosis, adjudication, or sentencing 
(Pardini et al., 2003). Alternatively, the information 
obtained should be used as support for applying the 
construct of psychopathy to youth that may contribute to 
the maintenance of antisocial behavior of some aggressive 
community adolescents.  
Future Research 
 In the future, research focusing on larger samples of 
community-based youth would allow for a more thorough 
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understanding of psychopathic traits in this population. 
Longitudinal studies with community populations would 
greatly improve the understanding of psychopathic traits as 
they manifest through development and allow for a 
connection between the adult psychopathy literature and the 
emerging literature focusing on youth who evidence similar 
psychopathic traits.  
 The current study examined three factors including 
callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, 
and narcissism. It would be important for future research 
to extend the findings of the current study by examining 
two factors, the callous/unemotional trait and the 
combination of the impulsivity/conduct problems and 
narcissism factors, with a community sample of youth 
displaying aggressive behaviors who attend an alternative 
education center in order to further define psychopathic 
traits in this population. 
 Future research may benefit from examining the 
relationship of psychopathic traits and each factor of 
dysregulation including behavioral, emotional, and 
cognitive with various samples in order to investigate if 
the current findings are similarly evidenced in other 
populations.  
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 Continuing to examine psychopathic traits as they 
apply to youth will offer further understanding into the 
nature of these traits in children and what implications 
the findings may have for children demonstrating these 
traits early in life. The more psychopathic traits are 
understood throughout the lifespan, the more information 
will be available to develop interventions that may prevent 
or alter the effects these traits could have when developed 
into adulthood. 
Conclusion 
 To summarize, severe antisocial behavior affects many 
facets of today’s society (Connor, 2002). Not only are 
these behaviors being witnessed in adults but also their 
roots are traced to childhood (Broidy, 2003; Loeber, 1982; 
Waschbusch, 2002). Yet, simply downward extending adult 
criteria to youth is problematic (Lynam, 1997; Salekin et 
al., 2001). Not all antisocials will evidence the trait 
patterns consistent with psychopathy (Gacono et al., 2001; 
Hughes & Gacono, 2004). However, those who show 
psychopathic traits also show severe and violent aggressive 
behaviors, poor treatment outcomes and high rates of 
recidivism (Hare, 1993; Salekin et al., 2004; Serin & Amos, 
1995). In youth, conduct problems and callous/unemotional 
characteristics are associated with characteristics of 
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adulthood psychopathy (Loeber, 1982; Lynam, 1997; Porter et 
al., 2001). This study adds to the developing literature 
clarifying the construct of psychopathy in community 
aggressive youth, including the nature of psychopathic 
traits and the relationship to social-cognitive processes. 
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